Gonzaga Debate Institute 2010 Scholars Nuclear K’s

No Impact – Doesn’t Turn Case – Prolif

Multiple alt causes to proliferation
Bowman 8 (Bradley L. CFR International Affairs Fellow The ‘Demand-Side’: Avoiding a Nuclear-Armed Iran TBC 7/2/10)

Since the advent of nuclear weapons at the end of World War II, 29 states have pursued nuclear arsenals. However, 18 of these states willingly abandoned their programs—a decision often called nuclear ‘‘rollback.’’2 These 18 case studies provide ample evidence that states can be dissuaded from pursuing nuclear weapons when the international community—and often the United States in particular—addresses the motivations behind the state’s quest for nuclear weapons. A review of these case studies offers four particularly important lessons. First, rarely is there a single explanation for a nation’s decision to pursue nuclear weapons. According to a National Defense University (NDU) study, the most influential ‘‘roll forward’’ factors have been: assessment of threat, breakdown of global nonproliferation norms, national pride and unity, personal leadership, strategic deterrent, and perceived weakening of security alliances.3

No Impact – Doesn’t Turn Case – Prolif

Proliferation reps don’t cause prolif – 5 Empirical Alt Causes
Garden 1 (Professor Sir Timothy Indiana University 1 March http://www.tgarden.demon.co.uk/writings/articles/2001/010301nuc.html TBC 7/2/10)

Insecurity The most common strategic reason for developing a nuclear weapon capability is insecurity. If a state feels extremely threatened, it may see a nuclear capability as its only defense. This will be particularly the case if the perceived threat is itself nuclear (or more lately perhaps Biological). The first nuclear weapon programme was developed as the answer to the potential development of atomic weapons by Germany in World War 2, and was continued for similar fears about the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union developed its nuclear capability as part of its armoury against a hostile West. China saw itself as vulnerable to a surprise attack from the United States, and it needed nuclear capability to deter such an attack. Israel saw itself as surrounded by enemies who wanted to sweep it into the sea. Iraq sees itself at risk from Israeli nuclear weapons, and from western nuclear powers and potentially from Iran. Similarly Iran fears Iraq, Israel and the United States. India saw itself vulnerable to Chinese nuclear weapons in any war, and Pakistan saw itself at risk from Indian weapons. International isolation can increase a state’s sense of insecurity, and therefore its need for a nuclear capability. This was the case for South Africa in apartheid times, and has been true of North Korea, Iran, Iraq and Libya at various times. The international isolation today will normally deepen if there are signs of a nuclear weapon programme under development, and this may reinforce the belief that such weapons are needed. On the other hand an extended security arrangement with a friendly nuclear power reduces the need to undertake a national nuclear programme. Aids to Victory While the acquisition of nuclear weapons for reasons of insecurity will primarily be centred on deterring nuclear attack, the weapons have also been seen as warfighting capabilities. The United States used them against the Japanese in order to secure victory in 1945. The use of them against Russia and China may also have been contemplated. Certainly the use of nuclear weapons in the Korean War was considered by President Truman. The Soviet Union had a military strategy which incorporated its tactical nuclear weapons into its warfighting doctrine. It can also be argued that the NATO doctrine of flexible response recognised nuclear weapons as having some utility in war. However, the main purpose of this doctrine was to reinforce deterrence rather than conceive of victory over the Warsaw Pact through nuclear use. While military victory through the use of nuclear weapons may have been a conceptual possibility in the early days, it is unlikely to be a convincing rationale for acquisition today, given the likelihood of massive retaliation by another nuclear state. Status and Influence A powerful motivation for acquiring nuclear weapons has been the effect on national status and prestige. Britain seems to have thought least deeply about the implications of embarking on a post-war programme independent from the United States. There was a natural assumption that it would need to have atomic weapons in order to retain its place as a leading world power. Similarly France saw the need for a nuclear capability to underpin its return to the world stage as a leading player. Given that each of the five permanent members of the security council are also the first five nuclear weapon states, the association of national status and influence with nuclear weapons is visible to others. It is possible that India may have had such motivation in its bid to become the regional leader. It certainly feels that its population and economy merit much greater international influence than it is accorded. However, the changing international approach to proliferation means that India has not gained greater international status from its weapons. Indeed it is likely to have put back the possibility of it gaining permanent security council membership. Argentina and Brazil may also have been looking for status from their programmes. If prestige is a declining factor in nuclear weapon acquisition, influence still remains important. In the post Cold War world, potential intervention by the more powerful international actors is a threat that worries a number of smaller countries. There is an assumption that this threat can be much reduced by the ownership of strategic weapons of mass destruction. The question is asked 'Would NATO have intervened in Kosovo against a nuclear armed Serbia?'. Iraq, Iran, North Korea, Libya and Taiwan can all use this thinking to justify weapons acquisition. Bigger Bang for your Buck In the early days, both American and British governments argued that nuclear weapons could provide a cheaper military capability than large conventional forces. John Foster Dulles is credited with boasting that they could give a 'bigger bang for a buck'. While the absolute cost of building an atomic bomb has dropped over the years, this argument is a less significant factor. Nuclear weapons do not replace conventional forces given their lack of utility for warfighting in the modern world. While the direct research, development and production costs may be much reduced, the economic implications for aspirant nuclear states can be adverse. The international community may show its disapproval of a nuclear programme through the use of economic sanctions as has been seen in Iraq. Nevertheless Iran seems to have decided that a nuclear programme may save it from spending more on conventional forces. Internal Civilian and Military Pressures

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