The eu’s Legitimacy in the Eye of the Beholders

9.4 – Speaking Hypothetically Again

These were the numbers and narratives. One might see the numbers as a skeletal overview of the discourses pointing toward several similarities and differences. The narratives showed the reliability of several similarities and the differences, but also exposed some hidden diversity. The skeletons thus got bodies, but now the most important issues have to be fleshed out in order to answer our central research question. In order to flesh out these issues we will test the three hypotheses.

9.4.1 – The Democratic Problem of Nationalist Identification

The first hypothesis tests whether the European political elites are right to coin the term ‘democratic deficit’.
H1: The EU only has a democratic deficit.
In terms of the Hontian framework one would expect, if the hypothesis is true, that the vast majority of observations use a universalist conception of legitimacy and lead to a negative evaluation. In the narratives, this would translate into a focus on issues, like representation, popular support, participation and transparency.

First, let us consider the case in support of this hypothesis. In all three discourses, the majority of the observations were universalist rather than nationalist in their conceptualisation of legitimacy and these universalist perspective leads more often to a negative evaluation than the national averages. Furthermore, perceptions characterised by a universalist concept of legitimacy with a focus on input and direct legitimacy leading to a negative evaluation are the most common in all three discourses. Also common are similar perceptions, but with a focus on throughput rather than input legitimacy. We also encountered the democratic deficit in the narratives. The EU is perceived as being ‘too far away’ from its citizens and measures are proposed to overcome this problem, like more power to the European parliament, more referenda, a senate of national parliaments and more transparent procedures.

Still, we will have to reject this hypothesis. First of all, many perceptions in all three discourses use a nationalist concept of legitimacy for the problem to just be democratic. For although admittedly perceptions using a nationalist conceptualisation lead more often to positive evaluations than universalist ones, the majority of evaluations are negative. In this regard the large number of observations characterised by a nationalist concept of legitimacy with a focus on input and direct legitimacy leading to a negative evaluation is an indicator of a different problem.

The narratives made this other deficit clearer. The ‘too far away’ argument is the crux of the matter. It is often given a democratic interpretation, but the evidence suggests one should actually interpretate this as a problem of identification. This makes the problem nationalist rather than universalist in nature. This interpretation is recognized by some commentators within the discourses. Some of them want to convince ‘the public’ that the EU is not a threat to their national identity or for that matter their national sovereignty, whilst others see Europe’s democratisation as an ‘unnatural’ undertaking.

A short side way into the academic literature is enlightening. The idea of a European nation or thick identity is rejected by many scholars (e.g. Scharpf 1999: 9; Thomassen and Schmitt 2004: 380).¹²⁴ There is one important discussion in this regard: Can one actually distinguish between the people as nation and as demos? Both scholars (e.g Thomassen and Schmitt 2004: 9) and commentators – the Dutch social-liberals, who see Europe as a ‘democratic-value community’ – seem to think so. Admittedly, there is nothing ‘natural’ about the nation’s link to democracy. Hont’s reconstruction of the process shows they became related through power-politics. Some authors point to the fact that the ‘national nation’ was created by the state and then leap to the assumption that the demos can thus be distinguished from the nation (Brubaker 1992; Fuchs 2000: 230; In: Thomassen and Schmitt 2004: 10).

Although the premise is largely right, the idea of separation or that this process can be repeated for the EU clearly underestimates the uniqueness and magnitude of this accomplishment in the first place. Nationalism is a historical success story in its ability to bind people to the ‘far away’ national state and one might wonder whether this feat can actually be repeated on an even further away European scale with less symbols of sameness to work with.¹²⁵ All politics is local, but the states through the idea of the nation – sameness – were able to make people identify and even commit to the ‘far away’ level of governance that became the nation-state (Scharpf 1999: 8). As Fareed Zakaria argues one does not fall in love with liberal constitutionalism, in other words a democratic state, therefore it needs to be associated with a cultural identity.¹²⁶ Further, nowadays people acknowledge that a mere political notion is not enough to embrace a state (WRR 2007: 103). Therefore, the distinction between demos and nation has become purely conceptual (Yack 2001: 220).¹²⁷

In the discourses, there were three groups relying on the idea of national sovereignty: the British Europhobes and Gaullist and the French Gaullist. Their position is partially inspired by state interests, but they also seem to recognize that the people identify and are loyal to the nation-state. In the one discourse where there is no such position, the Dutch discourse, we find a disillusioned electorate, mainstream politicians struggling with a message for the electorate and recently the rise of populist politicians that play into exactly this vacuum. The hypothesis is thus rejected, because the EU’s legitimacy deficit is not democratic, but rather the result of too little identification.

9.4.2 – Government or Regime, but not Governance

The second hypothesis goes as follows:
H2: The reason for the EU’s legitimacy deficit is that it is perceived as a political order of multi-level government and thus its legitimacy is assessed as such leading to a mismatch with reality.
In the theoretical framework, we saw the importance of the idea of constitutional representative democracy and the distinction between nation-states and international regimes. Many people perceive the EU as a political order of multi-level government (or federation in the making). In terms of legitimacy this means the use of both dimensional conceptualisations and a focus on the input and throughput components of legitimacy and a focus on direct legitimacy. This though will logically lead to a mismatch with the reality of multi-level governance and therefore the perception of a legitimacy deficit.

The case for this hypothesis is strong. All three discourses show a preference for a focus on input and direct legitimacy with a balance between the two dimensional conceptualisation and often a negative evaluation of the EU’s legitimacy. A focus on throughput legitimacy is a bit more often negative than one on input legitimacy in its evaluation, but the former is the least important component in the discourses. In the narratives, this translates into problems with the representation as well as identification and with the transparency as well as the efficiency of procedures. All are perceived as reasons for the EU’s legitimacy deficit. The EU is thus perceived as ‘simply’ another layer of government.

Further, it is very clear that none of the discourses take the reality of multi-level governance into account: this was proven in the numbers as well as in the narratives. Both elements of the hypothesis are proven and thus one might assume that a reason for the EU’s legitimacy deficit is the mismatch between theoretical standards and reality. Unfortunately, the second hypothesis is also rejected, because it is incomplete.

Although the Dutch and French federalist perceive the EU as a level of government or want it to become one (and one might argue the British Europhobes fear it exactly for this reason), this is only half the story. For the Gaullist, both British and French, and Europhobes the EU is and should be primarily an international regime. This is also the way the British press reports on the EU. Observations based on categories most related to this perspective – a nationalist conceptualisation, a focus on output legitimacy, a focus on indirect legitimacy and/or not using any model – lead more often to a positive evaluation of the EU’s legitimacy, but still they are overall more often negative than positive. The reasons are that from this perspective, the EU-institutions are already too large and they address the wrong issues – (economic) superpower not superstate is their motto. This is actually more in line with people’s expectations. They want the EU to tackle these issues and the environment (Thomassen and Schmitt 2004: 7-9). Further, this view cannot logically address the need for more democracy. The EU already has more direct and indirect legitimacy than any international regime. Identifications should be with the nation-state, because the EU should not and will not become a state. In other words, a deficit arises from this perspective and it is also the result a mismatch of the theoretical conceptualisation of legitimacy and reality.

The mismatches between the theoretical demands of multi-level government, but also of an international regime and the reality of multi-level governance are both reasons for the EU’s legitimacy deficit. These mismatches might very well account for the paradox of people’s support for the European project, but its weak legitimacy. They support an ideal version, but are not theoretically equipped to handle the reality of multi-level governance. This is problematic, because it is very unlikely that the EU will revert back to just an economic union or become a full-fledged federation anytime soon (and the desirability of both can be doubted).

9.4.3 – The Mass Media’s Shortcomings: Apparent and Acknowledged

Now for the final hypothesis:
H3: The EU’s legitimacy deficit is increased by the mass media.
The discourses were different and clearly influenced by ‘local’ political discussions. A European public discourse has yet to fully emerge and therefore it seems the EU has twenty-seven discourses. The EU’s legitimacy deficit takes on different forms in the discourses. In line with the idea of an emerging public sphere it should be noted that some articles were published in national discourses from foreign commentators, but the contribution is much smaller than the national contribution. This is in line with other research (Liebert and Trentz 2008: 19; Peters et al. 2005).

The three potential media deficits – knowledge, motivation and comprehension – were present to some extent. The lack of knowledge and comprehension of the EU’s system of multi-level governance are apparent. They might lead to a motivational deficit in two ways. On the one hand, if the EU is set standards of legitimacy based on a model of multi-level government, which it cannot reach then the EU will always be perceived as undemocratic. On the other hand, if the EU is seen as an international regime it is perceived as too intrusive and meddling in sovereign matters.

These contributions of the mass media to the EU’s legitimacy deficit are apparent, but the shortcomings of the mass media are also acknowledged in discourse. In all three discourses complains are voiced about the quality of the debate. The debate or specifically the politicians and mass media are perceived as bias and/or unorganised. They are even accused of deliberately misleading the public. There mass media thus increase the EU’s legitimacy deficit

Now for the methods which could help overcome these problems. They do not paint a much better picture. Quantity – the numbers of articles – does not seem to influence the evaluation of the EU, and one might even argue it increases when legitimacy is questioned as in the French discourse. EU-policy and institutions are often only mentioned rather than explained let alone made comprehensible: the discussions stay vague and abstract. Personification is important in both countries with powerful heads of state – the United Kingdom and France –, but the positive effect can seriously be doubted as shown in the case of Chirac. Further, there are almost no European faces in the discourse.

Finally, nationalisation only seems to lead to a positive evaluation in the Netherlands: a small country in a globalised world. In the case of United Kingdom, the majority think they can survive on their own. The rebate has for example become part of their national pride, because it symbolises a victory over the continent and Europe’s dependence on them. If they are forced to give it up this might lead them to turn away from the EU rather than toward it.¹²⁸ The French find themselves out of ’the driver’s seat’, thus in the near future trying to play the national interest card will probably play out negatively, except maybe with socialist/green federalists with whom the idea of a green and social Europe might catch on.

All in all, the mass media are flawed mediators, whom increase the EU’s legitimacy deficit. This is both apparent and actually acknowledged in the discourses. The solutions to overcome the mass media’s shortcomings though do not seem to work and some actually have the opposite effect. This hypothesis is proven and thus accepted.