V o L u m e I : a d

lenge. Americans were not enthusiastic. Ten days later, U.S. Secretary of State

James F. Byrnes declared that the United States was no more interested in an

alliance with Britain against the USSR than in one with the Soviet Union

against Britain. Churchill’s words, however, proved prophetic.

Germany was the principal tinderbox of the Cold War, and by Septem-

ber 1946 the collision of interests there led Byrnes to tell an audience of mil-

itary government officials and Germans in Stuttgart that the Americans would

not withdraw from Germany under pressure and that the Germans would soon

be receiving additional self-government.

By early 1947, when peace treaties were finally signed in Paris with other

defeated states, the time had arrived to begin work on peace arrangements

for Austria and Germany, but talks soon deadlocked. By the spring of 1947,

East and West were approaching a complete break over the German ques-

tion. The Soviets were stripping their zone of anything movable and failing

to supply food to the western zones as promised. Facing increasing costs and

difficulties caused by a lack of Soviet cooperation, the British and the Amer-

icans merged their zones into Bizonia at the beginning of 1947. General of

the Army George C. Marshall’s first appearance as secretary of state at a

major conference marked a hardening American reaction, as Washington

reached the conclusion that the Soviet Union’s actions were aggressive and

not defensive.

In addition to its demands on Iran, Moscow pressured Turkey to return

land lost by Russia at the end of World War I and also to permit the USSR a

share in the defense of the straits connecting the Black Sea to the Mediter-

ranean. There was also trouble in Greece, where communist guerrillas were at

war against the royal government. Civil war began there because of a rightist

victory in the Greek elections, the return of the unpopular King George II,

and intransigence on both sides. Fighting flared at the end of 1946, and the

Greek communists secured material support from Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and

Albania—all communist bastions. The communists seized control of large

portions of northern Greece. Athens appealed to the UN, but the Soviet

Union vetoed a Security Council resolution based on an investigative com-

mission’s report of evidence of support from the neighboring communist

states.

In February 1947 the British government publicly informed the United

States that it could no longer afford to support the Greek government, news

of which Washington had been forewarned. Still, this came as a shock and a

surprise to Washington. On 12 March 1947, therefore, President Truman

addressed a joint session of Congress and announced what came to be known

as the Truman Doctrine. Stating that “we must assist free peoples to work

out their own destinies in their own way,” he promised that the United

States would “support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation

by armed minorities or by outside pressures.” The United States now took

up the burden of being the world’s policeman.

In a remarkably short time, the U.S. Congress appropriated $400 million

for Greece and Turkey, somewhat over half of this in military aid. This U.S.

attempt to draw a line against communist expansion was successful, helped

Origins of the Cold War to 1950

21

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along by Yugoslav leader Josip Broz Tito’s break with Moscow, which cut off

most of the aid to the communist rebels. By the end of 1949 the Greek insur-

rection had been contained. There was trepidation in the United States over

the Truman Doctrine, but the alternative of giving in seemed far more per-

ilous. The Truman Doctrine was a momentous step; it led directly to the

Marshall Plan and NATO.

By the spring of 1947 the United States had distributed about $16 billion

in emergency relief, most of it to European states, but no general economic

recovery had taken place, and in fact Britain, France, and Italy were still in

serious distress. The winter of 1946–1947 had been particularly severe, and

strikes were widespread, especially in France and Italy. In France, the com-

munists controlled the huge General Confederation of Labor (CGT) and

threatened to bring the country to a standstill and perhaps even seize power.

U.S. policymakers reasoned that if Italy and France, with large communist

parties, could be taken, then perhaps all of Europe would fall under Soviet

influence.

To prevent such an alarming scenario, a more sustained and better-

organized reconstruction effort was needed. Thus, the Marshall Plan was

born. In a speech at Harvard University on 5 June 1947, Secretary of State

Marshall announced a plan for the reconstruction of Europe. He promised

that the United States would undertake financial assistance to Europe but

only if the nations of Europe got together, devised long-

range assistance plans for economic recovery, and concen-

trated on self-help and mutual assistance.

Behind this initiative lay the fear that continued eco-

nomic troubles would weaken the resistance of the surviv-

ing Western nations to communism. Of course, continued

American prosperity was also tied to a European economic

revival. Indeed, without an economically strong Western

Europe—historically the largest trading partner with the

United States—the future of American economic prowess

and of capitalism in general might be seriously jeopardized.

A U.S. State Department planning group headed by

George F. Kennan had sketched out the Marshall Plan.

It was announced as open to all, but the plan was devised

so that the Soviet Union would have to reject it and thus

ensure congressional passage. Without Soviet participa-

tion, the probability of its success would also be greatly

enhanced.

The plan called for a joint effort by the countries con-

cerned and a strict accounting of aid to ensure that it would

go not only to alleviating distress but also for constructive

measures to restore economic stability. Molotov insisted

on bilateral agreements in which the United States would

give money to each country separately, with sums deter-

mined according to their proportionate shares in helping

to defeat Germany. He claimed that American oversight of

22

Origins of the Cold War to 1950

Poster supporting the Marshall Plan is titled “Whatever

the weather we only reach welfare together.” (Swim Ink 2,

LLC/Corbis)

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