The year 1956 saw two watershed events of the Cold War occur simulta-
neously: the Suez Crisis and the Hungarian Revolution. To try to meet a per-
ceived growing threat by the Soviet Union in the Middle East, the United
States had promoted the formation of the Baghdad Pact in 1955. Iraq and
Turkey were the original signatories, soon followed by Britain, Pakistan, and
Iran. Many in the Arab world, especially the Egyptian leader Nasser, saw this
treaty as nothing less than an attempt by the West to reassert its old colonial
control over the Middle East.
In 1956 Nasser sought funding for a long-advocated project—construction
of a high dam at Aswan on the upper Nile. The Egyptian leader saw this as a
means of improving the Egyptian standard of living and strengthening his
standing in the Middle East. At the same time, however, Nasser sought to
secure new weapons that would place the Egyptian military on a par with that
of Israel. Dulles promised U.S. assistance for the dam but refused the Egypt-
ian request for advanced weaponry, and Egypt turned to the Soviet bloc for
the new weapons. This along with Nasser’s diplomatic recognition of the PRC
incensed Dulles, who then withdrew the offer to assist in financing the dam.
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Course of the Cold War (1950–1991)
Soviet Premier Nikolai Bulganin, U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower, French Premier Edgar Jean Faure, and British
Prime Minister Sir Anthony Eden, shown here during the 1955 Geneva Conference in the garden of the Palace of
Nations on 20 July 1955. (Library of Congress)
To pay for the dam, Nasser therefore nationalized the Suez Canal, a step that
he had already been contemplating.
Nasser’s actions led to the formation of a coalition of Britain, France, and
Israel against him. The British government had the largest stake in the Suez
Canal Company and in its operations, and Prime Minister Eden developed
an almost pathological hatred of Nasser and was determined to topple the
Egyptian leader. The French believed that Egypt was actively supporting
the Algerian rebels, while the Israelis were angry over Nasser’s decision to
blockade the Gulf of Aqaba (Israel’s entry into the Indian Ocean) as well as
Egyptian sponsorship of fedayeen (Arab commando) raids against the Jewish
state. Leaders of the three powers therefore concluded an agreement
whereby Israel would invade the Sinai and give Britain and France an excuse
to intervene militarily to “protect” the canal.
The Israelis moved at the end of October, and the French and British
governments demanded the right to occupy the canal zone. When the Egypt-
ian government rejected the ultimatum, on 5 November 1956 French and
British forces striking from Cyprus invaded and occupied Port Said at the
Mediterranean end of the canal.
Both the Soviet Union and the United States demanded that the British,
French, and Israelis withdraw from Egyptian territory. While the Soviet Union
threatened to send “volunteers,” it was the position of the United States that
was critical. President Eisenhower, livid that Eden had not informed him
beforehand, put heavy economic pressure on Britain, obliging the allied forces
to withdraw.
The Suez Crisis was a major event in the Cold War. Israel and Egypt
were the chief winners. The blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba was ended, and
UN observers were brought in to police the frontier between Egypt and
Israeli. Nasser found himself a hero in the Arab world; his prestige soared
on the retreat of the British and French. The Soviet Union and the UN also
benefited. Britain was the chief loser. The Suez Crisis marked the effective
end of Britain as a world power. And it shattered the solidarity of the major
Western powers. Unfortunately for the West, the crisis came at the worst pos-
sible time, diverting attention from the concurrent Soviet action against the
Hungarian Revolution.
The Hungarian Revolution of late October and early November 1956
was one of the most dramatic events of the Cold War, although it was not the
first sign of restiveness within the Soviet bloc. In June 1953, after the death
of Stalin, worker unrest led to rioting in East Berlin and across the Soviet
Occupied Zone, which was crushed only by Soviet tanks. Khrushchev’s
moves toward de-Stalinization in early 1956, particularly his “secret speech”
revealing the dictator’s crimes, led to unrest in Poland in June 1956. There
were demonstrations in Poznana, with industrial workers demanding redress
of grievances. Order was restored only by deploying large numbers of secu-
rity police.
Similar protests in Hungary that October became revolution, however.
Encouraged by events in Poznana and by the limited reforms subsequently
introduced in Poland, student demonstrators in Budapest protested the wide
Course of the Cold War (1950–1991)
35
gulf between the stated goals of the communist regime and the reality of its
rule. This demonstration led to widespread demands for democratic reform,
an end to the hated security police and censorship, and Hungary’s with-
drawal from the Warsaw Pact. Hungarian Premier Imre Nagy, brought to
power in an effort to accommodate the reformists, found himself swept along
by a revolutionary tide. He announced a host of changes that included free
elections, an end to press censorship, and reform of the hated security police.
The Soviets had already decided to intervene before Nagy’s demands
rose to include a Soviet troop withdrawal and the announcement that Hun-
gary would withdraw from the Warsaw Pact. The Kremlin found Nagy’s com-
mitment to democratic reforms unacceptable. If the situation in Hungary
was allowed to stand, Soviet leaders feared that the movement would surely
spread to other satellites.
On 4 November 1956, Khrushchev sent 200,000 Soviet troops and 2,000
tanks into Hungary. Nagy called for resistance, and the Hungarians fought
as best they could. Over the next several weeks thousands of people died;
200,000 Hungarians fled to neighboring Austria.
There was near universal condemnation of the Soviet action, but no
action was taken, in part because the Soviet move was made while the West-
ern powers were embroiled in the Suez Crisis. There was much criticism of
the United States among Hungarians and a corresponding loss of faith
regarding both Dulles’s frequent talk of “rolling back communism” and prior
pledges of U.S. assistance toward this end. The lesson of the Hungarian
Revolution for the peoples of the Soviet bloc was that the Kremlin could do
as it pleased within its existing sphere of influence.
The Cold War appeared to spread in the late 1950s with increasing
Soviet challenges in the Middle East, Africa, and Asia, especially in its sup-
port for so-called “wars of liberation.” In an effort to reassert U.S. influence
in the Middle East, the American president announced the Eisenhower Doc-
trine in early 1957. It pledged the United States to support the independence
of Middle Eastern countries against the threat of communism. Washington
intended this to underline the importance of the Baghdad Pact, to which the
United States was not a signatory. The Eisenhower administration also con-
tinued to send significant economic and military aid to the Diem govern-
ment of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam).
The Soviet challenge also spread to space, as Khrushchev was keenly
interested in his nation’s space program. On 17 August 1957 the Soviets fired
the first intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM)—the United States did not
fire its first ICBM until the next year—and on 4 October 1957 the Soviets
launched the first satellite into Earth’s orbit. Sputnik 1 was especially embar-
rassing to the United States, as it was seen as a sign of Soviet scientific
prowess, and became more so when in December a much smaller U.S. rocket
exploded on the launch pad. The United States did not place its first satellite
into orbit until January 1958, and it was still far smaller than those launched
by the Soviets. Sputnik 1 also marked the start of the Space Race between the
two superpowers.
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Course of the Cold War (1950–1991)
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