Easac'10 sb indd

EASAC 

Realising European potential in synthetic biology | December 2010 |    19

this area and the Royal Society summarised its national 

and international activities on reducing the risk of misuse 

of scientifi c research (Royal Society 2008c). Specifi cations 

for a code of conduct remain an active area of discussion 

for the bioscience community more generally and, for 

example, the German Research Foundation published its 

report on dual-use issues two years ago. The European 

Commission is proceeding with plans to establish 

a code of conduct in nanotechnology (European 

Commission 2008) that covers not just the dual-use 

issues for biosecurity but also broader aspects of research 

governance including biosafety, Intellectual Property 

Rights and scientifi c integrity.

In the meeting in Berlin, various specifi c actions for 

synthetic biology biosecurity were discussed that align 

with the general principles (Box 1). These included the 

following:

•   Progressing education on dual use issues in the 

undergraduate life sciences curriculum plus 

continuing effort to raise awareness across the 

research community. Recently, the Polish Academy of 

Sciences together with the US National Academy of 

Science hosted a workshop

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 to catalogue and assess 

current programmes at professional and graduate 

level for education about dual use technologies 

and biosecurity. Among the background papers for 

this meeting was a UK–Italian survey of life-science 

programmes in Europe that showed that only 

3 out of 57 universities surveyed included a biosecurity 

module and only 22 out of 142 degree courses 

referenced the Biological Weapons Convention.

•   Licensing or other management constraints in 

synthesising novel genetic sequences to control of the 

supply of sequences and gene synthesising machines. 

For example, in Germany businesses formed the 

Industry Association for Synthetic Biology (www.

ia-sb.eu) for the voluntary control of DNA sequence 

provision, subject to satisfactory completion of 

inquiries by the company on the customer to 

ascertain country of origin, nature of the laboratory 

and anticipated gene function.

•   Ensuring that synthetic biology applications are 

covered within the Biological Weapons Convention.

•   Considering whether there should be controls 

on publishing sensitive information that might 

aid misuse. In general, the scientifi c community 

maintains that it is better to publish openly to create 

the knowledge base that can counter misuse but, 

as noted by EGE (Appendix 2), it would be useful to 

defi ne global criteria for any circumstances where 

publication of data on highly pathogenic organisms 

or toxic agents might be constrained.

Action at the national or European level must 

be accompanied and integrated with action 

globally

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. The German export regulation guidelines 

for GMO production (German Technology Law, 

Gentechnikgesetz) might provide a model of national 

rules for other countries in controlling the supply of 

dual use goods according to the origin of the request 

for genetic sequence synthesis. In an international 

research environment, the screening of DNA 

synthesis orders requires centralised supervision to 

be effective—this raises issues for global governance 

and harmonisation of biosecurity standards, 

together with agreed disclosure of intended research 

protocols. The actions being discussed in Europe are 

consistent with what has already been proposed in 

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‘Education on dual use issues’ at http://dels.nas.edu/bls/warsaw. The survey of biosecurity education is at 

http://dels.nas.edu/bls/warsaw/NAS%20PAPER%20FINAL%20sent.pdf.

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Many in the research community are receptive. A survey gauged US researcher knowledge and attitudes about dual use 

(National Research Council with AAAS, survey of members, February 2009). Fifteen per cent of the 2000 respondents had 

taken personal action, including abandoning overseas collaboration, to avert misuse. Fifty per cent of respondents agreed with 

increasing restrictions on access to ‘select agents’, those pathogens that pose a known public health risk.

Box 1   Principles to be taken into account when 

formulating codes of conduct in the 

biosciences

1.  Awareness—scientists should bear in mind 

potential consequences of their research and 

refuse to undertake research that has only 

harmful consequences.

2.  Safety and security—scientists have the 

responsibility to use good laboratory procedures, 

whether codifi ed by law or common practice.

3.  Education and information—scientists should be 

aware of, and disseminate information about, 

national and international laws and regulations, 

policies and principles aimed at preventing 

misuse of research.

4.  Accountability—scientists who become aware 

of activities that violate the Biological and Toxins 

Weapons Convention or law should raise their 

concerns with appropriate authorities.

5.  Oversight—scientists with responsibility for 

oversight of research or evaluation or publication 

should promote adherence to these principles 

and act as role models.

Summarised from IAP Statement on Biosecurity, 

November 2005. IAP Working Group was chaired 

by Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei, Italy, and Royal 

Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences, www.

royalsociety.org/document.asp?tip=0&id=3948

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