BÜHLER’S AND CASSIRER’S SEMIOTIC CONCEPTIONS OF MAN
75
and moods » calls for the potency of symptomic signs.
13
Similarly, the
assignment of signs towards « objects and states of affairs » is dependent on
the use of symbolic signs. In Bühler’s opinion, « [i]t is thus correct to say
that according to the teaching of the organon model of language, phenomena
[of language] must be regarded as many-sided, and […] as many-levelled
significative structures » (ibid., 40, ST, S. 33, TL, 116). The postulated
dynamic character of language is by this means reflected by Bühler’s
sematology as well.
iv) Let us now come to the most important aspect of the present
explanatory listing: Bühler’s Krise is not alone of great relevance because it
may be regarded as a decisive forerunner of the Theory of Language; it also
deserves strict attention for it most plainly indicates the extent to which both
the theory of language and semiotics may help to understand the exceptional
position of man. In fact, the axiomatics of the Krise represents a teleological
graduation which claims the ability to point out the dividing line between
animal and man. On one side, Bühler elucidates that the aspects of « mutual
guidance » and « expression and impression » – the first two axioms of the
Krise – may be observed similarly within animal and human communal life.
On the other side, he suggests that the symbolic « Denkaspekt » – the third
axiom – is entirely human. « In the animal kingdom », Bühler writes,
« semantics has two basic functions, two dimensions of meaning in common
with human language, and it lacks (as far as we know today) the third. We
find there and here the communal-bearing, the social function of semantics as
well as the expression, the impression of experience. But nowhere [do we
find] the third, language or gestures as means of representation of objects and
states of affairs. » (Bühler, 2000, 68)
Accordingly, animals are conceded to be able to make use of
appealing and expressive signs;
14
at the same time, they are thought of being
incapable of using symbolic signs.
13
Bühler did not use the term « symptom » in the Krise. Instead, he spoke of « indicative
signs » (
Anzeichen) (
cf. Bühler, 2000, 97ff.).
14
Bühler explains this assumption in a more differentiated manner in his Theory of
Language. There, he distinguishes the non-interpretive, automatic, or instinctive response
to signals from the intentional production of more complex signs: « […] in my opinion, all
forms of learning, ranging from those encountered in the infusoria to human learning,
involve, in addition to everything else, objectively detectable reactions to signals; indeed,
it is a defining characteristic of the psychophysical system of animals that it functions as a
receiver and user of signals on a lower or an a higher level. » (Bühler, 1990, 44, ST, 38,
TL, 121) With respect to the intentional production of signs Bühler further writes that « the
biological source of the production of signs can be found at precisely the point when in the
higher community life of animals a social situation demands an expansion of the horizon
by means of joint perception » (ibid.). To put it in words that are taken from the Krise:
« […] the origin of semantics » is not to be located « by the individual but by the
Mark A. HALAWA
76
According to Bühler, the peculiarity of symbolic signs is as follows
(cf. ibid., 73ff.): Unlike signals and symptoms, symbols particularly feature
three characteristics which – as a whole – are assumed to be distinctive of
the human use of signs. On the one hand, Bühler considers symbols as self-
generated signs, i.e., the users of symbolic signs are supposed to be able to
refer to present and absent objects and states of affairs without having to
resort to extraneously-generated sign vehicles. On the other hand, he
describes symbols as signs which are eminently dematerialised (entstoff-
licht) and
detachable (
ablösbar) from the objects and states of affairs they
refer to. This ascription is not to say that symbols are entirely immaterial; it
rather accentuates that the semantic potency of symbolic signs is in no way
motivated by a physical connection between the sign and the signified
object. Symbols are by no means ‘imprints’ of the things they stand for, nor
do they mirror or picture reality; what they do, instead, is to represent objects
and states of affairs in an ideational manner which is uniquely human.
15
Bühler exemplifies the exceptionalism of the symbolic sign by
contrasting it with the matter-bound (stoffgebunden) guidance of behaviour
as it is observable within the realm of bee-communities (cf. ibid., 72ff.).
Bees, he suggests, can only inform their conspecifics about the location of a
feeding site, for instance, by carrying a material sample (Stoffprobe) of the
respective object of signification with them.
16
For this reason, Bühler
believes that bees – or animals in general – are not able not maintain
processes of « mutual guidance » without continuous recurrence to matter-
bound signs, i.e., signs which – unlike symbols – are not detachable from the
objects and states of affairs they stand for. For Bühler, this consistent
material fixedness denies animals the chance to develop or acquire a full-
fledged language. Thus, he believed that the possibility to compare animal
interaction with human language could only then be provided if animals
were also able to express their « mnemonic impressions to other conspecifics
without requiring somewhat of the old material sample again » (
ibid., 73).
What this example is supposed to prove may be paraphrased as
follows: The idea that man is primarily to be regarded as a linguistic animal
initially implies the more fundamental idea that man is first and foremost to
be regarded as a symbolic animal. Human language essentially requires
symbolicity, for only symbols set up the basis for the unique representational
community »; it is « not a by-product but a constitutive factor of any animal or human
communal life » (Bühler, 2000, 59, cf. Ungeheuer, 1967, 44).
15
In reference to Georg Simmel’s philosophy of money, Bühler characterises the level of
symbolicity as a
Wendung zur Idee, a «
turn towards the idea » (Bühler, 2000, 75).
16
I shall not comment on whether or not Bühler’s discussion of the nature of animal
communication is still valid. What is at stake here is simply his semiotic and anthro-
pological argumentation.