BÜHLER’S AND CASSIRER’S SEMIOTIC CONCEPTIONS OF MAN
77
function of language. Therefore, Bühler’s sematology accomplishes much
more than a semiotic foundation of his theory of language; after all, it
provides a semiotic theory about the nature of man as well.
3.
CASSIRER
’
S CONCEPTION OF MAN AS ANIMAL SYMBOLICUM
It is hardly surprising that especially Bühler’s latter remarks about the
symbolic peculiarity of man suggest a substantial conformity with Cassirer’s
famous notion of man as animal symbolicum. The fact that Bühler and
Cassirer often referred to each other’s works in an overly approving manner
reinforces this impression; so does the circumstance that both scholars
occasionally made use of a similar or identical terminology. To give an
example: Bühler assured that Cassirer’s explanations of the relation between
« word and sentence […] coincide perfectly » (Bühler, 1990, 87, n. 6, ST,
74, TL, 169) with his own thoughts on that topic. Cassirer, on the other hand,
admitted that there is a « fundamental agreement » (Cassirer, 1966, 110, n. 4,
PSF 3, 128, PFS 3, 130) between his and Bühler’s use of the term
Darstellungsfunktion. Furthermore, he explicitly referred to Bühler’s
Krise
(and – in this connection – especially to his illustration of matter-bound
animal communication) in order to affirm that « the particularity and the
characteristic meaning and value of human speech » (ibid., 333, PSF 3, 388,
PFS 3, 368) is constituted by the dematerialised and detachable nature of the
symbolic sign.
17
After all is said and done, when it comes to the specificity
and functionality of language, Bühler and Cassirer coincide almost
completely.
And yet: Does this obvious harmony necessarily imply that Bühler’s
and Cassirer’s reflections about semiotics, symbolicity, and the essence of
man are in perfect agreement with each other? At first sight, one might be
tempted to answer this question in the affirmative; but still – and as will be
demonstrated in the course of the following two segments –, a closer
inspection of Cassirer’s Philosophy of Symbolic Forms will reveal that
Bühler’s philosophical companion advocated a broader and more general
conception of symbolicity.
i) Proponents of Cassirer’s Philosophy of Symbolic Forms quite
rightly allege that the cultural- and life-philosophical implications of his
thinking go well beyond traditional transcendentalism. Nevertheless, the
basic motives of a Kantian critique of knowledge are perpetually prevailing
within Cassirer’s philosophical investigations (cf. Hendel, 1955, 21-35). Just
17
Subsequent to a quotation taken from Bühler’s Krise, Cassirer states: « It is these two
factors taken together – the step from the material sample to the genuine sign and the
essential detachability of the sign from the things for which it functions as a sign – which
constitute the particularity and the characteristic meaning and value of human speech. »
(ibid., 333, PSF 3, S. 388, PFS 3, 368)
Mark A. HALAWA
78
like Kant, Cassirer tried to understand the extent to which « the mere
diversity of existing things » (Cassirer, 1975, 76, PSF 1, 7, PFS 1, 17)
18
may
be converted into a « unity of being » (
ibid.); unlike Kant – and, incidentally,
quite similar to Charles Sanders Peirce’s philosophy of pragmatism –,
Cassirer explored the conditions of the possibility of knowledge with the
objective of reconstructing the « changing », not the « stationary » nature of
man (Cassirer, 1996, 36). As a result, he championed a dynamic model of
knowledge by steadily stressing the processual character of human cognition
which he believed to be able to pave the way for a comprehensive trans-
formation of Kant’s « critique of reason » into a « critique of culture » (cf.
Cassirer, 1975, 80, PSF 1, 11, PFS 1, 20).
Cassirer assertively introduced his transformation of Kantianism in
terms of a decidedly semiotic undertaking. The Philosophy of Symbolic
Forms, he explained, takes for granted that the sign
« […] is no mere accidental cloak of the idea, but its necessary and essential
organ. It serves not merely to communicate a complete and given thought-
content, but is an instrument, by means of which this content develops and
fully defines itself. The conceptual definition of a content goes hand in hand
with its stabilization in some characteristic sign. Consequently, all truly strict
and exact thought is sustained by the symbolic and semiotics on which it is
based. » (ibid., 86, PSF 1, 18, PFS 1, 27)
Just like in Peirce’s semiotic theory of cognition, Cassirer elaborated a
semiotics in which the concept of the sign functions as the most crucial
element of any knowledge-abetting synthesis. For Cassirer, to determine or
categorise something as something particular necessarily implies the
effectuality of signs and symbols, respectively. Therefore, every process of
objective knowledge is considered to be entirely dependent on the epis-
temological and semiotic impact of symbolism.
19
Accordingly, Cassirer
presupposed a general mediacy of cognition which he, amongst other things,
primarily put forward to strictly oppose any « naïve copy theory of
knowledge » (ibid., 75, PSF 1, 5, PFS 1, 15). As is outlined in the intro-
ductory remarks of the Phenomenology of Knowledge:
« We never find naked sensation as a raw material to which some form is
given: all that is tangible and accessible to us is rather the concrete deter-
minacy, the living multiformity, of a world of perception, which is dominated
18
In the rest of article the following acronyms are used : PSF (Philosophie der symbolischen
Formen 1,
2 or
3) to refer to the German edition of the three volumes by Cassirer, and PFS
1, 2 or 3 (Philosophie des formes symboliques) to refer to the French translation (1972).
19
« For consciousness the sign is, as it were, the first stage and the first demonstration of
objectivity, because through it the constant flux of the contents of consciousness is for the
first time halted, because in it something enduring is determined and emphasized »
(Cassirer, 1975, 89, PSF 1, 22, PFS 1, 31).