Aleksandr Antonovich Lyakhovskiy Working Paper pp
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“Now, a few words on the question of Amin and whether or not he was an American agent. It seems to me, to put the issue in those terms, is a little too black and white. What seems to me more plausible—and this is especially strengthened by my reading of the excerpt from the book by Diego Cordovez and Selig Harrison [Out of Afghanistan] that Malcolm [Byrne] included in the readings, was that, throughout that period, Amin seemed to be searching for other orientations. It was quite possible that he was seeking some role more independent of the Soviet Union, either through the Pakistanis, because of that abortive invitation to Zia to come to Kabul, or through his contacts with the Americans. This did not necessarily mean he was an agent; but it may be that in his maneuvering he was seeking a more independent role for himself. It is clear that this could have been misinterpreted from Moscow. It could also have represented a danger to Moscow. But the issue should not be limited to the question of whether he [was] or was not formally an American agent. I think the issue is more complex than that.” 3
On General Pavlovskiy’s return to Moscow Defense Minister Ustinov sent a note to the CPSU CC about the results of his work in the DRA.
Top Secret 4 CC CPSU
On the Results of the Mission of the USSR Deputy Defense Minister, General of the Army I. G. Pavlovskiy, in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan
In accordance with the CPSU CC's Decree No. P163/62 of 15 August 1979, USSR Deputy Defense Minister, General of the Army I. G. Pavlovskiy, and a group of generals and officers were in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan from 17 August to 22 October with the aim of reviewing the state of the People's Armed Forces of Afghanistan and the organization and methods of their combat operations against the rebels; providing on-site assistance to the Afghan commanders in dealing with these questions; and preparing recommendations for the further strengthening of the combat capabilities of the People's Armed Forces of Afghanistan.
The work of Cde. I. G. Pavlovskiy's group in providing assistance to the Afghan military command was carried out in strict accordance with the CPSU CC's decision and with instructions issued by the USSR Minister of Defense, taking account of the military-political situation in the country and also the political and organizational measures implemented within the Afghan army by the DRA leadership.
On all matters that they studied, recommendations were devised and transmitted personally by Com. I. G. Pavlovskiy to H. Amin, offering them as proposals for the further strengthening of the Afghan armed forces.
The provision of comprehensive practical assistance by our side to the People's Armed Forces of Afghanistan enabled them to make a transition between August and October. Rather than continuing to rely on a passive defense and faltering operations by small units against the rebels, they were able to launch coordinated and active operations by larger groupings. This allowed them to gain the initiative in combat and to destroy the most dangerous forces of counterrevolution in the provinces of Paktia, Ghazni, Parwan, Bamiyan, and several other areas.
combat operations were conducted to resolve specific tasks. Soviet generals and officers provided direct assistance in working out the plans for operations and in carrying them out. This experience in
3 See Nobel Symposium 95: The Intervention in Afghanistan and the Fall of Détente, Lysebu, September 17-20, 1995, transcribed by Svetlana Savranskaya, edited by David A. Welch and Odd Arne Westad (OsloL The Norwegian Nobel Institute, 1996), pp. 80-81, 101-102, 113-114. [Editor’s note: From the transcripts of that conference, the following exchange occurred regarding the question of whether or not Amin was a CIA agent. 4 APRF, f. 3, op. 82, d. 173, s. 120-122; translated by Mark Kramer; first publication in Russian in Novaya i Noveishaya Istoriya 3 (May-June) 1996, pp. 91-99 (document on 97-98), intro, by G.N. Sevastionov. [Translator’s note: Published in CWIHP Bulletin 8-9, p. 158 and CWHIP’s Afghanistan Dossier p.53]
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preparing and conducting operations taught the Afghan commanders, staffs, and political organs the methods and means of organization for undertaking active combat operations in mountainous regions. Help was provided to the Main Political Directorate in organizing party-political work among the troops according to the different categories of servicemen, so that they could be mobilized for the active pursuit of combat objectives. Taking account of the combat operations, drafts were also prepared of documents providing basic guidelines for the organization of combat and operational preparations.
Despite these efforts to increase the combat capability of the People's Armed Forces of Afghanistan, a number of questions are still unresolved.
instilled in the People's Armed Forces, and they have no impact on the practical life of the troops. The commanders, staffs, political organs, and party organizations do not always coordinate their work in resolving tasks among the troops. Staffs at all levels, including the General Staff, have still not become a central, directing organ in the daily life of large and small units and in the troops' combat activity.
Political work in the Afghan army, especially with the officer corps, is still not conducted concretely or effectively enough. The combat morale and fighting elan of the troops, the state of military discipline, and the army's willingness to act are still low.
During the final conversation with H. Amin, M. Yakub, and M. Ekbal, Cde. I. G. Pavlovskiy once again directed their attention to the unresolved problems and our recommendations for solving them. At the end of the discussion, H. Amin said: "We are taking all measures to ensure that your recommendations are fulfilled, and we will always work in coordination with Soviet advisers and specialists. Our friendship is unwavering." Then he expressed the hope that Soviet military advisers would be assigned to every battalion of the Afghan armed forces. In conclusion, H. Amin thanked the delegation for providing help and requested that they transmit warm greetings and personal thanks to Comrade L.I. Brezhnev, and also to Cdes. A.N. Kosygin, D.F. Ustinov, Yu.V. Andropov, and A. A. Gromyko, as well as all the other leaders of the CPSU and the Soviet government.
Overall, the group of generals and officers headed by the USSR Deputy Defense Minister, Army- General I. G. Pavlovskiy, fulfilled the tasks assigned to them.
Reported for informational purposes.
D. Ustinov 5 November 1979 No. 318/3/00945
Pavlovskiy recalls: Having flown into Moscow on 3 November I called the Minister right away and reported my arrival and asked to be received but he said that he would call me. However he did not call for about two weeks. Even during the parade on Red Square on 7 November he just looked at me, extended his hand, and said nothing. 5
When Ustinov called me to his office I reported to him about the work done in Afghanistan, but he said: “You did not analyze it there at all. Why did you go visit Amin? [You] needed to deal with Karmal”. I replied to the Minister that Karmal wasn’t in Kabul; at that time he was still in Czechoslovakia. Ustinov said nothing in reply but stopped summoning me or calling me. I understood that I had fallen into disfavor and tried to clarify the situation at Chief of the General
5 [Translator’s note: At these parades Ustinov, as a Politburo member and the official receiving the salute of the troops passing in review, stood on the top of the Lenin Mausoleum. Pavlovskiy would have been standing on a lower level of the Mausoleum to the side with the other commanders-in-chief of the branches of the armed forces.]
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