Neg China Reaction da 1NC

Arab Gulf

1NC

American influence in Arab Gulf high now

Pellerin 7/29

(Cheryl Pellerin, science writer for DoD News, 7/29/15 “Carter: Nuclear Deal Limits Iran, Not the Defense Department” accessed 7/31/15 from http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=129368 LC)

WASHINGTON, July 29, 2015 – The U.S.-Iran nuclear agreement limits Iran’s ability to produce a nuclear bomb but puts no limits on the Defense Department or the United States, Defense Secretary Ash Carter told a Senate panel today.¶ The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action reached in Vienna this month must receive congressional approval before it is implemented.¶ Carter and Army Gen. Martin E. Dempsey, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee on U.S. interests and the military balance in the Middle East.¶ When implemented, Carter said, the agreement will effectively cut off Iran’s pathways to fissile material for a nuclear bomb, but it places no limitations on the Defense Department.¶ No U.S. Limitations¶ “It places no limits on our forces, our partnerships and alliances, our intensive and ongoing security cooperation, or on our development and fielding of new military capabilities -- capabilities we will continue to advance,” he told the panel.¶ The department will continue to maintain a strong military posture to deter aggression, bolster the security of Israel and other allies and friends in the region, ensure freedom of navigation in the Gulf, check Iran’s malign influence, and degrade and ultimately defeat the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, Carter added.¶ “We're also continuing to advance our military capabilities that provide all options, as [President Barack Obama] has directed, should Iran walk away from its commitments under this deal,” he said.¶ Carter called the Iran agreement is an important step that keeps Iran from getting a nuclear weapon in a comprehensive and verifiable way.¶ “Once implemented,” he added, the agreement “will … remove a critical element of risk and uncertainty from the region.”¶ Other Areas of Concern¶ In his remarks, Dempsey said that, if followed, the Iran deal “addresses one critical and the most dangerous point of friction with the Iranian regime. But … there are at least five other malign activities which give us and our regional partners concern.”¶ These, he said, include ballistic missile technology, weapons trafficking, the use of surrogates and proxies to naval mines and undersea activity, and malicious activity in cyberspace.¶ “The negotiating deal does not alleviate our concerns in those five areas,” he said, “[or] change the military options at our disposal. And in our efforts to counter the Iranian regime's malign activities, we will continue to engage our partners in the region to reassure them and to address these areas.”¶ The agreement’s successful negotiation is one part of the broader U.S. foreign and defense policy, Carter said, noting the Middle East remains important to U.S. national interests.¶ “As a result,” the secretary said, “the Department of Defense is committed to confronting the region’s two principal security challenges: Iran and ISIL.”¶ Describing his recent trip to the Middle East, Carter said he spoke with some of the men and women in uniform who are carrying out the Middle East strategy to let them know that the department is continuing full speed ahead, standing with its friends, standing up to ISIL, and standing against Iran’s malign activities.¶ “On ISIL … we have the right strategy in place, built on nine synchronized lines of effort to achieve ISIL’s lasting defeat. But we continue to strengthen execution,” Carter said.¶ Working with Partners¶ In Iraq and elsewhere, the department is working with partners on the ground and in a global coalition to enable capable and motivated ground forces to win back Iraq’s sovereignty and peace in its own territory, he added.¶ “I saw several parts of this effort last week and spoke with some of our partners on the ground. We're headed in the right direction in this counter-ISIL effort: we've made some progress but we need to make more,” he told the panel.¶ “If Iran were to commit aggression, our robust force posture ensures we can rapidly surge an overwhelming array of forces into the region,” the secretary added, “leveraging our most advanced capabilities, married with sophisticated munitions that put no target out of reach.”¶ Iran and its proxies still present security challenges, Carter said, noting Iran’s support of Hezbollah and the Assad regime in Syria, its contribution to disorder in Yemen and its hostility and violence toward Israel.¶ The secretary said he made it clear last week in Israel, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Iraq that the department will continue to meet its commitments to friends and allies in the region, especially Israel, and continue to build on and enhance such cooperation.¶ “I also made clear that we will continue to maintain our robust regional force posture ashore and afloat, which includes tens of thousands of American personnel and our most sophisticated ground, maritime, air and ballistic-missile defense assets,” he said.¶ “Our friends understand, despite our differences with some of them about the merits of this deal,” Carter added, “that we have an enduring commitment to deterrence and to regional security.”

Plan makes way for Chinese-Iranian partnership to make Iran a regional hegemon

Singh 7/21

(Michael Singh, the Lane-Swig Senior Fellow and Managing Director at The Washington Institute 7/21/2015 “The Sino-Iranian Tango” Accessed 7/28/15 from https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2015-07-21/sino-iranian-tango LC)

As a recently released military white paper makes clear, China is seeking to expand its forces’ ability to “effectively secure China’s overseas interests.” This has manifested in Chinese warships’ participation in counterpiracy missions in the region, the People’s Liberation Army Navy’s evacuation of thousands of Chinese nationals from Libya in 2011—the first operation of its kind by China—and Beijing’s reported plan to establish a naval facility in Djibouti. As Beijing seeks to expand its power and influence, Iran is a logical partner. It is the only large, powerful state in the region not already allied with the United States, and it sits astride land and sea routes of vital importance to Beijing. Little wonder, therefore, that in October 2014, the Chinese defense minister publicly expressed Beijing’s desire to expand military ties with Iran (a sentiment Iran has reciprocated by inviting China to expand its naval presence in Iran), and that China’s top counterterrorism official recently visited Iran to seek expanded cooperation against extremists.¶ The growth in Sino-Iranian economic and security ties could prove challenging for the United States. China and Iran both appear committed to chipping away at the existing U.S.-led international order. China has established regional security and economic institutions that compete with those dominated by the United States and its allies, and Iran has vocally challenged the authority of the UN Security Council and U.S. hegemony in the Middle East. Furthermore, both enjoy alliances of convenience with Russia, which similarly competes with the United States. ¶ Increased Sino-Iranian cooperation would not be a mere diplomatic nuisance, however. As sanctions on Iran lifted, China has the capacity—through military assistance, economic investment, and the transfer of technology—to facilitate Iran’s rise as a regional power. Given Iran’s record of working through proxies, Chinese assistance could also indirectly strengthen nonstate actors supported by Iran. And Iran can offer China a strategically important foothold in the Middle East, should it choose to challenge U.S. influence there.

Iranian hegemony in the Middle East causes nuclear Armageddon—proximity to Tel Aviv makes strikes unstoppable

Nikolic 15

(Andrew, member of Australian Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security, and the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defense and Trade January 6, 2015 “Iran: still a pressing danger” in The Strategist Australian Strategic Policy Institution Accessed July 28, 2015 from http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/iran-still-a-pressing-danger/ LC)

The first is the question of whether the ‘Iranian leopard can change its spots’. Iran has played—and continues to play—a resolute and determined long game. For more than a decade it has been steadfastly unwilling to compromise or cooperate with the international community. Why would it? It hates the liberal and free West, and consciously eschews more than essential minimal interaction with it.¶ Notwithstanding Iran’s confrontation of daesh, nothing has emerged in recent times to suggest any prospect of the leopard changing. Make no mistake, Iran has a deep investment in its nuclear program and a determination to leverage the anticipated benefits of that investment. To think otherwise is for the West to bury its head in the sand—to the further advantage of an established Islamic State, and one which is potentially far more dangerous than its much-publicised namesake.¶ The second issue is that of an ‘opportune smokescreen’, behind which Iran has advanced its nuclear ambitions. This is due to the competing regional strategic distractions of Iraq, Afghanistan, and now, daesh. Each has—and continues—to soak up Western blood, treasure and resolve, now closer to evaporation than at any other time since September 11.¶ Meanwhile, Iran’s leadership has pursued its nuclear ambitions, unfettered by the West’s democratic challenges of factional division and dissenting public opinion. That situation is now further exacerbated by an increasingly constrained US President, with less than 700 days left in office, a frustrated domestic and international agenda, and diminishing executive authority, both symbolically and practically.¶ It’s been a good time for Iran to fly under the international radar of scrutiny, at a time when there should have been increased, not diminished, transparency and accountability. Near-term strategic priorities have crowded out a supremely-important dilemma.¶ Lastly, to the matter of the scale and dimension of the looming threat.¶ The threat posed by daesh is grim but at its ‘high-water mark,’ their barbarity and mayhem is counted in thousands. However, the threat now posed by a nuclear malevolent Iran is emphatically much worse, with the resulting chaos almost unimaginable in its wake, turbulence and duration.¶ As the crow—or more aptly, the missile—flies, the distance between Tehran and Tel Aviv is just under 1600 kilometres (approximately 1000 miles). Hence, the time from launch to impact is brief; potentially mere minutes to Armageddon and the worst crisis the world has seen since 1945. The ripples and ramifications of such an event would extend to the end of the 21st century.¶ No, Iran hasn’t gone away; nor will its strategic aspirations be dissipated by a near-term and welcome outbreak of common sense. To date, containment hasn’t worked. Nor have the much-anticipated and variously described—‘useful/helpful/intense/continuing’—negotiations in Geneva, designed to break the impasse of 12 years of Iranian delay and obfuscation.¶ The self-imposed deadline of November 24, 2014 to resolve the standoff has passed. An unnamed member of Tehran’s delegation was quoted in recent days as saying that uranium enrichment and how to remove sanctions remain as sticking points. Another seven months of talks to follow. More delay and obfuscation as Iran’s nuclear program develops into an even more serious threat to regional and international security¶ In the end, Iran is neither just a Middle East nor a US problem. Rather, it’s a pressing global concern, to which a global collective solution must be found.

UQ

No Chinese influence now

Sun 3/11/15

(Degang, professor and deputy director, Middle East Studies Institute, Shanghai International 3/11/15 “China’s Soft Military Presence in the Middle East” accessed 7/31/15 http://www.mei.edu/content/map/china%E2%80%99s-soft-military-presence-middle-east LC)

At present, the United States has deployed approximately 50,000 personnel and established military bases in the six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, Turkey, Djibouti, and Afghanistan. Its military influence is unparalleled. Britain and France have built military bases and deployed about 3,000 personnel in Cyprus, the UAE, and Djibouti. Their military presence ranks second to that of the United States. Russia and Japan constitute a third tier, having deployed about 200 personnel to Syria and Djibouti, respectively, and each having one military base. In contrast, China, India, and South Korea have not established military bases in the Middle East, though they do have convoy fleets and peacekeeping forces in the region and in the waters off Somalia.

After the Iran nuclear deal, US military presence deters Iran from dominance of the Arab Gulf

Goldenberg 6/18/15

(Ilan Goldenberg, senior fellow and director of the Middle East Security Program at the Center for a New American Security, 6/18/15 “An American Strategy for Making the Iran Deal Work” accessed 7/29/15 from http://nationalinterest.org/feature/american-strategy-making-the-iran-deal-work-13139 LC)

First, the United States should increase its efforts to counter Iran’s regional surrogates and proxies. Such an approach is intended to deter Iranian meddling in the region by signaling to Iran’s leadership that Iran is not ascendant in the region and that if it pushes too far it risks a direct conflict with the United States. These actions would also signal to America’s Arab partners that the United States is not abandoning them. The United States could for example increase interdictions of Iranian weapons shipments, improving intelligence cooperation with its partners, and pursue more aggressive joint covert actions against Iranian supported terrorism.¶ At the same time, the United States should maintain its current conventional military presence in the Middle East after an agreement to deter bad Iranian behavior and reassure partners. The United States could also consider increased arms sales to the gulf states. Ideally, these should focus on defensive capabilities such as minesweepers and ballistic missile defense.

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Post-Iran Deal it’s even more key that the United States maintain a strong presence—plan clears the way for Sino-Iranian partnership

Rosenberg and Sullivan 7/31/15

(Elizabeth, a Senior Fellow and Director of the Energy, Economics and Security Program at the Center for a New American Security, and Alexander, associate fellow in the Asia-Pacific Security Program, 7/31/15 “Why China likes the Iran deal” CNN accessed 7/31/15 from http://www.cnn.com/2015/07/31/opinions /rosenberg-sullivan-china-iran-deal/ LC)

True, some forms of China-Iran cooperation are positive for U.S. interests. For example, regional economic development, including in Iran, should be welcomed if it is done according to international best practices and lifts people out of poverty. Likewise, if China can, with Iran's help, contribute to Afghanistan's stability, so much the better.¶ Other forms of China-Iran cooperation, however, have the potential to do serious harm to U.S. policy in the Middle East and beyond. An Iran that is overly dependent on China will bolster Beijing's efforts to create alternative political forums that exclude Washington. Meanwhile, if the United States does not take a prominent role in Afghanistan's peaceful reconstruction and the development of Eurasia more broadly, it will cede influence in a pivotal region.¶ Ultimately, China's ties to Iran will become an important theater of future U.S.-China relations. The best way to balance China vis-à-vis Iran is to keep Sino-American interests in the Middle East constructive, not competitive. One way would be for the United States to consider sending its own companies into Iran to engage in commercial diplomacy. And it should also seek opportunities for regional security cooperation with China but channel it into inclusive multilateral frameworks.¶ Taking such steps would help the United States promote stability in the region, solidify its leadership and ensure that China and Iran both see their respective strategic relationships with the United States as more important than the one that they have with each other.

Removal of US military presence from the Arab Gulf causes fill-in by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army—they will want to ensure Chinese oil interests

Thompson 12

(Loren, Former Deputy Director of the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University “What Happens When America No Longer Needs Middle East Oil?” Forbes 12/3/2012 accessed July 28, 2015 http://www.forbes.com/sites/lorenthompson/2012/12/03/what-happens-when-america-no-longer-needs-middle-east-oil/ LC)

If you trace your finger on a globe northward over the pole from the U.S. Navy’s main naval base on the West Coast, you’ll discover that the entrance to the Persian Gulf is roughly on the opposite side of the world. The Gulf is so far away that prior to World War Two, few Americans thought there was any reason to visit the sparsely populated region, much less establish a permanent military presence there.¶ But after the war ended, world demand for oil surged while America gradually exhausted most of its easily-tapped domestic reserves. As U.S. oil companies joined the global search for new sources, geologists came to believe that two-thirds of the world’s exploitable oil reserves and one-third of its natural gas lay under a handful of states bordering on the Persian Gulf. As a result, the security of Gulf oil states became of paramount concern to U.S. military planners.¶ Now, that could be changing. The latest edition of the International Energy Agency’s World Energy Outlook says America will surpass Saudi Arabia as the biggest oil producer in 2020 and become self-sufficient in energy by 2030 as new drilling technologies, alternative fuels and declining consumption reduce the need to import oil. The U.S. may continue to use oil from Canada, Venezuela and other nearby countries if prices are competitive, but the IEA predicts Asian nations will end up consuming 90% of the oil produced in the Persian Gulf.¶ That’s good news for America, however it could have ramifications that are not good for the rest of the world. If the United States no longer needs access to Middle East oil under any foreseeable circumstances, then the priority Washington assigns to the region will plummet. Many analysts believe that a unified global pricing structure for fossil fuels will keep America engaged, but with U.S. spot prices for natural gas currently running at a fraction of what the fuel costs in Europe and East Asia, it appears global pricing isn’t so integrated after all.¶ Even if it were, Washington’s options for insulating U.S. energy markets from global price swings are multiplying as domestic production grows. If you know the history of global oil in the years before World War Two, then you realize there is nothing new about America enjoying energy independence as Asia worries about its own needs. What definitely is new, though, is that in the near future there might be no western nation capable of or willing to police the Persian Gulf.¶ Britain carried that burden from the late 1700s until World War Two, but its circumstances were so diminished in the war’s aftermath that it soon exited all of its military bases “East of Suez.” As Britain receded in the Middle East, America’s role there grew — especially after successive energy crises engineered by members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries alerted Washington to its growing dependence on foreign oil. So the Pentagon became accustomed to assuring the security of oil passing through the Strait of Hormuz, maintaining a continuous naval presence in and around the Gulf while periodically deploying ground forces to protect fragile oil-producing states.¶ Nothing lasts forever, though, and now a combination of energy independence and economic necessity may lead Washington to become more insular in its outlook, the same way London did after the war. With less need for foreign oil and an increasingly urgent requirement to rein in federal borrowing, it doesn’t take a genius to figure out where the political system will be inclined to cut spending. It will be in distant places that have ceased having an impact on how elections turn out.¶ With the prospect of OPEC-induced energy shortages off the table, at least in America, political leaders are sure to begin asking why the U.S. Navy is carrying the burden of making sure China has secure sources of oil. The answers they get from Pentagon strategists aren’t likely to be well received in a nation where economic growth has slowed to a crawl due in no small part to Chinese mercantilism.¶ So there’s a real possibility that Washington will go through the same East-of-Suez debate that London did in the 1960s. The Obama Administration’s new Asia-Pacific military posture may be the first, tentative sign that America is losing its enthusiasm for securing Middle East oil supplies. Of course, everyone in the administration will vigorously reject any such interpretation. But just for fun, let’s ask the question of who wins and who loses if America decides it’s had enough of being the policeman on the beat in the Persian Gulf.¶ The biggest losers would be the Arab oil states grouped in the Gulf Cooperation Council, most of which are monarchies kept in power by a combination oil dollars and American military power. Despite their oil revenues, none of these countries except Saudi Arabia has the wherewithal to defend itself against military pressure from Iran if America leaves the stage – or for that matter from Iraq, which has repeatedly laid claim to oil fields in Kuwait and other nearby states. The vacuum created by an American departure would force nations like Bahrain and Qatar to seek new military protectors, either by submitting to the influence of bigger regional powers or by reaching out to China.¶ The second category of losers would be the economies of East Asia, which the International Energy Agency says will be the main consumers of Persian Gulf oil in the years ahead. China, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan are heavily dependent on the flow of oil passing through the Strait of Hormuz, and yet do little to assure that flow is not disrupted by local tensions. If America pulls out of the Gulf, the nations of East Asia will either have to play a bigger military role in the Middle East, or find other sources of oil. America might have sufficient new-found reserves of fossil fuel to supply Japan and South Korea in an emergency, but concern about access to Persian Gulf oil would undoubtedly exacerbate tensions over who owns contested oil reserves in the South China Sea and elsewhere.¶ Israel too would likely be a big loser. Washington spends billions of dollars each year subsidizing the security of the Jewish state. The reason that isn’t controversial even though Americans usually want to cut foreign aid ahead of every other type of federal spending is because it is hard to separate securing Israel from securing Middle East oil. The same U.S. military forces and programs that help protect Israel from Iranian missiles and Islamist terror groups also protect Arab oil-producing states. But if America’s role in securing the oil were to wane, it would be harder to ignore the cost of defending Israel, and that might force Jerusalem to become more self-sufficient.¶ There would be plenty of other losers too, from the nations that depend on a steady flow of Middle East oil to stabilize global energy prices to the shippers that count on the Fifth Fleet for protection to the local companies that help sustain U.S. forces in the region. No doubt about it, a lot of players dependent on America’s military presence in and around the Persian Gulf would be hurt if America went home. But there would be winners, too.¶ One big winner would be Iran, because it would no longer find its regional pretensions blocked by America’s military. Although there are ethnic and religious differences separating Persians from their Arab neighbors on the western side of the Gulf, Iran’s big population and economic resources over time could come to dominate the region. Homegrown terrorist groups might also thrive in America’s absence, although Arab governments could feel freer to deal with them in the absence of American concepts about freedom and justice. The biggest winner of all, though, might be China’s Peoples Liberation Army, which would have a compelling reason for extending its presence outside of East Asia in order to secure the Middle Kingdom’s most important foreign sources of petroleum.¶ If you’ve stayed with me up this point, you’re probably thinking something like, “Gee, this energy independence thing sure has a lot of potential downside.” Well you’re right — if it becomes an excuse for pulling the joint force out of the Persian Gulf. But that doesn’t Youmean it won’t happen, because despite all the possible drawbacks, U.S. taxpayers would still benefit hugely from a scaling back of U.S. security commitments in the Middle East if that were accompanied by real self-sufficiency in energy. How much would they benefit? Potentially by a hundred billion dollars or more in annual budget savings as the military was downsized for a more limited role on the far side of the world.¶ If that sounds fanciful, then go read what the International Energy Agency says about America’s rapidly improving energy outlook — and try to keep in mind that the need for Persian Gulf oil is the main reason why the U.S. military showed up in the Middle East after having almost no role there for the first two centuries of the Republic’s history.

Gulf presence deters aggression from Iran and maintains regional stability via allies

Entous 14

(Adam, National Security Correspondent, Wall Street Journal, “Hagel Assures Gulf Allies of Continued U.S. Military Presence, 5/14/14, http://www.wsj.com/articles/ SB10001424052702304547704579561321483535490 accessed 7/29/15)

∂ JEDDAH, Saudi Arabia—U.S. Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel told Saudi Arabia and other Gulf allies on Wednesday that the U.S. would maintain its military presence in the region to deter Iran even if negotiations to curb its nuclear program are successful.∂ ∂ Negotiators will begin drafting terms of a final agreement on the future of Tehran's nuclear program this week in Vienna. A deal would end a decade-long standoff between Tehran and the West and put into place greater assurances that Iran won't be able to build a bomb, in return for a major easing of Western sanctions.∂ ∂ The U.S. pulled its troops out of Iraq and has sought to shift its focus to Asia, unnerving Gulf states worried about Iran's regional ambitions.∂ ∂ Addressing a meeting of the Gulf Cooperation Council in Jeddah, Mr. Hagel said the U.S. would "under no circumstances trade away regional security" for concessions from Iran over its nuclear program.∂ ∂ "While our strong preference is for a diplomatic solution, the United States will remain postured and prepared to ensure that Iran does not acquire a nuclear weapon and that Iran abides by the terms of any potential agreement," Mr. Hagel said at the Conference Palace.∂ ∂ "No matter the outcome of the nuclear negotiations, the United States remains committed to our Gulf partners' security," Mr. Hagel added. Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates make up the regional bloc.∂ ∂ The main area of disagreement in the nuclear talks continues to be the scope of Iran's uranium-enrichment facilities, which could be used to produce weapons-grade fuel for a bomb, according to U.S. and European officials.∂ ∂ Advertisement∂ ∂ The U.S. military currently has 35,000 military personnel in the region, including the Navy's 5th Fleet and advanced missile defense systems.∂ ∂ The Pentagon wants to strengthen its Gulf allies, and the GCC as a whole, to enable them to assume more responsibility for regional security. But tensions between member states, particularly Qatar and Saudi Arabia, have hampered those efforts.∂ ∂ Saudi Arabia, the U.A.E. and Bahrain withdrew their ambassadors from Qatar in March to protest Doha's support for the Muslim Brotherhood, a group labeled a "terrorist organization" by Riyadh and Abu Dhabi. Subsequent mediation by Kuwait has calmed the unusually public quarrel but deep differences remain.∂ ∂ In his address, Mr. Hagel called on the GCC to step up its role in the region, from assuming command of a combined maritime force in the Gulf to increasing cyberdefense cooperation with the U.S.∂ ∂ Israel and Saudi Arabia are calling for a complete dismantling of Iran's nuclear installations so the country couldn't maintain the capacity to build nuclear weapons.∂ ∂ Mr. Hagel will also visit Israel this week to tell its leaders that the U.S. remains committed to its security.

Impacts

Iran’s nuclear ambitions trigger an arms race

Shabaneh 6/15/15

(Dr. Ghassan, associate professor of international studies at Marymount Manhattan College in New York City, 6/15/15 “The Implications of a Nuclear Deal with Iran on the GCC, China, and Russia” Al Jazeera Centre for Studies accessed 7/29/15 from http://studies.aljazeera.net/ResourceGallery/media/ Documents/2015/6/14/20156148505316734Iran.pdf LC)

The Lausanne framework on Iran's nuclear ambitions, if implemented, is likely to change¶ many notions of the prevailing balance of power in the Middle East and to usher in a new¶ arms race among many aspiring regional powers in the Arab World and beyond. Signing¶ a nuclear deal with Iran without a careful review of the military and security landscape of the region is likely to cause an unprecedented tension between the U.S. and many of its¶ Arab allies and threatens a stormy transition of the unipolar system to an era of¶ imbalance and military competition among all the ambitious powers in the area: China,¶ Iran, Russia and Turkey. All the aforementioned powers are waiting to replace any¶ poorly planned American departure from the region. Thus, it is the responsibility of the¶ U.S. to slow the demise of the unipolar system in the Middle East and usher in a peaceful¶ transition of power to avoid a bloody and a complicated one by clarifying the nature and¶ the mechanisms of a future nuclear deal with Iran.¶

Iranian heg causes a US strike and regional arms race

Charbel 10

(Bechara Nassar, June 4, taught @ American University in Beruit, Middle East Online, http://www.middle-east-online.com/english/opinion/?id=39390, Accessed 7/2) CM

Second, we are confronted with Iranian hegemony over the region. With its nuclear program, Iran could be encouraged to follow a more hard-line and active foreign policy in the region. From observation, it has become evident that the Islamic Republic has gained place in new negotiations in the region—ranging from Iraq, Palestine, Lebanon and Syria, because of its large presence in the Arab region, through its alliances with Hezbollah and Hamas in Damascus. It has gained this influence at the expense of the role of Gulf countries—especially Saudi Arabia—that always played an influential role in the process of forming Middle East policies. There is also the likelihood of a military strike. In case a military strike is carried out against Iran, Gulf countries in alliance with the United States would find themselves at the forefront of this conflict because of the presence of military bases on their lands. In addition, there is concern for oil security, which is the main artery for Gulf countries. In this regard, recent exercises by Iranian Revolutionary Guards in the Arab Gulf and Strait of Hormuz deserve to be noticed. In addition to direct threat of war or sanctions on Iran, the above-mentioned reasons could also lead to a scenario of an escalation in arms race in the Gulf. However, it is not farfetched that a nuclear race ensues, if Iran is able to continue with its nuclear project due to lack of international resolve and its exceptional capabilities in negotiating to the very brink of the abyss. A nuclear race of this kind would drain the potential of Gulf Arab countries and Iran alike. It will impede development in countries, where most of the population is young and in need of jobs. It will pit the region in the face a dangerous sectarian division that would make the mission of the moderate forces impossible and would make the calls for dialogue futile and useless.