Gonzaga Debate Institute 2010 Scholars Nuclear K’s

NPT/Arms Control Good

Arms control agreements although not perfect have led to incremental reforms that make the world safer

Yost 7 (David, Naval Postgraduate School Associate Professor, Former DOD Official, Woodrow Wilson International Center Security Studies Fellow, John Hopkins Visiting Scholar, Int'l Affairs, 83.3, http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/news/view/-/id/370/, AD: 6/30/10) jl

'All the king's men'? Refashioning global order

Is the moment auspicious, as William Walker has argued, for a rebirth of the world nuclear ordering project? An auspicious moment would be marked by three key factors. First, the United States would seek to assert significant leadership and moreover would be able to do so on a sustained, bipartisan basis. Second, other actors essential to the project would be ready to lend their thinking and power to this effort. Third, a few key ideas about the management of the emerging challenges of deterrence and abstinence would have emerged and garnered substantial international support. All three factors are lacking today. But the time will come. To accelerate the arrival of the necessary vision and will, the policy and analytical communities should set some priorities and focus on a few hard problems.

Towards an NPT-restrained world that makes economic sense

Because most of the world's proliferators have used the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty's (NPT) call on nations to 'share the benefits of the applications of peaceful nuclear energy' to help justify their nuclear activities, it is unclear just how much any proliferator ultimately has been restrained by these rules. This needs to change but is unlikely, unless the NPT's qualifications on the right to 'peaceful' nuclear energy are read in a much more restrictive fashion to only authorize nuclear projects that are clearly beneficial economically and that truly can be safeguarded against diversion to make bombs. In this regard, our best hope is that, as nations consider how to prevent global warming, they might adopt clear economic guidelines that would compel all energy projects-both nuclear and non-nuclear-to compete economically against one another on a much more level playing field. This would make dangerous, uneconomical nuclear projects far less likely to be pursued, and a centering of the world's security on a proper reading of the NPT much more likely and sustainable. Indeed, unless economic discipline of this sort is attempted internationally, it is quite likely that the continued implementation of the current egregious view of the NPT will only serve to accelerate nuclear proliferation more rapidly than if there was no NPT at all.

Analysing international nuclear order

William Walker's article, 'Nuclear enlightenment and counter-enlightenment', raises fundamental questions about the history of efforts to construct order in international politics in relation to nuclear arms and weapons-related capabilities. However, Walker's 'enlightenment' and 'counter-enlightenment' tropes are clumsy and unsatisfactory tools for analysing contemporary policies concerning nuclear deterrence, non-proliferation and disarmament. Walker holds that in the 1960s and 1970s most of the governments of the world came together in pursuit of 'a grand enlightenment project'. This thesis cannot withstand empirical scrutiny with regard to its three main themes-a supposed US-Soviet consensus on doctrines of stabilizing nuclear deterrence through mutual vulnerability, a notion that the NPT derived from 'concerted efforts to construct an international nuclear order meriting that title', and the view that the NPT embodied a commitment to achieve nuclear disarmament. Walker's criticisms of US nuclear policies since the late 1990s are in several cases overstated or ill-founded. Walker also exaggerates the potential influence of the United States over the policies of other countries. It is partly for this reason that the challenges at hand-both analytical and practical-are more complicated and difficult than his article implies. His work nonetheless has the great merit of raising fundamental questions about international political order.

No Impact – Doesn’t Turn Case – Prolif

Alt Cause – National Pride
Bowman 8 (Bradley L. CFR International Affairs Fellow The ‘Demand-Side’: Avoiding a Nuclear-Armed Iran TBC 7/2/10)

In addition to Iran’s desire for security, national pride and prestige apparently play a major role in Iran’s long-term motivation to acquire a nuclear weapons capability. This is not surprising; nonproliferation scholarship has long identified national pride and prestige as major motivators for pursuing nuclear weapons. For example, these factors played a significant role in the nuclear ‘‘roll forward’’ decisions of Argentina, Brazil, France, India, Indonesia, Libya, and Romania. Today, the fact that five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council also represent the acknowledged nuclear powers under the NPT reinforces the idea that nuclear weapons are a prerequisite to great power status. The fact that several nuclear powers appear to attach great worth to their nuclear programs ‘‘reinforces just how important these weapons can be as sources of power and prestige.’’19

Alt Cause – Domestic Politics
Bowman 8 (Bradley L. CFR International Affairs Fellow The ‘Demand-Side’: Avoiding a Nuclear-Armed Iran TBC 7/2/10)

In addition to the prestige and national pride projected internationally, Iran’s nuclear program has served a useful domestic purpose for the regime in Tehran. Ahmadinejad ran for office on an essentially populist platform, promising various economic reforms. For the most part, Ahmadinejad has been unable to deliver on these promises. In fact, the Iranian economy continues to suffer from spiraling unemployment and inflation. In April 2008, the outgoing Iranian economy minister blamed Ahmadinejad for the country’s economic woes.24 Suggesting the degree of frustration that exists in Iran regarding the economy, 50 leading economists, risking regime retribution, published a harshly worded letter to Ahmadinejad decrying high unemployment and inflation in Iran.25 By focusing on Iran’s nuclear enrichment program, Ahmadinejad has attempted to shift attention away from his economic failures and promote a degree of unity and regime support that would not otherwise exist due to the country’s economic woes. For Ahmadinejad, to a significant extent, the confrontation over Iran’s nuclear program has served to unify the Iranian people around themes of ‘‘Persian pride’’ and to distract them from his economic shortcomings.

Alt Cause – Security Concerns
Bowman 8 (Bradley L. CFR International Affairs Fellow The ‘Demand-Side’: Avoiding a Nuclear-Armed Iran TBC 7/2/10)

An Iranian desire for security appears to drive long-term Iranian interest in obtaining a nuclear weapons capability. One need not delve into the long history of British, Russian, and American involvement in Iran to appreciate the Iranian desire for security from foreign intervention in domestic affairs. In just the last three decades, Iraq invaded Iran, the United States encircled Iran by invading Iraq and Afghanistan, and the United States threatened Tehran with regime change. To appreciate the central role that security plays in motivating the apparent Iranian nuclear weapons program, each of these events deserves additional attention.