Lexstat 18 usc section 1001 united states code service

Unpublished Opinions

Unpublished: District court did not abuse its discretion by enhancing defendant's offense level for her leadership role, sophisticated means, and abusing position of trust under USSG §§ 3B1.1(a), 2F1.1(b)(5)(C), 3B1.3 following her conviction for making false statements to Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) in violation of 18 USCS § 1001; defendant exercised leadership role over at least four other individuals to accomplish her scheme and record contained ample evidence that some of these individuals qualified as "participants" in defendant's criminal activity; when viewed together, steps defendant undertook to accomplish and conceal her fraud comprised sophisticated scheme; further, defendant abused position of trust with respect to buyers, sellers, lenders, and HUD. United States v Jacobs (2006, CA9 Cal) 2006 US App LEXIS 30916.

185. Debarment or disbarment

Government contractor can be debarred from future contracts for violation of 18 USCS § 1001; however, debarment is not automatic, agency must take close look at circumstances surrounding offense, effect of suspension and payment of fine, length of time which has passed and person's character since offense and conviction. Bender (1976, AGBCA) 79-1 CCH BCA Dec 13801.

186.--Attorneys

Conviction of attorney under 18 USCS § 1001 constituted conviction of felony requiring his mandatory disbarment under New York law. In re Cahn (1977, 2d Dept) 59 App Div 2d 179, 400 NYS2d 547, app den (1978) 44 NY2d 641, 405 NYS2d 1025, 376 NE2d 934, cert den (1979) 439 US 1069, 59 L Ed 2d 35, 99 S Ct 838 and app dismd (1978) 45 NY2d 775.

Conviction of conspiracy in advising alien clients to falsify information to be submitted to Immigration and Naturalization Service in violation of 18 USCS § 1001 warrants disbarment of New York attorney. In re Leifer (1978, 1st Dept) 63 App Div 2d 174, 407 NYS2d 1.

187. Cumulative punishment

Cumulative punishment is properly imposed on defendant convicted of making false statement to federal agency (18 USCS § 1001) and of willfully failing to report that he was carrying more than $ 5,000 into United States (31 USCS § 5316), even though both convictions are based on same false answer to single question on Customs form asking whether he was carrying more than $ 5,000 upon arrival into United States, since proof of one violation does not necessarily include proof of other. United States v Woodward (1985) 469 US 105, 83 L Ed 2d 518, 105 S Ct 611.

Legislative history of 18 USCS § 1001 reveals no evidence of intent to pyramid punishment for offenses covered by another statute as well as by § 1001; conviction for violation of 18 USCS § 542 and for violation of § 1001 were redundant and conviction for violation of § 1001 would be vacated. United States v Rose (1978, CA9 Wash) 570 F2d 1358 (criticized in United States v LeMaster (1995, CA6 Ky) 54 F3d 1224, 42 Fed Rules Evid Serv 494, 1995 FED App 157P) and (criticized in United States v Wiener (1996, CA2 NY) 96 F3d 35) and (criticized in United States v Solis (1997, CAAF) 46 MJ 31, 1997 CAAF LEXIS 5) and (criticized in United States v Huber (2002, DC ND) 2002 US Dist LEXIS 306).

Because defendant's conduct involved in each of his three 18 USCS § 1001(a)(1) false statements/concealments offenses was clearly directed at three investigatory entities, was sporadic or intermittent, and did not entail substantially same harm, they were not grouped under USSG § 3D1.2. United States v Safavian (2006, DC Dist Col) 461 F Supp 2d 76.

188. Miscellaneous

Absent indication that sentencing judge relied on constitutionally impermissible factors or upon material inaccuracies, sentence of 3 months imprisonment and fine of $ 10,000 was proper upon conviction of offense under 18 USCS § 1001. United States v Glazer (1976, CA2 NY) 532 F2d 224, cert den (1976) 429 US 844, 50 L Ed 2d 115, 97 S Ct 123.

Defendant was improperly sentenced under perjury guideline rather than under fraud and deceit guideline for violating 18 USCS § 1001 by checking box for "no income" on financial affidavit required for court appointment of attorney, since "affidavit" was not sworn to in sense of true affidavit and therefore defendant did not commit perjury. United States v Duranseau (1994, CA6 Mich) 19 F3d 1117, 40 Fed Rules Evid Serv 679, 1994 FED App 100P (criticized in United States v LeMaster (1995, CA6 Ky) 54 F3d 1224, 1995 FED App 157P, 42 Fed Rules Evid Serv 494).

Sentencing Guideline 2F1.1(b)(4)(A) was not limited to convictions for procurement fraud violations of 18 USCS § 1031, but rather, risk-of-serious-bodily-injury enhancement was appropriate for all fraud offenses, including 18 USCS § 1001. United States v McCord, Inc. (1998, CA8 Ark) 143 F3d 1095 (criticized in United States v Johansson (2001, CA9 Cal) 249 F3d 848, 2001 CDOS 3515, 2001 Daily Journal DAR 4345) and (criticized in United States v Lucien (2003, CA2 NY) 347 F3d 45).

Penalty for defendant, who was convicted of making false or fraudulent statement to department or agency of U.S., in violation of 18 USCS § 1001 and corruptly endeavoring to obstruct or impede administration of tax laws in violation of 26 USCS § 7212(a), was improperly increased under former USSG § 2F1.1(b) where defendant was incapable of inflicting intended loss on IRS. United States v Milton (2001, CA10 NM) 12 Fed Appx 643, 2001 Colo J C A R 1762, 87 AFTR 2d 1465.

Application of preponderance of evidence standard of proof in finding that truck driver's alleged conspiracy to violate 18 USCS § 1001 in matter within jurisdiction of Federal Highway Administration involved conscious or reckless risk of serious bodily injury, resulting in enhancement of sentence under USSG § 2F1.1(b)(6)(A) and ineligibility for "split sentence," did not violate due process. United States v Johansson (2001, CA9 Cal) 249 F3d 848, 2001 CDOS 3515, 2001 Daily Journal DAR 4345 (criticized in United States v Benton (2004, ED Wis) 323 F Supp 2d 903).

Lawyer's offense of making false statements to FBI with regard to matter of tax representation, in violation of 18 USCS § 1001, was not "more aptly covered" by Obstruction of Justice guideline, USSG § 2J1.2, where facts did not establish by preponderance of evidence that he knew of grand jury proceedings or that statements he was making to FBI, fairly construed as exculpatory denials, would reach grand jury. United States v Scungio (2001, CA1 RI) 255 F3d 11.

District court erred under USSG § 2B1.1 in determining loss attributable to defendant following entry of his guilty plea to making false statement in connection with Small Business Administration (SBA) disaster relief loan in violation of 18 USCS § 1001; district court's actual loss analysis was faulty because it ignored causation requirement inherent in rules for determining loss; district court erroneously assigned portion of loss that SBA realized on foreclosure of property to represent actual loss caused by defendant's false statement to SBA; defendant's acts could not reasonably have been considered to have caused SBA's foreclosure loss. United States v Rothwell (2004, CA6 Tenn) 387 F3d 579, 2004 FED App 375P.

District court erred under USSG § 2B1.1 in determining loss attributable to defendant following entry of his guilty plea to making false statement in connection with Small Business Administration disaster relief loan in violation of 18 USCS § 1001; district court erred in assessing eight offense level points pursuant to USSG § 2B1.1(b)(1)(E) because defendant replaced money he improperly obtained before offense was detected. United States v Rothwell (2004, CA6 Tenn) 387 F3d 579, 2004 FED App 375P.

Defendant's 58-month sentence for making false statement under 18 USCS § 1001(a)(2) was not unreasonable where district court properly found that Sentencing Guidelines were not mandatory and that upward departure was necessary in view of defendant's extensive criminal history and incorrigibility and sentence also complied with factors set forth in 18 USCS § 3553(a). United States v Shannon (2005, CA8 SD) 414 F3d 921.

Defendant, who was convicted of violating 18 USCS §§ 922(i), 1001, was entitled to have his case remanded pursuant to Third Circuit's decision in Davis because district court violated Booker when it imposed sentencing enhancement based upon its own factual findings; two-point enhancement for defendant's role in offense was not charged as part of indictment, and thus facts to support enhancement were not found by jury as required by Booker. United States v McBane (2005, CA3 Pa) 433 F3d 344.

Appellant's sentence on guilty plea conviction for making false, fraudulent, and fictitious material statement and representation within jurisdiction of U.S. Department of Homeland Security was vacated and case was remanded for resentencing where neither of cited cross-references could have been properly utilized to sentence him pursuant to USSG § 2L2.1 and sentencing him under that section was not harmless error as it resulted in greater guideline range. United States v Bah (2006, CA8 Iowa) 439 F3d 423.

Where defendant was convicted of bulk cash smuggling and making false and fictitious material statement and representation to Customs and Border Protection officer, violating 31 USCS §§ 5316, 5332 and 18 USCS § 1001, requiring him to forfeit entire $ 24,000 that he attempted to bring into U.S. without reporting, was not plain error and, thus, there was no violation of Excessive Fines Clause of Eighth Amendment; forfeiture amount was well within statutory maximum fine and within potential fine range under Sentencing Guidelines, which were among relevant factors that could be considered in assessing gravity of offense. United States v Ely (2006, CA6 Tenn) 468 F3d 399, 2006 FED App 425P.

Where defendant was convicted of bulk cash smuggling and making false and fictitious material statement and representation to Customs and Border Protection officer, violating 31 USCS §§ 5316, 5332 and 18 USCS § 1001, his sentence of five months' imprisonment and five months of home detention to be served as condition of supervised release was not unreasonable because district court had thoroughly and appropriately considered all of appropriate factors under 18 USCS § 3553(a); moreover, it sentenced him at very bottom of advisory range, even allowing for half of sentence to be served in home detention pursuant to USSG § 5C1.1(c); defendant, conceding that district court considered relevant factors, simply asked federal court of appeals to balance factors differently, which was beyond scope of its appellate review. United States v Ely (2006, CA6 Tenn) 468 F3d 399, 2006 FED App 425P.

Eighteen-month sentence for defendant's conviction for making false statements in violation of 18 USCS § 1001(a)(2) when he applied to work as baggage and passenger screener for Transportation Security Administration and said that he had never left job under unfavorable circumstances or had clearance authorization suspended, when in fact defendant had been discharged from U.S. Air Force because of his verbal support of Osama bin Laden and September 11, 2001 attacks and his access to classified information had been terminated at that time, was not substantively unreasonable; sentence was grounded in seriousness of crime and need for deterrence, it did not accord unreasonable amount of weight to any pertinent factor, and it was not selected arbitrarily. United States v Ahmed (2006, CA6 Mich) 472 F3d 427, 2006 FED App 475P.

District court did not plainly err by imposing sex offender assessment and treatment as special condition of defendant's supervised release under 18 USCS § 3583(d) and 18 USCS § 3553(a) following his conviction for making false statements to FBI, violation of 18 USCS § 1001, because (1) defendant would only have to undergo sex offender treatment if court-ordered evaluation found such treatment necessary, (2) defendant's lies to FBI included claims that he buried murdered child and was involved with child sex ring; (3) facts underlying defendant's conviction were not remote; and (4) evidence suggesting that defendant fantasized about crimes against children was sufficient to warrant sex offender treatment under plain error review; although imposition of sex offender treatment was somewhat unusual given nonsexual nature of offense of conviction, facts underlying same showed that sentence would not result in miscarriage of justice. United States v Ross (2007, CA7 Wis) 475 F3d 871.

In case in which defendant testified falsely before grand jury about his knowledge of illegal fill activity in violation of Clean Water Act--testimony that was facilitated by his failure to produce all of his subpoenaed record--and, as result of which, government was required to conduct further investigation into owner's conduct, defendant's 24-month sentence for violating 18 USCS §§ 1503, 1623, and 1001 was affirmed because district court did not err in imposing three-level enhancement under USSG § 2J1.3(b)(2); additionally, since district court: (1) correctly calculated USSG range; (2) considered 18 USCS § 3553(a) factors; and (3) sentenced defendant within Guidelines range, sentence was reasonable. United States v Johnson (2007, CA11 Fla) 485 F3d 1264, 20 FLW Fed C 599.

Federal district court did not improperly admit deposition when sentencing defendant for his conviction pursuant to 18 USCS § 1001; district court was not bound by ordinary rules of evidence, and there was no dispute about genuineness of transcript. United States v Riccio (2008, CA1 RI) 529 F3d 40.

Where defendant's sentence following his conviction under 18 USCS § 1001 included supervised release, remand for resentencing was not required on ground that there was conflict between written judgment and oral sentencing judgment regarding mental health counseling that was ordered as part of his supervised release; written judgment merely fleshed out details of more general oral judgment; in addition, USSG § 5D1.3(d)(5) expressly allowed courts to impose mental health counseling as supervised release condition, and district court ordered counseling because it believed that defendant was in need of psychological or psychiatric treatment. United States v Riccio (2008, CA1 RI) 529 F3d 40.

Where defendant was convicted of making false material declarations to grand juries, in violation of 18 USCS § 1623, obstructing justice by virtue of false declarations, in violation of 18 USCS § 1503, and making false material statements, in violation of 18 USCS § 1001(a), defendant's sentence was properly enhanced pursuant to USSG § 3A1.4 for obstructing investigation into federal crime of terrorism, as defined by 18 USCS § 2332b(g)(5), because defendant obstructed grand jury investigation into violations of 18 USCS §§ 2339A and 2339B and violations involved jihadist camps training people to fight governments of India, Russia, and United States; that enhancement depended on facts found by district court did not violate Sixth Amendment because district court treated U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual as advisory. United States v Benkahla (2008, CA4 Va) 530 F3d 300.

Where defendant embezzled funds while working as buyer at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) by submitting false claims for payments from fictitious vendor, defendant occupied position of trust based on (1) defendant's $ 100,000 procurement authority and lack of supervision, (2) defendant's ability to have new vendors activated in LANL procurement system, and (3) defendant's discretion to waive normal LANL rules regarding timing and manner of vendor payments. United States v Arreola (2008, CA10 NM) 548 F3d 1340.

In sentencing defendant under 18 USCS § 1001 for making false statements to federal authorities by using assumed identity during counterfeiting case, district court erred in finding that defendant's filings with appellate courts were violations of § 1001; documents submitted to judge by party to judicial proceeding were excepted from § 1001; district court properly included counterfeiting conviction as prior sentence under USSG § 4A1.2(a)(1), as counterfeiting was not relevant conduct under USSG § 1B1.3 for false statements offense. United States v Washington (2008, CA3 Pa) 549 F3d 905.

Because only two account holders suffered any pecuniary harm--which was prerequisite for being deemed "victim" under USSG § 2B1.1(b)(2)--they were only "victims" of defendant's violations of 18 USCS § 1341 and 18 USCS § 1001(a)(3); accordingly, district court committed legal error when it held that all 34 account holders were victims under USSG § 2B1.1(b)(2)(A) despite suffering no pecuniary harm United States v Kennedy (2009, CA3 Pa) 554 F3d 415.

Although defendant pled guilty to violating 18 USCS § 1001, because defendant admitted facts in his plea that established violation of 8 USCS § 1326, more serious offense on which his sentence was based, district court did not err in its calculation of U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual recommended sentence. United States v Gutierrez-Sanchez (2009, CA9 Cal) 587 F3d 904.

As defendant's offense did not involve firearms or arson, he was convicted under 18 USCS § 1001(a)(2), which proscribed false statements, and conduct set forth in his count of conviction did establish offense "specifically covered" by another guideline, it was appropriate for district court to apply cross-reference provision to determine defendant's base offense level. United States v Garcia (2009, CA5 Tex) 590 F3d 308.

In sentencing defendant under former USSG § 2F1.1 for violation of 18 USCS § 1001, district court properly inferred that defendant intended loss greater than actual loss based on fact that defendant concealed over $ 1 million of assets with intent to avoid maximum possible penalty for filing false statement with SEC. United States v Bolla (2003, App DC) 358 US App DC 173, 346 F3d 1148.

Where defendant pled guilty to making false statement and defendant's sentence was enhanced by factors that were not stipulated or admitted by defendant or found by jury, court corrected sentence; because Blakely and Sixth Amendment did not permit using additional facts beyond those contained in indictment and plea agreement to determine sentence, court applied base level offense on basis of facts explicit or implicit in plea. United States v Toro (2004, DC Conn) 335 F Supp 2d 268.

Cross reference provision of USSG § 2B1.1(c)(3) was applied to treat defendant's offense of making false statement under 18 USCS § 1001(a)(2) as one under USSG § 2L1.1(a)(3) because conduct charged in indictment adequately set forth offense of shielding alien from detection, with knowledge or reckless disregard, pursuant to 8 USCS § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii). United States v Rodriguez (2007, WD Tex) 493 F Supp 2d 833.

Although 18 USCS § 1001 imposes penalty which includes imprisonment for 5 years, court-martial punishment is based upon violations of Uniform Code of Military Justice, and limits of punishment cannot exceed those prescribed by Uniform Code of Military Justice and President of United States. United States v Varnadore (1958) 9 USCMA 471, 26 CMR 251; United States v Middleton, (1960) 12 USCMA 54, 30 CMR 54.

Offenses under 18 USCS § 1001 and Article 107 of Uniform Code of Military Justice are closely related offenses that are apparently multiplicitous when same act is charged in both ways, and when violation of § 1001 is laid as crime or offense not capital under Article 134 of Uniform Code of Military Justice, same may be punished only as violation of Article 107 of Uniform Code of Military Justice, with maximum of 1 year's confinement. United States v De Angelo (1965) 15 USCMA 423, 35 CMR 395.

Punishment for submission of false statements on matters within jurisdiction of departments and agencies of United States, prescribed in 18 USCS § 1001 being fine of $ 10,000 or imprisonment of not more than five years, or both, brings offense within definition of felony in 18 USCS § 1, which defines felony as any offense punishable by death or imprisonment for term exceeding one year. (1960) 40 Op Comp Gen 176.

Unpublished Opinions

Unpublished: Where defendant was convicted of engaging in scheme to falsify, conceal, or cover up presence of asbestos at oil refinery, in violation of 18 USCS § 1001(a)(1), it was error to fail to impose two-level enhancement for more than minimal planning under USSG § 2F1.1(b)(2) because defendant engaged in repeated acts over period of time. United States v Shaw (2005, CA10 Kan) 150 Fed Appx 863, 61 Envt Rep Cas 1363.

Unpublished: Although advisory Sentencing Guidelines range was 12 to 18 months for defendant's violations of 18 USCS §§ 1341, 1343, 1001 and 31 USCS § 333, district court's sentence of 30 months was reasonable; district court explicitly discussed 18 USCS § 3553(a) factors and found 18-month sentence inadequate to punish defendant's continued course of fraudulent conduct; it was reasonable for district court to conclude that 18-month sentence would not provide adequate deterrence for defendant's repeated fraudulent conduct and that longer sentence was necessary to protect public from further crimes committed by defendant. United States v Zaky (2007, CA6 Ohio) 2007 FED App 349N.

Unpublished: Defendant's 60-month sentence for making false statements in matter within jurisdiction of executive branch of United States was not disproportionate to defendant's 18 USCS § 1001 conviction because 18 USCS § 1001 contemplates sentence of five years and sentence imposed was quarter of length of applicable guidelines range; thus, sentence did not violate Eighth Amendment. United States v Maflahi (2005, CA2) 2005 US App LEXIS 10496.

Unpublished: Defendant failed to show that his within-guidelines 33 month sentence was unreasonable under 18 USCS § 3553 since (1) defendant, Social Security disability benefits recipient, was convicted of violating 18 USCS §§ 1341, 1001(a)(2), and 42 USCS § 408(a)(4), in connection with his concealment of financial information from Social Security Administration; (2) district court had considered mitigating factors cited by defendant, including his age, his physical condition, his family ties and responsibilities, and his public service, but those factors were generally irrelevant under federal sentencing guidelines, and defendant failed to show that he was more substantially affected by them than other convicted individuals; and (3) record showed that district court had considered 18 USCS § 3553(a) factors and that it had sufficiently articulated its reasons for imposing sentence, including seriousness of offenses, need for deterrence, and concerns about recidivism. United States v Ilges (2006, CA7 Ill) 2006 US App LEXIS 29827.

Unpublished: Sentence that defendant received for violating 18 USCS §§ 371, 1001(a)(2), which consisted of three-years' probation with six months' home detention, was reasonable where sentence was within applicable USSG range, sentence did not exceed statutory maximum, and district court explicitly stated that it considered factors in 18 USCS § 3553(a), including mitigating evidence showing that defendant committed theft of government housing assistance funds to support his six children. United States v Boatwright (2007, CA11 Fla) 2007 US App LEXIS 6289.