Philosophical Issues in Economics
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Bibliography Halevy, E. 1901. La formation du radicalisme philosophique. Paris: Germer Bailliere. Jevons, W. S. 1911. Theory of political economy. 4th edition. London. Macmillan. Layard, R. 2005. Happiness: Lessons from a new science. Allen Lane, London, Great Britain. Meeks, G. 1980. Utility in economics: A survey of the literature. In: Turner, C and Martin, E, (eds). Survey of Subjective Phenomena. Rusell Sage Foundation, New York. Mill. 1968. Utilitarianism. Everyman ed. 1968. Tom Nuttall. “Just don't call it paternalism.” Prospect March 17, 2005. NOTES 1 J.S.Mill, Utilitarianism 2 J.Glover 1990, Utilitarianism and its critics. 3 J.S.Mill ‘utilitarainism’ pg 24. 4 This section refers mostly to the following two works: Sen (1980) and Sen (1999). 5 Sen has an analogy making the distinction between a good description, and a description that is good to give, clearer. We may tell person A who is determined to kill person B that B ran off to the west side of town (when we know that B went off to the east side), in order to save human life – in this case, that of B. Our description in this case is a good one to give (as it saves B’s life), but obviously not a good description. A good description would require that we give an accurate account; it requires that we inform A that B went to the east side of town. (This is a modified account of Sen’s analogy, which Sen seems to have borrowed from Kant’s similar account in a different context). 6 The general argument for the differentiation between good descriptions and descriptions that are good to give is available in Sen (1980), while the more specific claims about the capability approach are available in Sen (1979; Section 4: Basic Capability Equality), and Sen (1999; Chapter 3, p 74-81). 7 Sen (1999, p 74). 9 Broad outline of question provided by Dr. Gay Meeks. 10 This section relies heavily on Sen (1999, 1979); Robeyns (2004a). 11 Bentham (1822). 12 Nozick (1977). 13 Pedro’s welfare determined to be high here because his achieved functioning helps him fulfil his moral/religious duty, which is a state of welfare, independent from the narrow mental state – utility – satisfaction. It helps him achieve his social welfare (as part of the community of Catholic priests, Catholics, etc). 14 Nabaneeta’s welfare is considered high because of reasons similar to the ones in the note above. Feeding her husband is individually satisfying to her in that she thinks her role as a housewife is being fulfilled, but it also satisfies her welfare in terms of how she is judged by her role in the larger village community; she may gain more dignity as a result of keeping her husband healthy (dignity, in the sense of approbation from others in the village, which may further reinforce her personal utility satisfaction). Social welfare can be thus differentiated from purely physical welfare. However, if one views welfare as only physical welfare, then both Pedro’s and Nabaneeta’s welfare would have to listed as ‘low’ in the table above. 15 Sen (1999, p 59) 16 Mill (1861). 17 Sen (1999, Chapter 2 and 6). 18 Sen (1979). 19 Sen (1999, Chapter 3). 20 Mill (1873). 21 One also needs to ask how effective have Sen’s own efforts been to falsify his theory; perhaps more needs to be done on that front. 22 This section relies heavily on Rawls (1999, 1998); Robeyns (2004b); and Pogge, T. 23 Sen (1999, Chapters 2 and 6). 24 Robeyns (2004a). 25 Nussbaum (1988). 26 Nussbaum (1992). 27 Rawls (1988); Robeyns (2004b). Robeyns counters Rawls on this front. 28 Sugden (1986, p 821). Sugden detects the essential a priori evaluation of what is good in Sen, which Sen seems to reject (Sen 1999, Chapter 3). Sen states his approach is open to various interpretations. 29 It is claimed that Marx said: “I [Marx] am not a Marxist.” 30 Sugden (1993); Pogge T; Srinivasan (1994). 31 Sen (1999). Annapurna has to select one person to clear her garden among four candidates. Sen never tells her which of the four she would choose on the basis of his evaluation criteria. (See note 5 for specific reference). 32 Prime Minister of India. 33 Quoted in Hannah Arendt (1994), Essays in understanding 1930-1954. Kohn, Jerome (ed). (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co.) 34 Sugden (1993). 35 Sen (1999, p 86). 36 Ibid. 37 Sen (1979; Concluding Remarks, final paragraph). 38 Many other views of equality and liberty exist. For an (incomplete) overview consult the Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/. 39 As pointed out by Norman 1987 page 143. 40 The Friedmans however, suggest a system in which parents that choose to send their children to private schools receive their tax payment back. They would have to spend this money on a registered private school (Friedmans 1980:168). The aim of the ‘voucher system’ is to increase all parents’ control of the quality and price of their child’s education. According to the Friedmans this system would benefit the poor most (in contrast to the rich whose relative situation would stay nearly the same). Most importantly, this type of system would increase the competition between public and private schools, as well as increase parents’ direct control over their children’s education, similar to that which people have who can afford private schools (Friedmans 1980:160-61). This system does not prevent parents that can, to spend their money on their children’s education (Friedmans 1980:168). According to the Friedmans “Even the very poorest can – and do – scrape up a few extra dollars to improve the quality of their children’s schooling. We suspect add-ons would be about as frequent among the poor as among the rest, though perhaps in smaller amounts” (Friedman 1980:168). Critics reply that this system would not increase equality since rich parents could always add-on more to the voucher than the poor, so rich children would still be sent to more expensive schools (Coons and Sugarman in Friedmans 1980: 167). 42 Freidman, M and R. 1980. Free to choose, pp 128, Secker & Warburg, london 43 Freidman, M and R. 1980. Free to choose, pp132, Secker & Warburg, london 44 Freidman, M and R. 1980. Free to choose, pp 134, Secker & Warburg, london 45 Tawney, R.H 1964. Equality. GeorgeAllen & Unwin Ltd 46 Tawney, R.H 1964. Equality. GeorgeAllen & Unwin Ltd 48 Berlin.I. ‘Liberty’ in Four Essays on Liberty. Oxford University Press. 49 ‘Equality’ in The Stanford Encyclopedia of philosophy. pp 18 50 Berlin.I. ‘Liberty’ in Four Essays on Liberty. Oxford University press. 51 Many proponents argue that one of the capability approach’s main advantages is its all-inclusive informational base, which makes these necessary debates explicit concerning which capabilities to choose and how they should be weighed (Sen 1999:75). 52 These example decisions need not be the case. One of the reasons for such a choice may however, be driven by data limitations, which may facilitate the implementation of the income or human development approach and hamper that of the capability approach. Furthermore, it is arguable that to obtain certain interpersonal comparisons more simple approaches than the basic needs and capability approach are sufficient. 53 The following preference ranking was inspired by Sen’s discussion in Sen 1977:336-7. Subjective preferences is however, not defined the same way. 54 Sen., 1997. 55 Charles K.Wilber, ‘Economics and Ethics’ for the Elgar Handbook to Economic Methodology (eds/) John B.Davis, D.Wade Hands and Uskali Maki 56 The multiple self approach treats non-binding commitment as not differnt from binding commitment . 57 Elias L. Khalil, ‘Sentimental fools: A critique of Amartya Sen’s notion of commitment’ 58 The feel good after feeling you acheive after commiting a benevolent act, or an act based on commitment. 59 Sen (1973) discusses the relation of ‘preference’ to welfare and choice. 60 Return passing allowed once between Master – i.e. if Master Sense has not already chosen his fruit - and person who receives the basket from him. 61 After having too many mangoes, Sense developed a taste aversion of sorts for mangoes. Hence his preference orderings changed. 62 Sen (1977;1997;1999). 63 Note the confusion here (between commitment and self-interest) reflects the kind of bundle available. If there was only one mango, we would know whether Sense’s choice was based on commitment or self-interest. 64 Sen (1997). 65 Chooser dependence is interpreted broadly. If my choice is dependent on the choice of another person, this may constitute chooser dependence as well. Sense’s choice to pass the basket, is based on what he expects Jim’s choice to be. The ultimate outcome of what fruit Sense gets is conditional on Jim’s choice; hence, ‘chooser dependence.’ Also, refer Sen (1997). 66 But the choice is still one motivated by self-interest, since that was what prompted Sense to use strategic nobility to begin with. 67 Hahn (1991). 68 Of course, this may not be the case every time; see table 2.2, outcome 2.3. 69 Sen (1977; 1997). 70 Sen (1994;1997). 71 In the sense of rational, as welfare optimiser (calculated on the basis of self-interest). 72 Hahn (1991) for one such defence. 73 Meeks, Gay Tulip. Refer lecture notes for REP/RIP use. 74 Uncertainty, according to Keynes, is different from improbability. It is critical to be clear about his usage of these terms. For him, the terms “certain and probable describe the various degrees of rational belief about a proposition which different amounts of knowledge authorise us to entertain” (Keynes 1921, p 3). Also refer, Runde (1990); Weintraub (1975). Probability, while it is subjective and can be non-numeric, can still be fixed objectively: “when the facts are given which determine our knowledge, what is probable or improbable in these circumstances has been fixed objectively, and is independent of our opinion” (p 4). Risk assessments would need to be based on probabilities which have been quantified, and these are different from uncertainty. (See Chapter 3, Keynes 1921 for more details). There is no scientific basis for determining uncertainty or quantifying it; it is simply unknown. 75 Question set by Dr. Gay Meeks. Most of my work here benefits from references to works listed in the selected bibliography below. Critical understanding of Keynes’ views on uncertainty was provided by Meeks (1991), and relentless discussions with a friend – Neil Tseng – whose formal training in finance helped me understand Keynes’ concerns better, and enabled me to try to evaluate Keynes on his own terms. I let the reader judge how far I have been successful in this task. 76 Keynes (1931); Keynes (1936). 77 Keynes (1931). “Absolute human needs are absolute in the sense that we feel them whatever the situation of our fellow human beings may be” (p 365). An example would be subsistence needs like that of minimum food in-take. 78 Keynes (1931); also Keynes (1936): after all, why bother with full employment – which is what the general theory is about – if the goal is not to reach an aspired level of economic productivity as soon as possible? 79 Non-economic factors like war, population growth, and scientific/technical progress play an important role, but the purely economic factor is singular: capital accumulation. (Keynes 1931, p 361-363, 373). 80 Relative human needs are needs that “we feel only if their satisfaction lifts us above, makes us feel superior to, our fellows” (Keynes 1931, p 365). 81 Future is used for long-term in this essay, unless specified otherwise. 82 The rate of interest and the marginal efficiency of capital are also important factors in this process, but for Keynes, uncertainty seems most crucial. (Keynes, 1936, Chapter 12; Keynes 1937, p 217-218). 83 Economic man; who is presumed to have a perfect understanding of his self-interest, which is calculated rationally by using complete information. Man, here, is used in the sense of human individual, as opposed to “monkey” as Meeks (1991) puts it! 84 Classical theory, in this essay (keeping with Keynes’ usage), means the theory of the followers of Ricardo; Classical economists are then, followers of Ricardo. (Keynes, 1937, Chapter 1). This is arguable, but since this paper analyses Keynes’ work, I feel it is prudent to follow his classification of ‘Classical economists). 85 Keynes (1937) p 215-216; and Keynes (1936), Chapter 12. (A formal term, in Keynes’ writings, for hoarding wealth in money is liquidity preference). 86 See note 1 on probability. Also, Keynes (1936; 1937). 87 Keynes (1937) p 214-215; Keynes 1936, Chapter 12. 88 Keynes 1936, Chapter 12. 89 Ibid. 90 Ibid. 91 Ibid. 92 Ibid. Other factors that mitigate future uncertainty are included in Sections VII (end) and VIII (beginning) in Chapter 12. 93 Meeks (1991). 94 Keynes 1936, Chapter 24. 95 Shakespeare, Julius Caesar. 96 Dr. Meeks pointed this out as a factor in Kahneman’s discussion. Keynes is also aware of this, though he downplays its significance; refer Keynes (1921) p 18-19. 97 Keynes (1936). 98 Relevant, weight and evidence have precise meanings in Keynes. See Runde (1990); Keynes (1921). 99 Coddington (1982). 100 As Keynes does (Keyens 1936; Chapter 12). 101 Refer Herbert Simon’s 1978 Nobel Lecture. Available at: http://nobelprize.org/economics/laureates/1978/simon-lecture.html 102 Keynes uses these terms – direct and indirect knowledge – specifically; for definitions see Keynes (1921) Chapter 1 and 2. 103 Keynes (1921) p 353. This moral recommendation has also proved itself in politics and the disasters of Nazi and Bolshevik totalitarianism. 104 Keynes (1931). Though of course, one may challenge that small development projects may slow down the rate of progress. This in turn may aggravate the economic problem instead of alleviating it. Would it not be better to start a continent-wide HIV/AIDS eradication programme rather than have limited village level projects for the same purpose? It is crucial to keep these issues in mind. 105 Arendt (1998). 106 Pigou on Keynes’ General Theory, quoted in Skidelsky (2004). 107 See J.G.Tulip Meeks, ‘Utility in Economics’ in Surveying Subjective phenomena (eds.). Charles Turner and Elizabeth Martin. 108 We actually might prefer shorter durations of pain rather than tapering it off, as the same time involved in the tailoring off might be spent in the relief being experienced to be free of the pain. 109 The peak end rules dictates that ‘adding a period of pain to an aversive episode will actually improve its remembered utility if it lowers the peak-end average’. 110 Diener et al 1999, Lykken and Tellegen 1996, Myers and Diener 1995 111 Headey and Wearing 1992, Frederick and Loewenstein 1999) 112 J.G.Tulip meeks, ‘Utility in Economics’ in Surveying Subjective phenomena (eds.) Charles Turner and Elizabeth Martin 113 Tom Nutall writing in the Prospect (2005), has expressed a similar concern “….Layard seems to cling to what for him should be an outdated fear of paternalism, hesitating when the logic of his argument points to illiberalism”. Yüklə 402,29 Kb. Dostları ilə paylaş:
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