Counterplans General Stuff

Russia SOI

Russia SOI link

The plan causes war with Russia – not acting in the Arctic cedes influence

Thórsson, 14 – journalist for the Arctic Journal (Elías, “Washington’s folly” The Arctic Journal, 5/20,

http://arcticjournal.com/politics/619/washingtons-folly)//DH Huebert = associate professor at the University of Calgary’s political science department

Instead of sparking a conflict, however, Washington’s Arctic indecisiveness might actually help avoid the type of one-upmanship we saw during the Cold War. Huebert points to the enigma surrounding Putin’s goals in the region, and says increased US attention could actually be seen as aggression by Moscow.

He argues that we need to be trying to decipher what Moscow’s Arctic goals are.

“Is it responding in defence of what it sees as fascist thugs, such as the prospect of Sweden and Finland joining Nato, or is this the beginning of an increasingly aggressive Russia, which is planning future actions in country’s such as Moldova and Belarus?

“Some argue that all this is for internal consumption, that this is just to consolidate Putin’s power in Russia. If that is the case and the West responds, it creates a very dangerous dynamic. If you get one wrong you will be making the system that much worse. Do nothing is fine, but only if he is just doing this for internal consumption.”

Currently, the Pentagon is downplaying any Russian threat to stability in the region. Derrick-Frost, though, says the military has its eyes on the situation.

AT: Deterrence solves

Russia won’t back off – ideological and market relevance

Keil ’13 – Europe Director for the Arctic Institute, Project Scientist at the Institute for Advanced Sustainability Studies (IASS) in Potsdam, Germany, in the Sustainable Interaction with the Atmosphere (SIWA) cluster, PhD at the Berlin Graduate School, Fellow at the NVP-Nansen interdisciplinary PhD and Post-doc Summer School (“The Arctic: A new region of conflict? The case of oil and gas”, June 6th, SagePub) //J.N.E

Market relevance. According to the US Geological Survey (USGS), Russia has the biggest estimated Arctic oil and gas potential, amounting to 52% of the total, with 216 billion barrels of oil equivalent (BBOE).5 Table 1 indicates how estimated Arctic hydrocarbon resources are distributed among the five Arctic coastal states. Russia’s Arctic resources account for the major part of the country’s hydrocarbon reserves: the biggest share is in Western Siberia, especially the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous District, with more than two-thirds of Russian oil and gas production. The lion’s share of the Eurasian resource base consists of natural gas, accounting for approximately 88% of its total. Gas is generally the more important Arctic commodity: the region is expected to contain three times as much undiscovered gas as oil. However, many of the older Russian wells are declining and Russia is very active in exploring for new sources, particularly its promising continental shelves in the Barents and the Kara Seas (Bambulyak and Frantzen, 2011: 10–17; Budzik, 2009: 7; Lesikhina et al., 2007; Schröder et al., 2011: 20).

According to the USGS, Russia accounts for approximately 34% of undiscovered oil resources in the Arctic, which in comparison to gas is rather the minor share (Budzik, 2009: 7). Russia has the most proven gas reserves, with an absolute base of 44.8 trillion cubic metres (Tcm) giving it 23.9% of the world’s total (see Figure 1). However, the global gas market is changing. The USA has developed new technologies to extract huge amounts of unconventional gas, and the global economic crisis since 2008 has led to an overall decline in energy demand. Increased gas production and international decline in demand for gas have created an oversupplied gas market, which weakened demand for Russian gas. This might, however, hold for only the short- to midterm future as gas is generally considered a cleaner form of energy than coal and oil, and lower prices can, in the mid- to long-term, generate increasing demand, which in turn can lead to rising prices. Given this uncertain market situation, Russia is at the moment hesitant to move forward with big gas exploitation projects, as the August 2012 decision to postpone the Shtokman gas project for the foreseeable future illustrates (Macalister, 2012). The launch of the Prirazlomnoye oil field in the Pechora Sea has also been postponed several times in the past, which would be Russia’s first ever offshore oil field in the Arctic (BarentsObserver, 2010c).

Ideological, cultural and historical relevance. According to the Russian definition, ‘the North’ (and so-called areas equivalent to the North) encompasses more than 60% of Russian territory (Rowe, 2009: 1; cf. also map in Sapper et al., 2011: 113). Thus, more than any other state, Russia is to be described and understood as a northern country. The memory of glorious Soviet Arctic expeditions, for example the first aircraft landing at the North Pole in 1937 by Valerii Chkalov, adds to many peoples’ belief that ‘the Arctic is by rights a Russian preserve’ (Emmerson, 2010: 52). As Rowe (2009: 2) concludes, Soviet successes in mastering the North ‘positioned the Arctic firmly as a factor in both Russian national identity and conceptions of security and sovereignty’. Russia’s active role in the Arctic has also been interpreted as playing a pivotal role in Russia’s plan to return to great-power status by means of becoming an ‘energy superpower’ (Penkova, 2009: 1, 8; Petersen, 2009: 45; Rowe, 2009: 5). Ingo Winkelmann (2009: 10) points out that Russian Arctic activities are rather to be interpreted as part of a national identification process or national identity shaping instead of a pure military approach to alleged Russian possessions. This is also in line with Pavel Baev’s (2009: 21; also 2007: 9–10) assessment of Russia’s military capacity: ‘the far too apparent weaknesses in Russia’s strategic posture make it senseless to consider relaunching a military brinkmanship in the North, in which Moscow would hardly be able to impress its potential competitors.’ Rather, Russian ‘patriotic propaganda, combining stories of “heroic” exploration with the advertising of military muscle-building, is aimed at creating a positive message pertaining to the very 23.9% 15.8% 13.5% 4.3% 4.3% 4.1% 3.2% 0.0% 5.0% 10.0% 15.0% 20.0% 25.0% 30.0% Proven Natural Gas Reserves Figure 1. Proven worldwide natural gas reserves (by end 2010). Source: BP (2011: 20). Downloaded from cac.sagepub.com at UNIV OF MICHIGAN on July 20, 2014 170 Cooperation and Conflict 49(2) core of the still vague Russian national identity.’ In sum, emotional and symbolic issues play a crucial role in Russian Arctic policies.

Overall, the Arctic is of outstanding importance for Russia and Russians. This holds economically and strategically with the vast hydrocarbon resources found and expected to be found, as well as ideologically, given the meaning of the North for the biggest northern country and its ambition to restore Russia’s political standing internationally.

Energy Internal Link

Energy is the lynchpin of Russian soft power

Misje ’12 – Geography Department, Fullerton (“RUSSIAN HEGEMONY IN THE ARCTIC SPACE? CONTESTING THE POPULAR GEOPOLITICAL DISCOURSES”, April 16th, Thesis Presented to the Faculty of California State University, Fullerton) //J.N.E

Ultimately, the reactions to Russian policies in the Southern Caucasus and to the Nord Stream project shed light on a new outlet for Russian power in two ways. First, Russian energy policy has become a mechanism that allows the state to assert power over the post-Soviet states and to influence or shape the decisions of various stakeholders involved in resource development. Russia could merely participate in energy dialogues and thus invoke opposing energy policies based on the geography of the elusive pipelines. Mainly, "the Nord Stream project addresses the manner in which gas pipelines influence, embody and reflect relations of discourse and power across transnational 35 political spaces" (Bouzarovski and Konieczny 2010, 2). But it also reveals how a "nonmaterial object" such as a pipeline, can "gradually became embedded into a specific set of policy initiatives aimed at transforming the material realities of surrounding regions and cities" (Bouzarovski and Konieczny 2010,12).

Second, Russian strategies have a positive impact on energy development for the opposing countries, while still allowing Russia to reap benefits when their energy initiatives are actually instituted. In the Southern Caucasus, the United States was able to find more viable energy routes while indirectly bending to Russia's will in Armenia and Georgia. Thus, the persuasive technique of engaging in political dialogue to motivate action is a complex strategic medium that gives Russia an immense amount of geopolitical clout. Through rhetorical dialogue of energy development and expansion of infrastructure, Russia strategically plants a seed of paranoia in the minds of other states and effectively sways geopolitical action within its periphery.

Conclusion

Accordingly, Russia can be considered a great power when the arena for measuring power is the energy sector and the assessment is based on political influence. Power can be circumstantial and contingent upon the benchmarks that are most applicable to the state of affairs. Furthermore, a nation's powers can truly be assessed when it is comparable to its opponents. When the stage is Russia's backyard, the country has the geopolitical strength to dominate the energy sector within its periphery and to act as the hegemonic power over the opposition. Within its non-Arctic margins, Russia is 36 able to remain a great power because the geopolitical and economic attempts to destabilize Russian energy development in its periphery have yet to make headway. However, this energy strategy cannot be so easily employed in the Arctic Ocean. In the Arctic, energy strategies are based on the language of the articles in the UNCLOS. Russia is utilizing the provisions under Article 76 to stake its claim to Arctic resources. Therefore, the counter attempts to stop Russia will also be based on the provisions of the UNCLOS. It is the view of this study that, like the pipelines, Article 76 will be a mechanism for Russian power that influences and provokes the other Arctic nations, whether or not the provisions actually provide Russia with sovereign rights beyond their EEZ. But unlike the geopolitical games in the post-Soviet space, the competing states will be more capable in at least delaying Russia's political goals for some time, or until the United States joins the game. Yet, Russia will retain its geopolitical power through its continued attempts to claim sovereign rights, which will perpetually provoke a response from its Arctic neighbors. The following chapter will outline the theoretical framework for this line of reasoning.

AT: N/U – Exxon drilling

Recent drilling is a joint venture with a Russian Rosneft - it skirts sanctions

Marshall, 7/22/14 (Steve, “Rig sails for troubled Russian waters”,

http://www.upstreamonline.com/live/1370147/Rig-sails-for-troubled-Russian-waters)//DH

A Seadrill rig is reported to be heading for Russian waters to carry out a controversial drilling effort in the Kara Sea for partners ExxonMobil and Rosneft after departing a Norwegian yard at the weekend.

The semi-submersible West Alpha was reported to have sailed under escort by the Norwegian Coast Guard, along with a flotilla of tugs and an anchor-handler, as it begun its long voyage following completion of winterisation and upgrade work at the Westcon yard in west Norway.

Local newspaper Bergens Tidende reported both the police and Coast Guard were called in to supervise the departure of the rig and prevent a possible boarding by Greenpeace after activists earlier this year climbed aboard the semisub at the Olen yard in a protest against Arctic drilling.

The environmental group’s protest vessel Esperanza was earlier reported to be in the vicinity of the yard amid rumours that activists may carry out further disruptive action.

Greenpeace Norway leader Truls Gulowsen, who has earlier characterised the planned Kara Sea drilling effort as an “environmental crime” due to the potential risk of an oil spill in Arctic waters, would not tell Reuters whether the group was planning another protest.

ExxonMobil , which has chartered the 1986-built rig until July 2016 for a dayrate of $532,000, aims to start drilling of the Kara Sea probe next month.

The proposed probe targeting the Universitetskaya structure at the East Prinovozemelsky block will be the first to be drilled by the US supermajor under its Arctic exploration pact with Russian state-owned Rosneft.

The drilling operation, targeting potential resources of a reported 9 billion barrels in the overall play, is estimated to cost at least $600 million – making it one of the most expensive wells ever to be drilled by the US giant.

Drilling is set to take place in a licence that overlaps Russia’s Arctic National Park that is a habitat for a diversity of wildlife, including polars bears and walruses, and also hosts a bird colony.

However, aside from environmental concerns, the passage of the rig has now assumed greater political significance amid tighter sanctions being imposed by the West on Russia – including Rosneft – over escalating violence in Ukraine.

Rosneft was added to the list of Russian entities barred from debt financing with US sources under the latest sanctions imposed last week by the US Treasury Department.

US President Barack Obama said the sanctions were "designed to have maximum impact on Russia while limiting any spillover effects on American companies or those who are allies”.

He also warned though that additional steps were on the table if Russia does not change course in eastern Ukraine - a signal that joint ventures with US companies could face risks.

While ExxonMobil’s joint exploration effort with Rosneft may not break sanctions, it could be seen as a sign of support for Moscow from the US giant.