political decisionism (politics of the exception), the concept of the political
(friend/enemy distinction), and concrete-order-thinking (land-appropriations
as determinants of changes in international law and order). This point of
departure – the historically specific conditions of knowledge production –
affords a better understanding of how these premises translate into a
particular, though specious and defective, reinterpretation of the history
of international law and order. This operation of contextualization pro-
vides a privileged view on the anatomy and limits of Schmitt’s interna-
tional political and legal theory.
The article also suggests that the neo-Schmittian turn in IR pays insuffi-
cient attention to Schmitt’s political context and his politics of concept-
formation, which governed the construction of his history of international
law and order. Its followers tend to take Schmitt’s theoretical premises and
his historical narrative for granted in order to project his interwar critique
of American imperialism onto the 21st century. This compromises their
attempts to use his thought for purposes of international theorizing. To
demonstrate these claims, the article performs four analytical moves. First, it
sets out the context-dependent conception of Schmitt’s triple axiomatic
premises (decisionism, concept of the political, and concrete-order-thinking).
Second, it provides an exposition and critique of the explanatory limits of
this theoretical architecture. Third, it shows by means of a reconstruction
and critical examination of Schmitt’s account of the rise and fall of the
ius publicum europaeum across the four ‘spatial revolutions’ that defined his
intellectual terrain of engagement – from the Discoveries to Hitler’s
Großraumpolitik – how the defects of his theoretical assumptions expressed
themselves in a problematic history of the European interstate system. The
argument is that the discrepancy between Schmitt’s
explanans – concrete-
order-thinking – and his
explanandum – transformations in the structure of
political authority, international law, territorial order, and war and peace –
reveals fundamental deficiencies in the explanatory power of Schmitt’s
theoretical approach. Given these defects, the article finally questions IR
theorists’ reliance on Schmitt’s history and theory for the purposes
of formulating a
general, plausible, and coherent international theory
(given its context-dependent purpose). It concludes by drawing out how
Schmitt’s problematic history and the limits of his theory manifest
themselves in their interpretation of 20th and 21st Century international
relations and, in particular, the War on Terror.
To bring Schmitt’s distinct approach into sharper relief, the article
contrasts his international political and legal theory throughout the text
with the alternative paradigm of International Historical Sociology.
As Schmitt’s intellectual preoccupations moved from constitutional to
international law during the mid-1930s, he realized that political decisionism
Fatal attraction: Schmitt’s international theory 183
was insufficient to capture the geopolitics of land-appropriations and
spatial revolutions, which he now privileged as foundational world order-
constituting acts in order to re-conceive his history of international law and
order as an anti-liberal and anti-normative tract. This shift from decisionism
to concrete-order-thinking as a sociologically enhanced new type of juristic
thought was meant to remedy this explanatory vacuum. Yet, Schmitt’s ren-
dition of the sociological that drove geopolitical expansion never incorpo-
rated the social sources and social processes that caused geopolitical conflict,
spatial revolutions, and world-order projects. This resulted in a gap between
the objectives of his theoretical premises and his de-sociologized and de-
subjectified historiography that regressed into the power-political reifications
of geopolitics as such. This suppression and elimination of social relations
was already prefigured in his concept of the political – an ontologized friend/
enemy distinction – that now informed his concept of the geopolitical. Both
detached the (geo-)political from the social – in fact, prioritized and valorized
the (geo-)political over and against the social.
Accordingly, Schmitt’s work is engaged not solely in terms of interna-
tional political theory – a mode of theorizing that all too often remains
unchecked by its confrontation with its empirical referent – but is set in
dialogue with international history and, ultimately, international histor-
ical sociology. For it is this absence of an international historical sociology
in Schmitt’s work – an explanation of the differential relations between
historically varying forms of authority relations, geopolitics, law, and
spatiality in their articulation with changing social relations – that ulti-
mately renders it defective.
Given these liabilities, the article raises the question as to how neo-
Schmittians, given the anti-sociological cast of Schmitt’s theoretical tools,
can counter and diffuse the restrictions and limits of his premises. It also
suggests that any de-contextualization of Schmittian insights from their
contextual purpose and detachment from their theoretical presupposi-
tions threatens to imperil the theoretical standing of attempts to apply his
categories to an altered contemporary geopolitical configuration. For
those IR theorists who endorse Schmitt’s theoretically informed history
in
toto, any salvaging of the Schmittian research programme seems proble-
matic; for those authors who draw on discrete Schmittian concepts and
insights in a more eclectic and syncretistic manner, the challenge arises
how to re-anchor, secure, and integrate these disparate insights theoreti-
cally in line with the normal protocols of social science to satisfy the
requirements of theorizing. Even if particular Schmittian claims may
illuminate aspects of international relations, both groups of authors need
to address the question as to whether decisionism, the concept of the
political and concrete-order-thinking, combined or each on its own, can
184
B E N N O G E R H A R D T E S C H K E