Philosophical Issues in Economics

All ‘theoretical’ poverty judgements as laid out in the table above, are theory-laden since the descriptions of reality they provide must be interpreted in light of the theory they are based upon. All of these theories are to an extent value-laden. Values come into play while deciding how to distinguish the poor from the non-poor. In the case of the income and human development approach, the poverty line or percentage to make this distinction has to be decided upon. The basic needs and capability approach are based on more flexible informational bases that do not predetermine which basic needs or capabilities should be taken into account and to what extent. The basic needs tend to be relatively agreed upon, including food, shelter, water, sanitation facilities and education. Their weight and exact definition depends on the characteristics of the individuals and society. Basic capabilities are also relatively agreed upon and can be derived from the basic needs (amounting to such capabilities as health and freedom). More extensive capability sets tend to differ depending on the context and aims of the evaluation.⁵¹

The decisions of how to distinguish the poor from the non-poor and what basic needs or capabilities to include and how to weigh them are all essentially answered by the same question, namely ‘What do people need to live a decent life?’ In essence this question is itself value-laden (for example: what is decent?). Dasgupta (2004) however argues, that the answer is to a large extent a consensus. Most people would agree that humans need amongst other things; food, shelter and access to health care and education (Dasgupta 2004:43). The approaches essentially interpret the answer to this question differently. The income and human development approach attempt to do this by calculating these needs into an amount of income or percentage of a population with access to and command over certain things, which are deemed to be a fair representation of ‘poorness’. The basic needs and capability approaches extend the informational basis in reply to this question and will vary between situation, time and place. In all of these approaches values necessarily play a part in the decision of where to draw the line between the poor and the non-poor. The degree to which the approaches are value-laden however, varies. When there is clear agreement on the basic needs of humans, these can be regarded as value-laden facts, varying in their degree of ‘value-laden-ness’. The more debatable basic needs and capabilities can be regarded as more heavily value-laden, moving towards fact-laden values, with on the end of the spectrum subjective personal poverty judgements, which can be considered value judgements.

The choice between poverty definitions

Inherent to making a poverty judgement is the decision-making process concerning which definition and essentially which theory, one chooses. This decision is primarily directed by one’s objective(s) with regard to the poverty judgement. Essentially the approach is chosen that best represents the selection of reality one is attempting to make explicit. Hence, if a person wants to make a comparison between a number of countries’ poverty levels, the income or human development approach may be the most appropriate. However, if someone is trying to obtain an extensive representation of poverty in a particular place, the capability approach may be chosen.⁵² Hence these choices are not necessarily value driven.

Poverty judgements and values
Are poverty judgements value-laden? Closely related, Sen (1980) asserts that poverty is not a value judgement since, as has been discussed above, value interests are not the sole possible motivation underlying selection involved in poverty description (Sen 1980:366). Moreover, Sen stresses that even if value interests were the only motivation, poverty description would only reflect socially held value judgements rather than be a value judgement themselves (Sen 1980:366).
This, however, does not directly answer the question whether poverty judgements are value-laden. From the preceding discussions it is clear that poverty judgements based on theoretical poverty definitions are theory-laden, since they must be interpreted in light of the chosen theory underlying the chosen approach. The chosen approach necessarily reflects socially held values and the following poverty judgement is therefore to varying degrees necessarily value-laden.

Additionally, poverty judgements can be made on the basis of personally motivated choices as Orshansky’s aphorism puts “Poverty, like beauty, lies in the eyes of the beholder” (in Sen 1980:366). They can also be, as Sen (1980) assumes, based on both a prescriptive view of description as well as a subjective view of prescription, which would lead to poverty as a value judgement. Sen’s interpretation of subjective valuation seems too narrow. Arguably these types of poverty judgements can (in)directly be influenced by the same theoretical considerations as discussed above, depending on the person. As previously asserted most people do agree that humans need certain things to live a ‘decent life’. If one defines the situation in which a person lacks some of these basic needs as poverty, arguably many people would agree to an extent on the existence and content of the concept poverty.

In sum, this essay has shown how the assertion that “poverty is a value judgement” is misleading. Rather I would contend that poverty judgements are theory-laden as well as to varying degrees value-laden. Additionally, it has been contended that there is a high degree of agreement on the basic needs of people. It can therefore be asserted that poverty judgements are often to varying degrees based on value-laden facts.

Bibliography

Dasgupta, P. 2004. “What do Economists Analyse: Values or Facts?” forthcoming.

Myrdal, G. & P. Streeten (ed.). 1958. Value in Social Theory: A selection of essays on methodology. London: Routledge & Kegal Paul.

Popper, K. 1959. The Logic of Scientific Discovery. London: Hutchington & Co.
Putnam, H. 2002. The Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy and Other Essays. Cambridge, Massachussetts: Harvard University Press.
Sen, A. 1970. Collective Choice and Social Welfare. San Francisco: Holden-Day, Inc.
Sen, A. 1980. “Description is Choice” in Oxford Economic Papers, Vol. 32, No. 3, pages 353-369.
Sen, A. 1982. Choice, Welfare and Measurement. Oxford: Blackwell.
Sen, A. 1999. Development is Freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

V. Preference, choice and self-interest
Amartya Sense is making a reasoned choice of a piece of fruit from a basket passed round at a dinner party. Filling in background circumstances as required, catalogue a range of bases on which his selection might be made and examine what role, if any, self-interest could be held to play in each of them. Do you think that there is a clear relationship between choice, preference and self-interest?

Essay 1
(by Mariah Mansvelt Beck)