Russia's Attitudes towards the eu: Political Aspects

Strategy documents

In 1999, the EU and Russia adopted new documents on their respective policies towards each other. For both sides, these documents represented a kind of a new experience. The Common Strategy of the European Union on Russia was the first document of this type as envisaged by the Amsterdam Treaty, and Russia could be pleased to have been chosen by the EU as primary ‘target' of its CFSP new pattern³¹. The Medium-Term Strategy for the Development of Relations between the Russian Federation and the European Union 2000-2010³² also represented a new genre for Moscow's foreign policy; it was considerably more elaborated than, for instance, the 'Decree on Russia's strategy with respect to the CIS states' of 1995.

Both 'Strategies' may be considered too vague and lacking concrete and strategically relevant actions. In addition, the closer reading of two documents reveals significant differences between them. In the case of Russia, for instance, a special attention is paid to the notion of 'equality'—which is in line with Moscow's emphasis on 'national interest' as the foundation of its foreign policy but sounds very traditional and not very appropriate with respect to the EU as unconventional international actor. Furthermore, the origins of the Russian 'strategy' seem to be connected first of all with the intention to prepare an 'adequate response' to what was being prepared by the EU—and this also in line with the idea of 'balanced relationship'. Some analysts believe that both documents are fundamentally different in terms of substance and orientation³³.

The criticism from within the EU³⁴ seems also linked to the problems of the inter-agency relationship in the Union. The Common Strategy on Russia was reported to create some uncertainty about the status of Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, and Javier Solana, the EU High Representative for the CFSP, questioned the added value of the document with respect to the already existing cooperation pattern³⁵. Noteworthy, on Russia's side there have been no signs of similar assessments; Moscow seems to appreciate the EU's strategy, even if this is explained more by the satisfaction of the Union's attention to Russia rather than by the substance of the document³⁶. Anyhow, the very fact that the two documents were adopted almost simultaneously, look very cooperatively oriented and both proclaim aiming at 'strategic partnership' between the EU and Russia seems telling and encouraging, even if only for considerations of political symbolism.

Summits

Russia-EU summits represent the highest level of the political dialogue. They are held regularly twice a year; thus, the summit in Brussels in October 2001 was the eighth since the PCA entered in force. For Russia, the significance of this practice is threefold:

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  Summits highlight the status of the EU-Russian relationship and in this sense have a symbolic importance.
  
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  They allow to interact with top officials representing different EU pillars—the head of member-state holding rotating presidency in the Council, the President of the EU Commission, the EU commissioner with responsibility for external affairs, the EU High Representative for the CFSP. For the Russian side, meeting with them 'en block' provide better chances for overcoming complexities of the EU 'compartmentalization' that might slow down cooperative interaction.
  
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  Summits' agendas are relatively more flexible; they are not necessarily defined well in advance and allow to address 'hot issues' that otherwise might take considerable time for being inscribed into bureaucratic machinery of both sides. For Russia, this responds to Moscow's desire to expand the dialogue and to re-orient it in the direction of broader political issues.
  

As an example, one could refer to the seventh Russia—EU summit that was held in Moscow in May 2001³⁷. Its agenda focused on three items: developments in Russia and in the EU, EU-Russia co-operation and current international issues. Each of the three allowed to address issues that otherwise would be rather sensitive as subjects of formal negotiations.

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  The EU, apart from discussing the routine matters (such as the safeguarding of sustainable economic development and other aspects of the reform process in Russia), was interested in expressing its concerns about recent developments in the Russian media sector, in particular with respect to what was perceived as worrisome signs of increasing governmental control over it³⁸.
  
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  On the situation in the North Caucasus, the EU aimed at underlining the need for a rapid political settlement in Chechnya, as well as for a rapid return of the OSCE Assistance Group thereto. It wanted also to press for more progress in the human rights enquiries and for improvements in humanitarian aid deliveries to 'internally displaced persons'.
  
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  Russia, on its turn, expected reliable information and assessments on the state of play regarding CESDP and the EU enlargement. In addition, both sides seemed to be ready for engaging in a delicate dialogue on whether and how the CESDP approach to third country co-operation might be applied to Russia.
  
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  The summit was to facilitate addressing controversial aspects of some other issues on the EU—Russia agenda: the energy dialogue, the question of Kaliningrad, the cooperation in justice and home affairs, notably on combating organized crime.
  
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  Finally, an overview of international issues, such as the Middle East Peace Process, the Korean Peninsula, Western Balkans and Belarus, might be both easier at the summit level and conducive to eventual rapprochement of approaches.
  

By and large, during a relatively short period the formal Russia EU summits have turned into a traditional practice, which in itself represents a significant achievement. In addition, a remarkable innovation appeared at this level in March 2001, when President Putin took part in the session of the European Council in Stockholm. This event has clearly gone beyond the framework of political dialogue between the EU and Russia, marking a certain difference in comparison with traditional Russia EU summits. It was for the first time that Russia's head of state was invited to participate in the EU summit, i.e. in what is considered to be the highest structural level of the Union's political system. In addition to political symbolism, it is worth noting the practical significance of this pattern that gives a possibility for an interaction with all leaders of the EU states, and not with only one performing chairmanship in the Council.

On the EU side, inviting leaders of non-member-states to the Union's summits is an exceptional practice, and there had been only two earlier cases of similar pattern of meetings (with Nelson Mandela and Yasser Arafat). Not surprisingly, observers in Russia stressed the importance of this meeting and its qualitative specificity; it was regarded as reflecting the rising character of Russia's relations with the EU, as well as the deliberate intention of the latter to highlight Russia's role as its partner³⁹. Some comments were close to assess this move of the EU as only falling short of inviting Russia to join the Union⁴⁰.

Russian observers also pointed to the fact that the new US president was to attend the next EU summit only four months later, in July 2001⁴¹. Accidentally, Putin's visit to Stockholm took place exactly at the moment of growing tensions with the administration of George W.Bush and coincided with a peak of a scandal with the expulsion of Russian diplomats from the USA. Thus, the 'rapprochement' with the EU seemed particularly impressive against the background of deteriorating Russian-American relations.

Another noteworthy aspect of Putin's participation in the EU summit was Russia's role in defining its agenda. Although the EU summit was focused upon economic issues, discussions with Russia's president were inevitably to touch upon broader political issues. In particular, Putin was reported to address the problems of the EU enlargement, the status of Kaliningrad and ballistic missile defence (BMD) plans. It would not come as a surprise if the latter issue was in fact imposed on the summit by Moscow. In any case, Russia could feel satisfied with the EU's responsiveness towards its attempts to promote political and security agenda rather than remaining encapsulated within the 'traditional' one.

In addition, the Stockholm summit took place at the time when hostilities that were beginning in Macedonia marked the emergence of a new 'hot spot' in Europe. Noteworthy, President Boris Traikovsky of Macedonia was another invitee to the EU summit in Stockholm. Thus, the summit allowed Russia and the EU to focus jointly (and, noteworthy, in the absence of the USA) on the then most urgent and crisis-prone development on the continent. For Russia, this pattern could look as responding to its best EU-related desiderata.