Masaryk university faculty of social studies



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Suffixes:
1, List of after-war Prime Ministers


  • Shidehara Kijuro (1945-1946)

  • Yoshida Shigeru (1946-1947, 1948-1954)

  • Katayama Tetsu (1947-1948)

  • Ashida Hitoshi (1948)

  • Hatoyama Ichiro (1954-1956)

  • Ishibashi Tanzan (1956-1957)

  • Kishi Nobusuke (1957-1960)

  • Ikeda Hayato (1960-1964)

  • Sato Eisaku (1964-1972)

  • Tanaka Kakuei (1972-1974)

  • Miki Takeo (1974-1976)

  • Fukuda Takeo (1976-1978)

  • Ohira Masayoshi (1978-1980)

  • Suzuki Zenko (1980-1982)

  • Nakasone Yasuhiro (1982-1987)

  • Takeshita Noboru (1987-1989)

  • Uno Sosuke (1987-1989)

  • Kaifu Toshiki (1989 - 1991)

  • Miyazawa Kiichi (1991-1993)

  • Hosokawa Morihiro (1993-1994)

  • Hata Tsutomu (1994-1994)

  • Murayama Tomiichi (1994-1996)

  • Hashimoto Ryutaro (1996-1998)

  • Obuchi Keizo (1998-2000)

  • Mori Yoshiro (2000-2001)

  • Koizumi Junichiro (2001-2006)

  • Abe Shinzo (2006-2007)

  • Fukuda Yasuo (2007-2008)

  • Aso Taro (2008-2009)

  • Hatoyama Yukio (2009-present)

Note: except for Hosokawa Morihiro (New Japan), Hata Tsutomu (Japan Renewal), Murayama Tomiichi (Social Democratic Party of Japan) and Hatoyama Yukio (Democratic Party of Japan), all of these Prime Ministers come from the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan


2, List of Political Parties in Japan


Main parties:

  • Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) Jiyū Minshu-tō, or Jimin-tō 自民党 (conservative, 1955-)

  • Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) Minshutō (social liberal 1998-)民主党

  • New Komeito - Komeitō (conservative, theocratic Buddhist, 1998-)公明党

  • Japanese Communist Party (JCP) Nihon Kyōsan-tō (communist, 1922-)日本共産党

  • Social Democratic Party (Japan) (SDP) Shakai Minshutō, or Shamin-tō (socialist, 1996-)社民党

  • Liberal League Jiyu Rengo (liberal, 1994-)

  • People's New Party (PNP) Kokumin Shintō (conservative, 2005-)

  • New Party Nippon (NPN) Shintō Nippon (2005-)

  • New Party Daichi (NPD) Shintō Daichi (2005-)

Current political parties that used to be in the Diet but aren't currently represented:

  • Dainiin Club Dainiin Kurabu (centrist, 1983-)

  • New Socialist Party Shin Shakai To (socialist, 1996-)

  • Sports and Peace Party Supotsu Heiwa To (centrist, 1989-)

  • Takeru (centrist, 2001-)

  • Rainbow and Greens Niji to Midori (green)

  • Ishin Seito Shimpu (far right, 1995-)

  • Women's Party (Japan) Josei To (Feminist, 1993-)

  • Internet Breakthrough Party of Japan (Led by Iron Chef Comentator and Judge and former LDP member Shinichiro Kurimoto)

Some of the main regional parties represented in regional assemblies:




  • Kanagawa Network Movement Kanagawa Nettowaku Undo (Yokohama, socialist)

  • Seikatsusha Network Seikatsusha Nettowaku (Tokyo, socialist)

  • Okinawa Social Mass Party Okinawa Shakai Taishu To (Okinawa, socialist)

  • Green Niigata, Midori Niigata (Niigata, communist)

    • formerly Niigata New Party for People, Shimin Shin-to Niigata (Niigata, communist)

  • Association of Independents Mushozoku no Kai (centrist, 1999-2004)

    • formerly House of Representatives Club Sangiin Kurabu (centrist, 1998-1999)

  • New Conservative Party, (conservative, 2002-2003)

    • formerly Conservative Party of Japan (2000), (conservative, 2000-2002)

  • Liberal Party (1998), (liberal, 1998-2003)

  • Democratic Party of Japan (1996), (liberal, 1996-1998)

  • Good Governance Party, (liberal, 1998)

  • New Fraternity Party, (liberal reformist, 1998)

  • Sun Party, (liberal reformist, 1996-1998)

  • Democratic Reform Party (liberal reformist, 1993-1998)

  • Midori no Kaigi Environmental Green Political Assembly (ecologist conservative reformist, 2002-2004)

    • formerly The Sakigake Party, (conservative reformist-ecologist, 1998-2002)

    • formerly New Party Sakigake, (conservative reformist-ecologist, 1993-1998)

  • New Peace Party, (conservative, 1997-1998)

  • Japan New Party, (liberal, 1993-1996)

  • Japan Renewal Party, (liberal, 1993-1994)

  • New Frontier Party, (socialist/liberal, 1994-1997)

  • Democratic Socialist Party (Japan), (social-democratic, 1960-1994 - broke off from JSP)

  • Democratic Party of Japan, Occupation, (agrarian conservative, 1945-1955)

  • Liberal Party of Japan, Occupation, (conservative, 1945-1955)

  • Great Achievement Association, (conservative nationalist, 1889-1909)

    • formerly Conservative Party of Japan (1880)

  • Constitutional Liberal Party (Japan), (liberal, 1882-1931)

  • Constitutional Progressive Party, (moderate liberal, 1882-1934)

  • Liberal Party of Japan (1881), (liberal, 1881)

    • formerly Aikokusha, (liberal, 1872-1881)

  • Liberalism in Japan

Source: List of political parties in Japan. http://www.search.com/reference/List_of_political_parties_in_Japan



1 However, some authors tend to name this version of classical liberalism in other words. For example, Ole Weaver (Smith 1996, 149) addresses this theory as “pluralism, interdependence and world society”; Brown (1997, 40) refers to this theory as “neoliberal institutionalism”, however, most of the authors concerned with the theoretical research admit, that the core of this theory really is in some version of traditional liberalism (thus neoliberalism).

2 However, as the realists always point out, the sources of realism can be found a long time ago, with thinkers and historians such as Thucydides.

3 Although in some circumstances, “class” may be a basis of group solidarity. More in Gilpin (1984 , 290)

4 Or, as Gilpin (1984, 290) writes “organized groups of people” in form of a nation state

5 And thus once again growing importance of liberalism-based paradigms

6 However, „classical“ realist theory of international relations was no longer the same, because of the changes that English school and the events refered to as „the second Great debate“ brought to it. As it is not the focus of this thesis, I will mention it only shortly. Second debate originated in the criticism, that classical realist school is not based on researchable methods, that its assumptions (such as human nature) are not proper theoretical material. Thus, this debate is considered as a debate on the method, which did not alter from the classical realist ontology, just brought scientific measures into it. More in Smith, Booth, Zalewski (1996), Baldwin (1993), Sullivan (2005), Buzan (2001),Gilpin (1984), Brown (1997) etc.

7 As Stefano Guzzini (1998, 154) points out, Waltz acknowledges the importance of other theories, by stating that: “The fact, that there might be no balance of power, or that some states do not successfully cope with successful practices of other states can be easily disregarded as based on forces outside the reach of neorealist theory” (Waltz 1979, 124-125 in Guzzini 1998, 155, translated to English by the author)

8 See Baldwin (1993, 3), Moravcsik (1997, 525-530), Sorensen (2005, 194)

9 Or idealists, as some authors describe liberalism in the inter-war period. E.g. Hollis, Smith (1990, 31), Brown (1997) etc.

10 Therefore, the economic aspect is also very important for liberal theory; especially the economic independence, as it was presented by the classics of economic thought, Adam Smith and David Ricardo

11 Whereas realists argued, that human nature is neutral, but would most like tilt to the evil side, rather than to the good side

12 An organization, that anticipates war

13 Resulting in a 1928 Briand-Kelogg pact that definitely outlawed war

14 Government, in this sense, is seen as a battleground, constrained by the underlying identities, interests and power of individuals or groups.

15 In this argument lies one of the differences from neoliberal institutionalism. Institutionalism says, that “state preferences should be treated as if they were partially convergent”, which differs from liberal “state’s preferences are always determined by other states”. See Moravcsik (1997), Baldwin (1993), Grieco (1988)

16 But was also advocated in Keohane and Nye’s (1977) Power and Interdependence and others

17 “Regimes” and “institutions” are parallel terms; many of the terms of regime literature are also reflected in institutions literature. See Schweller, Priess (1997, 3-4)

18 Keohane continues by stating that “Dynamically, the relationship between these institutionally affected transaction costs and the formation of the new institutions will, according to the theory, be curvilinear. If transaction costs are negligible, it will not be necessary to create new institutions to facilitate mutually beneficial exchange: if transaction costs are extremely high, it will not be feasible to build institutions-which may even be unimaginable” (Keohane 1988, 386)

19 Three especially important works on the liberal side were the special issue of International Organization on "Transnational Relations and World Politics" in 1971 (Keohane and Nye 1972); Keohane and Nye's Power and Interdependence in 1977; and the special issue of International Organization on "International Regimes" in 1982. Three especially important works of neorealists during the 1970s and 1980s included Kenneth Waltz's "Theory of International Relations" in 1975, his Theory of International Politics in 1979, and Joseph Grieco's "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism ' in 1988. The first was a preliminary version of the second, which has become the touchstone for neorealists, .much as Morgenthau's text (1948) served as a touchstone for realists in the 1950s. (Krasner 1983a in Baldwin 1993)

20 Daniel Baldwin (1993, 5-6) adds, that “It is not clear why this issue receives so little attention since it does not seem to have been resolved. One should not be surprised if it resurfaces as the debate evolves.”

21 See Jervis 1999

22 As an example of this debate, we can see John Mearsheimer’s (1994, 5-7) realist critique of institutions. Mearsheimer argues that the classical institutionalist teaching that “institutions can alter state preferences and therefore change state behavior. Institutions can discourage states from calculating self-interest on the basis how every move affects their relative power position. Institutions are independent variables and they have the capacity to move states away from war” is nothing more, than just a “reflection of the distribution of power in the world, based on self-interested calculations of the great powers with no independent effect on state behavior”

23 This division is based on a book by Michael J. Green, Japan’s reluctant realism (2003, 4-10)

24 In office from 1948 to 1954

25 Primarily by the cooperation with United States and American military presence in Japan. Another influence on the executability of Japanese foreign policy have been the historical relationship and unfinished issues such as the wartime memories or as Rapkin (1990, 195) puts it, „legitimacy deficit.“

26 This understanding of power or this inability in translating Japanese economic power into political power has confused most realist thinkers. More in Hagstrom (2005, 396-7)

27 E.g. Berger (2007, 49)

28 Samuels (2007, 39) specifies three American concerns about Japan: The first is that Japan might re-militarize after the Occupation and launch a revanchist attack. The second was that it might remain unstable and require excessive U.S. attention. The third was that it might make a separate peace with the Communist powers and give them access to its considerable industrial potential.

29 As a part of U.S. security doctrine, we may see traces of classical geopolitical thinking, inspired by such authors, as were Halford Mackinder or Nicholas Spykman. According to Spykman, Japan was part of a so-called rimland, an area vital to American security interests. This rimland theory was then projected into the containment strategy and executed by U.S. during most of the cold war period. More in Spykman (1942)

30 Nichibei (日米) is a Japanese term for Japan-U.S. partnership

31 Despite the fact that Japan supported the U.S.-led coalition with a hefty monetary contribution of $13 billion. More in Berger (2007, 4-6)

32 The first one to define this concept was a famous Japanese political scientist and a student of Fukuzawa Yukichi, Maruyama Masuo in his book Thought and behavior in modern Japanese politics (1963) (Maruyama 1969, 128-129; Hiraishi 2003, 241)

33 With this idea comes the “nickname”, the Americans gave Japan during second part of 20th century: “Japan Inc.”

34 Tokyo University in particular. It’s said, that around 80% of Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and 90% of Ministry of Finance (MOF) officials are Tokyo University (and Faculty of law in particular) students. (Koh 1989, 67-123 in Hook et al. 2001, 42)

35 And the name of the university in particular. Students of Tokyo, Keio, Kyoto or Waseda universities are generally considered as a elite of the nation with open door almost in any company or institution. See Doyon (2001), Kiefer (1970) etc.

36 This U.S.-Japan bilateral bureau gave MOFA an occasional “nickname” in the press: “Kasumigaseki branch consulate of the US embassy in Japan”

37 Second reason for the change is usually considered Japanese diplomatic fail during the Gulf War

38 Official Development Organization

39 Former International Finance Bureau, the newest of all the Bureaus within MOF. This bureau was created as a response to Japan joining OECD and IMF in 1964. See Stockwin (2003)

40 In other words, the old electoral rules were replaced with a mixed-member system

where 300 seats are elected in single-member districts and 200 in one of 11 PR districts. The

number of PR seats was reduced to 180 after the 1996 election. A PR district is one where voters

cast a vote for a party list and then seats are allocated to that party in proportion to the percentage



of votes it receives. See Christensen (1994), Patterson, Maeda (2007), Rahat (2004), Horiuchi, Saito (2004)

41 And the Upper House elections of 2007, where LDP lost its majority to DPJ. See Govella, Vogel (2008)

42 Political party, which was formed in 1996 from SDPJ (Social Democratic Party of Japan) and former members of NFP (New Frontier Party)

43 This term is connected to the elections of 1958, 1960 and 1963 and its meaning is simply to capture the strength of LDP in terms of votes and seats, both of which were over the majority mark. Also, this phrase frames the situation, when LDP was twice as strong as its nearest vote competitor. See Patterson, Maeda (2007, 419-420), Hook (2001, 52)

44 In 1976 it was the unaffiliated conservatives and New Liberal Club, a newly-formed party which split from LDP after the Lockheed scandal of 1976. Despite the success they earned in 1976 elections, they were eventually made to re-join LDP in 1986. See Reed, Scheiner (2003)

45 I.e. Nihon Shinto (Japan New Party), Shinseito (Japan Renewal Party) and the Shinto Sakigake (New Party Harbinger)

46 The first time was the 1993-1994 11months period

47 However, as most polls indicate, the current situation looks grim for DPJ, as it got only 35% in the last Asahi shimbun poll. See Ozawa (2010)

48 This debate evolved around the idea, that Japan should exploit all the possibilities it had; Japan wanted to explore Chinese market and the LDP stood split: China lobby on one side and Taiwan lobby on the other.

49 Examples can be the cross-party groups, trying to influence the foreign policy, such as Dietmen’s league for the Promotion of Japan-North Korea Friendship, Japan-China friendship, Comprehensive Security; Japan-EU inter-parliamentary Delegation. See Hook (2001)

50 Party system from 1955 to 1993/4

51 The 1951 pact can also be seen as a result of the loss of China as a strategic partner to US in 1949. See Yoda (2006)

52 Theorists concerned with constructivist theory argue, that one of the main factors shaping the Yoshida doctrine and the post-war pacifism is also the trauma of atomic bombing and catastrophic defeat, which discredited war in Japanese people’s eyes. See Berger (2007), Arase (2007), Ikenberry, Mastanduno (2003), Hatakeyama (2005), etc.

53 The leader of “realist” defense activists, Nakasone Yasuhiro did not see this as a victory for Japanese remilitarization though, as autonomous defense still had not been accomplished.

54 Courtney Purrington (1992) pointed out, that the main reason Japan failed during the Gulf War was the public opinion allergic to dispatching SDF. On the other hand, the main actor forcing on the dispatch was the LDP.

55 See US-Japan Defense Cooperation, on-line text http://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_policy/dp04.html

56 US-Japan Defense Cooperation, Section V, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo. See on-line text http://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_policy/dp04.html

57 For overall incentives for US-Japan cooperation, see The Guidelines for US-Japan Defense Cooperation, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/guideline2.html and Bluebook on Japan’s foreign policy, section 2: http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/1988/1988-3-2.htm

58 However, the national budget has not been raised to a significant degree, as it was seconded with the restructuralisation of Japanese military. See Japanese Budget, 1998, Chapter 7: National Defense. On-line text http://www.mof.go.jp/english/budget/bib012.pdf

59 Not only on the national level, but also on the level of Japanese public opinion

60 Tetsuya Endo (2007) in his analysis of Japan’s capability of creating nuclear weapons argues, that “Technologically, Japan is capable of developing nuclear weapons if it invests considerable time and money. A major nuclear energy user possessing 55 nuclear reactors and committed to its nuclear fuel cycle program, Japan possesses high-level nuclear technologies, a substantial amount of plutonium and the capability to enrich uranium. Although nearly all this plutonium is reactor-grade plutonium unsuitable for nuclear explosion, Japan does possess a small amount of high-grade plutonium.” With this analysis Endo proves, that it is far from impossible for Japan to create its nuclear potential.

61 Japan’s dispatch of peacekeeping troops to Iraq may be another sign of this statement’s validity

62 Since the US were afraid of Japanese after-war revanchism

63 However, as some other authors add, these reasons were not the only ones connected to the Japan-China relations. Glenn D. Hook (2001,164) points out that “The Japanese state and its people ever since the period of the Chinese world order, have felt a sense of cultural affinity and friendship with their massive neighbor, expressed in the phrase

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