Environment Disadvantage -4wkj-ndi

AT: Regulations Check

Irresponsible yet legal oil company regulations make Gulf spills inevitable

Markey 5/10(May 10, 2013, Rep. Ed Markey, “Markey Report: Americans Still at Risk from Dangerous Offshore Drilling Practices,” http://democrats.naturalresources.house.gov/press-release/markey-report-americans-still-risk-dangerous-offshore-drilling-practices, Edward John "Ed" Markey (born July 11, 1946) is an American politician and lawyer who is the junior United States Senator from the Commonwealth of Massachusetts). WASHINGTON (May 10, 2013) – A new report, released today by Rep. Edward J. Markey (D-Mass.), shows that oil and gas companies drilling offshore in the Gulf of Mexico continue to suffer major safety lapses three years after the BP spill and that penalties are still insufficient to deter risky practices. The report, prepared by Rep. Markey's staff on the Natural Resources Committee, analyzes data from the Department of the Interior (DOI)—including company-by-company data, which has not been publicly disclosed before—to assess progress over the last three years, comparing accidents, inspections, safety violations and civil penalties before and after BP’s Deepwater Horizon disaster. “Oil and gas companies with the worst safety records in the Gulf before the BP disaster continue to spill oil, lose control of their wells and rack up safety violations today,” said Rep. Markey, the top Democrat on the House Natural Resources Committee. “We need to make sure these companies change their ways and pay a price for their risky practices. Unfortunately, House Republicans have blocked legislation to strengthen regulatory enforcement and raise penalties for offshore safety violations.” Rep. Markey also sent letters today to BP and the Environmental Protection Agency expressing displeasure that BP has refused to provide information and documents related to the company’s guilty plea of obstructing Congress. Rep. Markey asks EPA not to lift BP’s debarment from receiving federal contracts until the company has provided the requested documents. “First, BP lied to Congress when I asked for information about the amount of oil being spilled into the Gulf,” Rep. Markey said. “Now, BP won’t provide me information about why company officials lied. Until it comes clean and cleans up its act, the government should not be in business with BP.” The data in the report -- “Dangerous Drillers: Offshore Safety Lapses Continue Three Years After BP Spill” -- show some positives. The number of injuries from offshore accidents is down 50 percent over the last two years, as DOI has been more aggressive in handing out violations, and companies have less frequently lost control of their wells -- as happened in the BP spill -- since DOI adopted stronger regulations in 2010 following the catastrophic blowout at BP's Macondo well. However, the companies with the most safety violations before the BP spill are still racking up the most violations today, and a number of companies, including Chevron, Shell and Apache, have spilled oil into the Gulf or lost control of wells both just before and after the spill. Even BP has been cited for more major offshore safety violations in the last two years than before the spill.

Venezuela

Environmental regulations not achieving protection of Venezuelan sea turtles

Joaquín Buitrago 8 (Estación de Investigaciones Marinas de Margarita, Fundación La Salle de Ciencias, “Conservation science in developing countries: an inside perspective on the struggles in sea turtle research and conservation in Venezuela”, October 2008, http://www.sciencedirect.com.turing.library.northwestern.edu/science/article/pii/S1462901108000336

Human exploitation of sea turtles in Venezuela dates back at least 800 years and continues to the present day. The first concerns about the status of sea turtle populations arose in the 1970s, and the projects from this early era were a tagging program, beach evaluation and in situ nest protection. Since then, efforts to develop a sea turtle research and conservation sector in Venezuela have resulted in a number of successes and rather more failures. Among the achievements is a course “Sea Turtle Biology and Conservation Techniques”, which has now been run for 15 years and has educated several hundred participants and enabled the establishment of a valuable professional network, and the publication of the Venezuelan “Sea Turtle Recovery Action Plan” in 2000. But Venezuela shares with other developing countries some crucial shortcomings which have restricted the success of conservation and research efforts. Whilst regulations relating to protected areas and natural resource use have proliferated, enforcement is weak. Community-based projects and environmental education programs exist, but levels of participation are low. A large number of conservation approaches have been applied, including head-starting and nest translocation to hatcheries, but their value as conservation tools remains unproven. Research has increased, but its impact on decision-making is not significant. Taking an insider's perspective on the challenges to date in sea turtle research and conservation in Venezuela reveals much about the reality facing conservation scientists in developing countries and the forces that shape and can potentially derail research and conservation efforts.
Better forest management needed in Venezuela

Vilanova 12 (Emilio Vilanova 12, Biodiversity and Sustainable Development in Forest Ecosystems BIODESUS) Research Team, “Compliance with sustainable forest management guidelines in three timber concessions in the Venezuelan Guayana: Analysis and implications”, April 2012, http://www.sciencedirect.com.turing.library.northwestern.edu/science/article/pii/S1389934111001833)

After more than 40 years of natural forest management (NFM) in Venezuela, out of 16 million ha of production forests only 10% located in the Guayana region is currently being managed with some consideration of sustainability. A recent survey of three private concessions in the Imataca Forest Reserve, based on partial consideration of criteria and indicators for the sustainable management of tropical forests, revealed that a new form of management is needed. Compliance with reduced impact logging was very low, with poor planning in logging operations detected in all cases, highly affecting forest stands and biomass recovery. A limited capacity for monitoring was also found. Social assessments showed that local communities in all cases demanded more participation in wood production benefits and tended to value provision services such as timber, food and water above other important regulations and cultural services. Here, three strategies are proposed as an effective way to partially modify NFM into a more integrated approach: 1) strengthening of institutional cooperation between private and public sectors and capacity building in the process of monitoring; 2) creation of a training framework for reduced impact logging techniques 3) a review of current legal structures and national policies related to NFM in order to favour small-scale operations. Since 1980, the area of tropical forests used for wood production purposes has consistently increased. In recent years it has risen from about 42 M ha to close to 353 M ha (Food and Agriculture Organization – FAO, 2001 and International Tropical Timber Organization (ITTO), 2006). This increase has represented a significant contribution to national and local economies. However the implementation of sustainable forest management procedures for timber is still very limited. Complex challenges are being faced in many tropical countries where natural forest management (NFM) still represents a sound option. These critical issues include land tenure and social participation in forest benefits management, reduction of the ecological impact of logging activities, biodiversity conservation, small-scale vs. large-scale operations (Karsenty et al., 2008) and more recently the role of tropical forest ecosystems in climate change mitigation (Lewis, 2006). In addition, how to capture the total value from tropical forests through multiple-use options is presently a matter of concern (Guariguata et al., 2009).¶ Forest concessions have been an important part of forestry in many tropical countries. Management operations have been implemented through large-scale industrial models involving a mutual contract based on the agreement of a forest owner (in most cases represented by the figure of the national government) and another party permitting the use of a given area for harvesting of timber or other forest resources (Gray, 2002). In South American countries, for example, industrial forest concessions have been operating for over two decades (for instance Bolivia started in 1996 and Peru in 2001) using a concession-based regime for managing and selectively logging their natural forests. More often than not, the concession experience in these countries has not been successful (Gray, 2002). Logical arguments against this model remain when poor logging practices are still the rule in most cases of wood extraction in the tropics (see for example Putz et al., 2000, for a more detailed analysis). Opponents to the use of tropical forests for timber production argue that misguided forestry can play a critical role in the overexploitation of forest resources, promoting other critical forces of degradation such as illegal logging, wild-life hunting, land-use changes, which may aggravate rather than slow down the problem of biodiversity loss (Niesten and Rice, 2006).¶ Venezuela is a tropical country with one of the longest history of forest management under the forest concession model (see Dourojeanni, 2000, Kammesheidt et al., 2001 and Torres-Lezama et al., 2008). During the 1970s, the introduction of a forest concession system represented a significant advance in NFM at a regional level. The first private concessions were awarded in 1970. By 1992 almost 3.2 million ha had been allocated in more than 30 forest management units (FMUs) or concessions (Centeno, 1995); the highest proportion was in the Imataca Forest Reserve (Guayana region). In 1995, the national government planned to increase the area under forestry concessions to 10 million ha over 5 years, but the country's adoption of structural adjustment policies and the rising criticism of forest management strategies prevented this from happening (Torres-Lezama et al., 2008).¶ A significant reduction in timber production coming from FMUs occurred when in 1987 almost 40% of the national round wood production came from this form of management (Centeno, 1995), and 20 years later this proportion dropped to 7% (MinAmb, 2008). A critical analysis of the forest management model applied in Venezuela is explained in detail in Centeno, 1995, Aicher, 2005 and Lozada, 2007. Those reports remarked on critical limitations in the implementation of adequate measures to assure the long term permanence of production forests and a total absence of sustainable management guidelines during the monitoring activities. After more than four decades of NFM in Venezuela, of the 16 million ha of production forests, a very low proportion of close to 3% of permanent production forests (PFF) are considered as being sustainably managed (ITTO, 2006). In addition, a lack of updated management plans and adequate monitoring are also part of the current situation of forest management in the country. The few community-based efforts to incorporate local people into benefits management resulted in catastrophic ecological effects (cf. Lozada, 2007 and Rojas-López, 2007), and there are currently no certified natural forests in Venezuela. As occurs in many tropical production forests, most of the timber coming from natural forests in Venezuela is harvested to meet the demands of the domestic market where environmental concerns have less weight. As a consequence, many wood companies are reluctant to implement better logging practices and to improve other critical areas of forest management.¶ In the last 20 years several initiatives, mainly through the efforts of international organisations such as the International Tropical Timber Organization (ITTO, 2005), have been developed for the purpose of ensuring that the sustainable management of tropical forests can be achieved. One important initiative is the instrument of Criteria and Indicators (C&I) to measure and monitor the sustainability of forests (Mendoza and Prabhu, 2000). In general, it is useful to think of C&I as information nodes on several areas of concern, which together provide a full picture of the state of the forests and current sustainability trends (Pokorny and Adams, 2003). An example of how C&I work in forest concessions is explained in Mendoza and Prabhu, 2000 and Pokorny et al., 2005. Further information about the concession model and its effectiveness can be found in Gray, 2002 and Karsenty et al., 2008.¶ Improving the performance of forest concessions is not likely to be a popular topic. Nevertheless, if sustainable management is to be achieved in Venezuelan tropical forests, it may be necessary to assess and analyse the results of more than 40 years of concession management. So far, considering that Venezuela is one of the countries in the tropics that have been largely neglected in the subject of NFM literature, there is an urgent need for information on how critical issues of management are being implemented nowadays. Therefore, in this paper we present an analysis after applying the first known attempt to evaluate a selected group of C&I for assessing specific aspects of sustainable forest management for timber. Based on a survey of three industrial forest concessions located in the Venezuelan Guayana, we include a discussion on the compliance of current practices with sustainable management guidelines, followed by a debate considering the perspectives of the concession model in national forest management.¶

Cuba

Cuba neglects Environment

Rasha Maal-Bared 6 (Works at Institute of Resources, Environment and Sustainability, Library Processing at University of British Columbia “Comparing environmental issues in Cuba before and after the Special Period: Balancing sustainable development and survival”,April 2006,http://www.sciencedirect.com.turing.library.northwestern.edu/science/article/pii/S0160412005001741)

The Republic of Cuba belongs to the West Indies and is the largest Caribbean country with a total area of 111,000 km2. The Cuban Archipelago, which is formed of nearly two thousand islands and cays, lies between the Caribbean Sea and the North Atlantic Ocean, 180 km south of Florida and 210 km east of the Mexican Yucatan Peninsula. Cuba is located in the Tropic of Cancer between 74°8′ and 84°58′ western longitude (Borhidi, 1991). The climate is categorized as semi-continental and the average temperature ranges between 25 °C and 26 °C. As for rainfall, the dry season starts in November and ends in April, with December being the driest month of the year. The wet season starts in May and ends in October, with the heaviest rainfall occurring in August (Stanley, 1997).¶ The island has a wide variety of ecosystems and environments: the coastal terrain is fairly flat with many interior mountain ranges of different heights (Borhidi, 1991 and De La Cruz, 1989). There are more than two hundred, mostly small rivers, streams and creeks, in the country. The most notable rivers are: the Cauto (longest 370 km), the Toa (77 km), and the Almendares River (402.02 km2 basin), which flows through the capital Havana. Most of these rivers lack water periodically and dry up completely during the winter season (Arcia Rodriguez, 1994). Major dam construction programs were launched after a major flood in 1962 in the Eastern Provinces. By 1992, Cuba had completed the construction of 200 dams and 800 micro-dams (Servicio Hidrologico Nacional (CENHICA), 1996). There also are a number of natural lakes in Cuba. Larger lakes are usually salt-water lagoons, such as Laguna de Leche or Laguna Barbacoas. The largest lakes in the country are Ariguanabo and Laguna del Tesoro, which have a surface area of approximately 9 km2 each (Borhidi, 1991). As for underground water sources, the largest aquifers are concentrated in two areas. The first aquifer lies in Western Cuba running from Pinar del Rio to the Matanzas province. The second aquifer extends from Ciego de Avila and Sancti Spiritus through parts of Camaguey and Las Tunas (Servicio Hidrologico Nacional, 1996).¶ Cuba is known as the most biologically diverse of all Caribbean Islands. 50% of its flora and 41% of its fauna are endemic (Vales et al., 1998). These species are harbored in a variety of ecosystems, such as the mountain zones in Sierra del Rosaria and Sierra Maestra (with Moa–Sagua–Baracoa and Nipe–Sagua–Baracoa being particular hotspots). Cuban caves are of particular natural value and have become part of several bioreserves in Santiago de Cuba and in Pinar del Rio (Silva Lee, 1996). Some of these endemic species are also harbored in the different Cuban forest, which are divided into five categories: mangroves (77 × 102 km2), inland swamp (36 × 102 km2), montane rainforests (72 × 102 km2), lowland rainforests (78 × 102 km2), and sub-montane rainforests (25 × 102 km2) (Domech and Glean, 1999).¶ 1.2. Cuba and the Special PeriodEver since the Cuban revolution in 1959, Cuba followed the Eastern Block Paradigm of resource exploitation and environmental domination. While anthropocentric and social issues, such as education, health care, economy and security ranked high on the country's priority list, environmental issues were of no importance (Lane, 2000). For three decades after the first US Blockade in 1961, Cuba maintained favorable trade relations with the former Soviet Block. This allowed Cuba to focus on its economy and grow at an annual rate of 2% between 1965 and 1975, while improving health and social indices. Between 1975 and 1989, the annual economic growth rate reached 4% (Garcia, 1992).¶ Despite the repeated efforts for diversification, Cuba's model for development was based on a centralized sugar economy, leaving many sectors of the economy underdeveloped (Figueras, 1992). Thus, the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Community for Economic Cooperation (COMECON) in 1989, compounded with the Toricelli Act in 1992 and the Helms Burton Legislation in 1994, resulted in a national economic disaster. Soviet Block exports to Cuba dropped by about 70% between 1989 and 1993; and the value of all Cuban imports declined from $8 billion to $1.7 billion (Garfield and Santana, 1997). Before the economic collapse, Cuba was energy-rich, supplied with cheap crude oil from the Soviet Union, a portion of which was refined and exported again. Oil and sugar constituted the largest portion of Cuba's exports. After the collapse of its main partners, Cuba was left without fossil fuel. At the time, 98% of the country's electricity production was fossil fuel dependent and many factories had to close down due to the lack of oil and spare parts (Garfield and Santana, 1997). The lack of oil, gas, batteries, spare parts, and tires crippled the country's transportation systems (Garcia, 1992). Agriculture in the country was based on the Green Revolution Model and was hit hard due to the lack of fertilizers, weed killers, fuel and parts for irrigation pumps as well as other machinery (Díaz-Briquets and Pérez-López, 1995). The sugar industry was hit the hardest, but crop yields in general declined (Fitzgerald, 1994). Hospital equipment went unrepaired. Doctors lacked medicines and opted for herbal cures. Paper was no longer available to print newspapers and supply schools. Drastic measures had to be taken to save the country from total collapse; in a period referred to by Fidel Castro as “the Special Period in Time of Peace”. The main economic measures taken by Cuba at the time were: promotion of tourism, curtailment in consumption, selective cutbacks in state spending, implementation of a food self-sufficiency program, legalization of foreign investment and dollar possession (Dello Buono, 1995).¶ Despite the negative effects that the fall of COMECON and the US Blockade had on the Cuban economy, some inadvertent positive by-products resulted with respect to Cuba's prospects for sustainability and sound environmental management (Fernandez, 1999). By the time the Special Period hit Cuba in 1990, the Cuban environment was undergoing very serious degradation. Deforestation was still a major problem despite all attempts to reforest. Deforestation and habitat fragmentation were identified as main causes of species endangerment and extinction in Cuba (Tuxill and Bright, 1998). Water pollution from domestic sewage, industrial waste, agricultural runoff and drainage, and other point and non-point sources was ubiquitous. The bays were very polluted by anthropocentric activity. Industrial activities posed threats to ecosystem integrity and human health. Several provinces, such as Holguin and Moa, were devastated due to strip mining activities. Finally, Cuba had been subjected to serious urban degradation with 70% of its population living in cities, and more Cubans moving towards the western parts of the island (Comite Estatal de Estadisticas, 1998).¶ After attending the 1992 Rio Summit, the Cuban Government planned on changing its relationship with the Environment. It started with establishing numerous institutions, policies, programs, and laws governing environmental impact assessments, forests, management of protected areas, and environmental education (Lane, 2000). The government also realized the intrinsic link between sustainable development and conservation of natural resources. It turned to organic farming, renewable resource sources, energy conservation, while applying precautionary measures and clean technologies when possible. Cuba also decreased dumping into rivers and bays, emission of gases into the atmosphere, and overexploitation of water resources (CITMA (Ministry of Science Environment and Technology), 1992). And while many think that this drive towards sustainable development was steered by necessity not choice, the decisions the Cuban government will make over the next several decades could demonstrate their commitment towards this newly found ideology.¶ It would be naïve to say that the Special Period has only brought environmental benefits to Cuba. Between 1992 and 1995 Cuban statistics reported that deforestation indices showed a clear increase, which was mostly obvious in mangrove forests and the Zapatas Swamp. Other negative effect reports included increases in illegal hunting and fishing, illegal trade of wild species to tourists, habitat fragmentation and loss, forest fires, and illegal dumping (CITMA (Ministry of Science Environment and Technology), 1992). Combined, the positive and negative effects of the Special Period on the Cuban environment have resulted in a very complex dynamic of environmental risks in the country, which will definitely affect the country's prospects for sustainability.

Mexico

Mexican Environment on a downhill slope

Agence France Presse 9 (Agence France-Presse (AFP) is a French news agency, the oldest one in the world,[1][2] and one of the three largest with Associated Press and Reuters. It is also the largest French news agency, “Mexico plants trees, loses forests: Greenpeace” June 3, 2009, http://www.lexisnexis.com.turing.library.northwestern.edu/hottopics/lnacademic/) Mexico is failing to stop deforestation, despite planting millions of trees, Greenpeace said here Wednesday, two days before the country hosts the UN World Environment Day .Mexico is fifth in the world for species diversity, but also fifth in the world for deforestation, the lobby group said."We call on the government of (President) Felipe Calderon to be coherent. It's not possible to extol Mexico as an example in defending the environment ... whilst systematically destroying ecosystems with environment policies which do not stop deforestation," a statement said.Mexico loses around 600,000 hectares (almost 1.5 million acres) of trees and jungle each year, which is equivalent to four times the size of the country's sprawling capital of some 20 million people, the group said. Environmental policy under Calderon -- who will host World Environment Day on Mexico's Caribbean coast -- has not changed, Greenpeace said." Mexico even has one of the highest rates of environmental degradation in the world," it added. Greenpeace said that bad practice in tourism -- one of Mexico's main sources of foreign income -- had accelerated the destruction of the environment. Mexico has so far planted 537 million trees and is a "leading partner" in a plan to plant seven billion trees worldwide by the end of 2009, according to the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP).The UN-sponsored World Environment Day began 37 years ago and takes place annually on June 5.This year's event will focus on combating climate change, one of the top priorities of UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon.
Mexico City emissions numbers are corrupt

Olivia 12(Paulina Olivia, Assistant Professor Department of Economics University of California, Santa Barbara, “Environmental Regulations and Corruption: Automobile Emissions in Mexico City”, March 2012, http://www.econ.ucsb.edu/~oliva/Docs/Smog_Checks_Jan2012.pdf)

Researchers and governments have questioned the effectiveness of smog checks in reducing vehicle emissions. They have cited repeated testing and cheating as potential explanations for why vehicles with high on-the-road emissions have been able to pass the emissions test. This paper uses indirect evidence to show that cheating is a wide spread practice in Mexico City. I develop a test for cheating relies on detecting serial correlation patterns in consecutive emissions generated by the use of donor cars. This test predicts that 79 percent of centers have engaged in donor car use, a cheating practice that involves using emissions from a clean car to substitute for emissions of a cheater. The test for cheating is also an input for the estimation of a structural model of car owner decisions that recovers the underlying parameters of the cheating decision and is used to simulate individual responses to the smog check requirement. Although cheating decisions are unobserved, the parameters of the model can be recovered without any explicit information on cheating decisions. The model’s identification relies on the difference in costs between odd and even retests, and on observing the distribution of the probability of passing the test. The maximum likelihood estimation of the model yields an estimate for the bribe amount of about 20 U.S. dollars. This estimate is within the range of bribes that has been reported in newspapers. The simulations of individual decisions suggest that about 9 percent of car owners choose to cheat on the smog check. Because cheating is an alternative to car maintenance, and the price of the bribe is relatively low, the model suggests that incentives for car maintenance are very low or non-existent. An extension to the model further allows to estimate the benefits and costs from boosting incentives for car maintenance through plausible policies such as increased enforcement and higher retesting costs. These combined policies are predicted to induce car maintenance in 4 percent of the vehicles. The resulting emission reductions are equivalent to less than one day of Mexico City traffic a year. However, the emission reductions come at a high cost for the entire car fleet: smog check-costs for car owners increase by about 3.7 million per cycle. These calculations suggest that, forcing car owners to pass smog checks twice a year is not a cost effective policy for reducing vehicle emissions in Mexico City.

Mexico Land-Use policy does not stop environmental destruction

Aguilar and Santos 11 (Adrian Guillermo Aguilar, Clemencia Santos, Institute of Geography, Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico (UNAM), Mexico, “Land Use Policy”, Land Use Policy 28 (2011) 649–662, 2011, http://www.sciencedirect.com.turing.library.northwestern.edu/science/article/pii/S0264837710001134)

The aim of this article is to analyze the effectiveness of land-use policy in Mexico City in controlling the expansion of informal human settlements in peri-urban zones of high ecological value. It is argued that Mexico City's land-use policy has been reactive and internally inconsistent, failing to take informal settlements into account, has not offered the poor access to housing with adequate services and greater security in terms of land tenure, and lacks the necessary financial resources and institutional capabilities for providing solutions to these problems. Through a case study of informal settlement management policy in the Tlalpan Delegation,1 applied in what has been termed SC or “Conservation Land,”2 we conclude that local government exhibits an inability to confront the new challenge of urban sustainability, that it resorts to conventional solutions which give rise to contradictory situations where political decision-making prevails over ecological considerations, so land-use policy is permissive and does not halt informal urban expansion in areas of high environmental value. One of the most dramatic manifestations of poverty conditions and inequalities in Latin American cities is the persistence and even increase of informal human settlements (IHSs). It was estimated that in 2005, there were 134 million people in Latin America and the Caribbean living in such settlements – this figure represented a bit more than 30% of the total urban population –, and that from 1990 to 2005 there was an increase of slightly more than 23 million people living in this type of settlement in the region (UN-HABITAT, 2006, Table 1.2.1). Despite this growing number of inhabitants with illegal and precarious living conditions, land-use policies have been unable to find solutions for these settlements, and that has a direct repercussion on Latin American cities’ lack of social justice and environmental sustainability. Urban policies have generally failed to address the fundamental determinants of informality and have evidenced a lack of orientation for the purpose of mitigating the impacts of social and economic vulnerability among the urban poor and meeting their basic needs (Winchester, 2008:28; McGranahan et al., 2008:77, Smolka and Larangeira, 2008:100). The main contribution intended by the authors of this study is an analysis of what possible solutions local government can offer for a challenge that is currently most significant: how do we reconcile the protection of ecological conservation areas and the needs of informal settlements in a peri-urban zone? New urban development patterns should implement measures to cut local, regional, and global environmental costs and, therefore, are in need of effective policies for managing urban expansion. Conceptually this paper deals with how urban policy confronts the challenge of working with new innovative schemes not only to address the traditional needs of informal settlements such as housing, basic services, and land tenure security, but also to incorporate the conservation of the environment where these settlements are located. The upgrading and environmental conservation of IHSs have become very important areas to focus on, and the emphasis and operational support given to these areas through more innovative mechanisms show the present effectiveness of land-use policy in each city. Several analysts in Latin America have used a wide variety of terms to refer to informal settlements,3 among which we could mention the following: informal housing, irregular settlements, squatter settlements, self-help housing, colonias populares (lower class neighborhoods), etc. (see Turner, 1965, Mangin, 1967, Portes, 1972, Cornelius, 1975, Burgess, 1982, Gilbert and Ward, 1982 and Connolly, 2009). Naturally, none of those terms fully conveys all the dimensions of the problems affecting those settlements or the heterogeneity among them. In essence, what they all attempt to describe is that poor people try to find housing solutions on their own; they occupy urban land, in most cases illegally; and engage in the settlement process in the absence of public services, albeit the conditions of their dwellings can improve over the years. The precarious nature of dwellings with insecure land tenure is as serious and severe as is inhabitants’ poverty according to their income and employment status. In Latin America, estimates vary from one country to the next, but it has been found that in some cities, a significant share of the population – which could be as high as 50% – lives in informal conditions in terms of land tenure, occupying public or private land illegally (Winchester, 2008:33). Unfortunately, the inability of urban policy to resolve the urban poor's lack of access to land or affordable housing led to a high degree of tolerance by urban governments as regards informal settlements. Urban governments were forced to “accommodate” a large number of poor inhabitants in the urban space. This “accommodation” was not only expressed in the form of great tolerance, but also facilities for occupying urban land illegally and thus increasing the number of precarious dwellings (Smolka and Larangeira, 2008:101). One strategy that has remained constant in efforts to deal with this issue has been land tenure regularization, a strategy that has been criticized because it leads to land price rises and promotes greater irregularity in land occupation. Many of the settlements that are regularized give in to new pressures for incorporating even more dwellings at greater densities through a large number of informal occupations in surrounding areas, since infrastructure provision helps to encourage more informal settlements (Smolka and Larangeira, 2008:103). In fact, regularization programs are focused on dealing with the consequences, rather than with the causes, of informality. Regularization is an “easy way out,” being a short-term, relatively inexpensive solution for urban governments. It is politically advantageous because it facilitates manipulation of inhabitants and provides a certain degree of control over an illegal city (Durand-Lasserve, 2006:287).

Recently, informal human settlements (IHSs) have been the object of renewed interest because solving this problem has become a new challenge from the perspective of urban sustainability: it is imperative to cope with rapid urban growth in many cities, to endow them with infrastructure and health and educational facilities, as well as to improve living standards among the urban poor because it has been claimed that ameliorating conditions of poverty will surely have a positive effect upon the urban environment. Throughout this decade, the problem of poverty and IHSs has been closely linked to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) (www.un.org/millenniumgoals). For example, for MDG Goal No. 7, Ensure Environmental Sustainability, its Target 4 proposes by 2020, “to have achieved a significant improvement in the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers.” This puts pressure on the international community to tackle a specific feature of urban poverty which heretofore has not been adequately captured in national statistics, much less in urban ones. By overlooking the problem of IHSs, governments are indirectly adopting urbanization models that are neither sustainable nor acceptable (UN-HABITAT, 2006:50). Any city that undergoes a certain degree of economic development and population growth has a series of complex, changing demands for non-urban land, particularly in adjoining areas located in what has been called the “urban fringe” or “peri-urban area.”4 As regards environmental impacts, several different changes and processes characterize peripheral urban spaces. Some important processes related to the environment are: encouragement of a scattered pattern of urban occupation for housing and infrastructure; the emergence of informal settlements for groups of poor inhabitants with precarious dwellings and a deficit of public services; disposal of solid and toxic waste; extraction of building materials and surface water and groundwater; and alteration of river courses; flooding and landslides; and environmental stress in conservation areas, green areas or recreational spaces (Douglas, 2006:18; Aguilar, 2008:134). To a large extent, the aggravation of urban problems such as environmental damage is derived from the inability of local governments to manage rapid urban growth, to offer public goods and services to all social groups, and to evidence suitable technical and political capacities (Aguilar, 2008:135). On this issue, two relevant questions arise: How are cities moving towards more ecologically sustainable patterns of production and consumption and land-use policy? And: How can zoning and development controls be used not only to protect environmental quality for the rich and powerful but also for the most socially deprived groups? In short, it is obvious that conventional approaches to informal settlements need to be transformed. As McGranahan et al. (2008:93) point out, looking to the future it is clear that steps need to be taken now to avoid a new generation of IHSs from forming, not by halting urbanization, but by accommodating urban growth more efficiently and equitably; local governments should stop regarding IHSs as a symptom of over-urbanization and stop utilizing land-use policies as a means of curbing urban growth. Instead, these governments need to: work constructively with IHSs dwellers, design and apply measures for informal land and housing markets, and develop physical and financial strategies for future growth. To this issue, our paper will attempt to make a contribution by analyzing the effectiveness of land-use policy in Mexico City in controlling the expansion of informal human settlements in peri-urban zones of high ecological value. Our study explores this challenge in the Tlalpan Delegation, which recently established a specific policy to attempt to cope with this problem in the city's “Conservation Zone (SC).”5 This strategy functions as a pilot plan worth assessing in order to determine the effectiveness and repercussions of a policy of this nature at the local level. Following this introduction, the paper briefly outlines the tolerant position taken by urban policy towards illegal occupation of private and ejido and communal land, and the application of land tenure regularization as an ex-post solution. It then goes on to emphasize the importance of the SC in the Federal District, but also the lack of consistency of urban and environmental zoning in this area, as well as the absence of a policy to manage informal settlements. Subsequently, the authors provide a detailed review of this strategy's weaknesses in terms of managing informal settlements in the Tlalpan Delegation. The paper concludes with a number of reflections on the significance of this investigation for urban and environmental land-use policy in Mexico City. Research for this article has been based on information derived from the following: existing studies on the topic; census data; a review of documentary material and urban planning regulations in the Federal District; statistical data and cartographic material provided by officials of the Tlalpan Delegation on informal settlements and the strategy for managing them; fieldwork in the SC and in several informal settlements to observe the application of the pilot plan; a series of semi-structured interviews with different officials of the Tlalpan Delegation in charge of managing informal settlements in the second half of 2008 and first half of 2009; a revision of the Official Gazette of the Federal District to identify regularized lots in the 2000–2007 period; and calculations of urban expansion in the SC based on satellite images taken between 2003 and 2007.