benefit wholly from the claimants expenditure to her detriment. In this
case, the defendants’ enrichment is prima facie, an unjust enrichment.
Therefore, this was a case for which the court should find that the
claimant was entitled to the relief as pleaded.
[12] Counsel for the defendants on the other hand submitted that:
(i)
The claim form contains no claim for breach of contract nor is there
a claim for proprietary estoppel. Therefore the claim should be
restricted to recovery of possession and the claim for the sum of
$4,800,000.00;
(ii) The claimant’s evidence is a clear rejection of a contract being formed
between the parties. It cannot be said that the claimant entered into a
contract with the defendants or that it was in the minds of or intention of
any of the parties that the assistance to be given by the claimant was
being done with an intention to create legal relations between the
parties;
(iii) The evidence given by the claimant, specifically that “
she was the one
who took the initiative in relation to the construction of this house and
that she contributed towards the construction of the house out of love
and affection for her parents. That further she volunteered to assist as a
loving child with deep love and affection for her parents and owning the
house was never in her mind when she commenced assisting them”,
gives the court no basis on which to ground proprietary estoppel or
unjust enrichment;
(iv) The equitable doctrine of proprietary estoppel by way of mistaken belief
is only applicable when the claimant can prove that the defendant was
aware that she had acted in reliance on the mistaken belief, that the
defendants acquiesced to her acting in this way, and in their
acquiescence abstained from “setting her right” so as to benefit from the
mistake;
(v)
There was no agreement, assurance or encouragement by the
defendants to the claimant that she would be given an interest in the
property. This instant case is wholly distinguishable from that of Gillett
v Holt [2001] 1 Ch D. 210, on which the claimant relies. In the present
case, the defendants deny making any promises to the claimant at all
and as held in Gillett v Holt, “it is necessary to look at the claim in the
round”;
(vi) Proprietary estoppel requires that there be an assurance made to the
claimant, on which the claimant reasonably relied and expended money
in reliance on that assurance. The claimant has not passed the test in
establishing the relevant assurance given. Further, the claimant’s
evidence is woefully deficient in establishing that she had suffered
detriment. The detriment cannot be categorized as substantial and
unconscionable, given the circumstances of the case and the evidence
that has been adduced under cross-examination. As such having failed
to establish that the defendants had, in fact, made assurances to her
and that she had relied upon these assurances and acted to her
detriment, the claimant’s claim for relief on the basis of proprietary
estoppel must be rejected;
(vii) The claimant cannot be accepted as a credible and truthful witness.
Further, the version of the claimant’s evidence that she got the title to
secure her monies being spent on constructing the house with the
intention to put her name on it, should be rejected as unreliable,
untrustworthy and in fact untrue. Mr. White’s hearsay evidence ought to
be rejected and ought to be seen as further contradiction of the case for
the claimant. Mr. Clarke is neither a reliable nor a truthful witness and
the evidence of Mr. Rohan Henry and Mr. Franklyn Dixon were not in
any way helpful and/or valuable in determining the factual situation
between the parties. Mr. Baugh’s evidence should not be relied on
because he ended his cross-examination by admitting that his account
and the account of the claimant were mixed and that being the case,
there would be a danger to rely on such evidence;
(viii) The evidence given by the claimant and her witnesses therefore cannot
establish any contractual relationship between the parties and cannot
by any remote possibility establish any liability on the part of the
defendants. The claimant has not proven the particulars required to
establish either a contract between the parties, proprietary estoppel, or
unjust enrichment;
(ix) The 2
nd
defendant gave one and only one version as to how possession
of the Title came to pass to the claimant. This is important, as the
claimant gave two (2) versions of how she came into possession of the
Title. The court should have no difficulty finding the 2
nd
defendant to be
very advanced in age but that she was able to recall with clarity the
sequence of events leading up to the claimant laying hold of her land
title. The evidence of the 2
nd
defendant that all funds were sent to the
claimant, the coordinator of the project, was credible and on a balance
of probabilities should be believed in preference to the evidence of the
claimant. In total the case of the defendants is more believable than that
of the claimant;
(x) The claimant’s claim for restitution is untenable on the basis of claiming
unjust enrichment in these circumstances. The pre-requisite for granting
this remedy was the ability of the claimant to establish that the benefit
enjoyed by the defendant was unjust. This was not a matter to be
simply inferred but had to be proved by the asserter to the ordinary civil
standard of proof, in a context where awarding the remedy would do
justice between the parties. In the alternative to a finding of unjust