BÜHLER’S AND CASSIRER’S SEMIOTIC CONCEPTIONS OF MAN
71
primarily due to its foundation on a primacy of sociality. Bühler’s account of
psychology does not proceed from the insulated, self-absorbed, or withdrawn
individual. On the contrary, it deals with individuals who first and foremost
subsist as social beings which are constantly interrelating with each other.
Academic psychology, therefore, cannot rely on conceptions that privilege
the method of intuition and introspection alone.
7
But let us now allow Bühler
to speak for himself:
« I. Wherever real communal life exists, there has to be mutual guidance of
the communal member’s goal-oriented behaviour. Where the direction points
of guidance are not given within the shared situation of perception, they have
to be mediated through a contact of higher order, through specific semantic
devices. […]
II. Should the personal needs and moods of the individuals, who are involved
in a communal act, supposed to be exerted within mutual guidance, they need
to come to expression and impression. […]
III. By means of assigning signs of expression to objects and states of affairs,
they gain a new dimension of meaning. As well as an incalculable increase of
their capacity as a means of communication. […] » (ibid., 71)
This list of fundamental principles is of course susceptible to a vast
number of explanatory interpretations. Yet, I am going to emphasise solely
four aspects which – in my mind and against the background of the present
essay’s intentions – turn out to be most important:
i) As the three axioms demonstrate, Bühler perceived psychology as a
« science of meaningful life » (ibid., 28). He presupposed that psychological
states or phenomena are steadily accompanied by specific motivations,
needs, desires, intentions, demands, sentiments, etc. which are consistently
brought forward, provoked, or found within communal life. Besides, he
postulated that the uncircumventable outgrowths of communality – i.e.,
interaction and communication – are prevalent in every single axiom (for
this reason, it is not surprising that Bühler is often appreciated as a classic of
communication theory as well
8
). Thus, the ongoing range of sociality brings
about the integration of all three psychological aspects. Any process of
interaction or communication necessarily comprises what is at the centre of
the particular axioms. On the one hand, it involves the mutual exertion of
influence on the internal and external experiences and behaviours of those
individuals who participate in what Bühler calls « real communal life ». The
first axiom, then, accentuates what lies within the scope of those
psychological conceptions which focus on the behaviouristic aspect of
7
This conclusion displays a self-critical component as well, for in his earlier career, Bühler
was a pioneering representative of introspection himself (
cf. Bühler, 1907, 1908a, 1908b).
8
Cf., for instance, Ungeheuer, 1967, Eschbach, 1990, Eschbach, Kapitzky, 2000, 249.
Mark A. HALAWA
72
« mutual guidance » (the
Verhaltensaspekt). On the other hand, the second
axiom brings into view that any process of “mutual guidance” is powered or
affected by specific « personal needs and moods ». According to Bühler, it is
unimaginable to appeal to another individual’s attitudes, motives, beliefs,
and behaviour without simultaneously being impelled by certain needs,
wants, desires, or other sensitivities, which all comprehend the working
sphere of experiential psychology and – by implication – the second
psychological aspect (the Erlebnisaspekt). Finally, the third axiom sheds
light on the cognitive conditions that run those forms of interaction or
communication which do not operate within a « shared situation of
perception ». Whenever the causes, motivations, and guidelines of « mutual
guidance » are not instantaneously perceptible, it is – for the sake of a
preferably successful execution of communal interaction – inevitable to have
recourse to cognitive capacities which enable the respective individuals to
virtually transcend the immediate here and now. Since these cognitive
capacities call for highly elaborated forms of abstraction (cf. segment iii),
Bühler assigns the third axiom to the sphere of humanistic psychology which
is primarily concerned with the Denkaspekt.
ii) Adepts of Bühler’s Theory of Language will very probably notice
that the cited axioms anticipate the organon model of language. The basic
idea of the organon model is derived from Plato’s seminal dialogue Cratylus
in which it is claimed « that language is an organum [a tool] for the one to
inform the other of something about the things » (Bühler, 1990, 30, ST, 24,
TL, 104)
9
. As Bühler further points out, « [t]he list the one – to the other –
about the things names no fewer than three relational foundations » (
ibid.,
30f., ST, 24, TL, 104). These include a) a speaker or sender (the one), b) a
hearer or
receiver (
the other), and c) the
objects or
states of affairs that are
linguistically referred to (the things). Bühler insisted that these three
elements are inseparably bound to each other. At the same time, he conceded
that the organon model displays « three largely independently variable
semantic relations » (ibid., 35, ST, 28, TL, 110). Any of the three relational
foundations, he claimed, may be highlighted differently in the course of
linguistic interaction. A linguistic phenomenon does not only bear a relation
with the objects or states of affairs which make up the subjects of a
linguistically generated contact between a speaker and a hearer; its range and
agency is also connected with and dependent on the individual sensitivities
and orientations of the senders and receivers of linguistically submitted
messages (cf. Veltrusk!, 1984, 161). Thus, the scope of language is essen-
tially threefold: Regarded from an ideal-typical perspective, a linguistic
9
In the rest of this article the following acronyms are used : ST (Sprachtheorie) to refer to
the German edition by Bühler (1934), and TL (
Théorie du langage) to refer to the French
translation (2009).