Cndi 2017 – Title I finance Affirmative

Case – Disruptive Federalism Adv

XT – Fed Control of Education Good

[See the States CP answers]

XT – Econ Impact

Economic decline in an interconnected world collapses the global economy, results in multiple scenarios for war.

Pamlin and Armstrong 15 – Dennis Pamlin, Executive Project Manager, Global Challenges Foundation, Stuart Armstrong, James Martin Research Fellow, Future of Humanity Institute, Oxford Martin School & Faculty of Philosophy, University of Oxford, 2015 (“Global Challenges: 12 Risks that Threaten Human Civilization,” Global Challenges Foundation, February 2015, http://www.astro.sunysb.edu/fwalter/HON301/12-Risks-with-infinite-impact-full-report-1.pdf)

Often economic collapse is accompanied by social chaos, civil unrest and sometimes a breakdown of law and order. Societal collapse usually refers to the fall or disintegration of human societies, often along with their life support systems. It broadly includes both quite abrupt societal failures typified by collapses, and more extended gradual declines of superpowers. Here only the former is included. The world economic and political system is made up of many actors with many objectives and many links between them. Such intricate, interconnected systems are subject to unexpected system-wide failures due to the structure of the network311 – even if each component of the network is reliable. This gives rise to systemic risk: systemic risk occurs when parts that individually may function well become vulnerable when connected as a system to a self-reinforcing joint risk that can spread from part to part (contagion), potentially affecting the entire system and possibly spilling over to related outside systems.312 Such effects have been observed in such diverse areas as ecology,313 finance314 and critical infrastructure315 (such as power grids). They are characterised by the possibility that a small internal or external disruption could cause a highly non-linear effect,316 including a cascading failure that infects the whole system,317 as in the 2008-2009 financial crisis. The possibility of collapse becomes more acute when several independent networks depend on each other, as is increasingly the case (water supply, transport, fuel and power stations are strongly coupled, for instance).318 This dependence links social and technological systems as well.319 This trend is likely to be intensified by continuing globalisation,320 while global governance and regulatory mechanisms seem inadequate to address the issue.321 This is possibly because the tension between resilience and efficiency322 can even exacerbate the problem.323 Many triggers could start such a failure cascade, such as the infrastructure damage wrought by a coronal mass ejection,324 an ongoing cyber conflict, or a milder form of some of the risks presented in the rest of the paper. Indeed the main risk factor with global systems collapse is as something which may exacerbate some of the other risks in this paper, or as a trigger. But a simple global systems collapse still poses risks on its own. The productivity of modern societies is largely dependent on the careful matching of different types of capital325 (social, technological, natural...) with each other. If this matching is disrupted, this could trigger a “social collapse” far out of proportion to the initial disruption.326 States and institutions have collapsed in the past for seemingly minor systemic reasons.327 And institutional collapses can create knock-on effects, such as the descent of formerly prosperous states to much more impoverished and destabilising entities.328 Such processes could trigger damage on a large scale if they weaken global political and economic systems to such an extent that secondary effects (such as conflict or starvation) could cause great death and suffering.

Economic decline leads to nuclear war

Stein Tønnesson 15, Research Professor, Peace Research Institute Oslo; Leader of East Asia Peace program, Uppsala University, 2015, “Deterrence, interdependence and Sino–US peace,” International Area Studies Review, Vol. 18, No. 3, p. 297-311

Several recent works on China and Sino–US relations have made substantial contributions to the current understanding of how and under what circumstances a combination of nuclear deterrence and economic interdependence may reduce the risk of war between major powers. At least four conclusions can be drawn from the review above: first, those who say that interdependence may both inhibit and drive conflict are right. Interdependence raises the cost of conflict for all sides but asymmetrical or unbalanced dependencies and negative trade expectations may generate tensions leading to trade wars among inter-dependent states that in turn increase the risk of military conflict (Copeland, 2015: 1, 14, 437; Roach, 2014). The risk may increase if one of the interdependent countries is governed by an inward-looking socio-economic coalition (Solingen, 2015); second, the risk of war between China and the US should not just be analysed bilaterally but include their allies and partners. Third party countries could drag China or the US into confrontation; third, in this context it is of some comfort that the three main economic powers in Northeast Asia (China, Japan and South Korea) are all deeply integrated economically through production networks within a global system of trade and finance (Ravenhill, 2014; Yoshimatsu, 2014: 576); and fourth, decisions for war and peace are taken by very few people, who act on the basis of their future expectations. International relations theory must be supplemented by foreign policy analysis in order to assess the value attributed by national decision-makers to economic development and their assessments of risks and opportunities. If leaders on either side of the Atlantic begin to seriously fear or anticipate their own nation’s decline then they may blame this on external dependence, appeal to anti-foreign sentiments, contemplate the use of force to gain respect or credibility, adopt protectionist policies, and ultimately refuse to be deterred by either nuclear arms or prospects of socioeconomic calamities. Such a dangerous shift could happen abruptly, i.e. under the instigation of actions by a third party – or against a third party. Yet as long as there is both nuclear deterrence and interdependence, the tensions in East Asia are unlikely to escalate to war. As Chan (2013) says, all states in the region are aware that they cannot count on support from either China or the US if they make provocative moves. The greatest risk is not that a territorial dispute leads to war under present circumstances but that changes in the world economy alter those circumstances in ways that render inter-state peace more precarious. If China and the US fail to rebalance their financial and trading relations (Roach, 2014) then a trade war could result, interrupting transnational production networks, provoking social distress, and exacerbating nationalist emotions. This could have unforeseen consequences in the field of security, with nuclear deterrence remaining the only factor to protect the world from Armageddon, and unreliably so. Deterrence could lose its credibility: one of the two great powers might gamble that the other yield in a cyber-war or conventional limited war, or third party countries might engage in conflict with each other, with a view to obliging Washington or Beijing to intervene.

XT – Fed Gov K2 Disaster Relief

Federal government key to disaster relief – states can’t finance it.

Hayen & Swanson 11 (Diane Swanson and Bernie Hayen,, 5-25-2011, Diane Swanson has a Ph D, University of Pittsburgh, 1996. Major: Business Administration Supporting Areas of Emphasis: Strategy, Corporate Social Responsibility, Ethics, Organizational Theory, Sociology of Organizations, Business Environments, Public Policy and Regulation, Bernie Hayen has a MPA-Masters of Public Administration, Kansas State University, 1984. Major: Public Administration Supporting Areas of Emphasis: Organizational Politics MBA, Wichita State University, 1982. Major: Public Finance BA, University of Kansas, 1996. Major: Political Science/Psychology Supporting Areas of Emphasis: Foreign Languages "Picking up the pieces: Federal government plays key role in disaster relief," No Publication, https://www.k-state.edu/media/newsreleases/may11/disaster52511.html)mo

Federal funds are even more important to cash-strapped states in disaster relief. States are required to have balanced budgets by law. This limits many resources and the ability of the state to adequately respond to disasters. Meanwhile, the federal government has the ability to not only tax but also raise money through debt. This may run counter to ideological preferences for small government, but it is necessary to rebuild.

Strong federal role is key to disaster response – coordination and funds.

Beauchamp 12 [Zack Beauchamp, 10-30-2012, "Why The Federal Government Should Handle Disaster Relief," ThinkProgress, https://thinkprogress.org/why-the-federal-government-should-handle-disaster-relief-b3c991bbd4a0]

Almost on cue after Hurricane Sandy, conservatives and libertarians have begun arguing that the federal government should get out of the business of providing disaster relief. The function could be delegated to states and the private sector, they claim, echoing an argument advanced by Mitt Romney last year. But they’re wrong. The private sector and states cannot muster the resources that the federal government can. To deal with massive disasters like Sandy, we need the feds. Conservatives touting the market often refer to one paper, by Professor Stephen Horwitz, arguing that Wal-Mart responded more efficiently to Hurricane Katrina than the federal government. While it’s widely agreed that Wal-Mart played an important role in the aftermath of the 2005 storm, it amounted to only $17 million in direct donations and roughly $25 million when you include in-kind work. By contrast, the federal government spends $10 billion every year on routine disaster preparedness, a figure that spikes in the case of severe disasters like Katrina. It’s simply inconceivable that corporations would be capable of filling that gap on their own. But isn’t most of that federal money wasted? Not really, say the experts. Michigan State Professor Saundra Schneider wrote in her survey of recent American disaster relief efforts that “for the vast majority of natural disasters, public institutions respond very well.” When asked if the private sector could fill-in for the government, she scoffed. “The government is the only entity that has the power and resources to deal with this disaster of this scope,” Schneider said. “[There’s] a pretty strong consensus in the literature, especially the social science literature, that that’s needed.” Indeed, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) itself has had a rather sterling track record in responding effectively to crises like Sandy — but while the agency suffered under both Presidents Bush, it prospered during the Clinton administration. During the Bush administrations, FEMA was considered a backwater agency, led by unqualified nominees and given relatively little attention. The results were catastrophically bad responses to 1992’s Hurricane Andrew and 2005’s Hurricane Katrina. After Andrew, President Clinton’s renewed attention on FEMA revitalized the agency, resulting in a substantially more effective agency. As The New Republic’s Jonathan Cohn notes, FEMA’s response to last year’s tornadoes was generally considered exceptional. And New Jersey Governor Chris Christie, a prominent Romney surrogate and vice presidential contender, has praised the organization’s swift response to Sandy, saying “The federal government’s response has been great…The President has been outstanding in this and so have the folks at FEMA.” Currently, federal, state, and local governments all play critical roles in managing disaster relief. The system works in the following way: local governments respond first, turn to the state government if the disaster exceeds their resources, who in turn may ask FEMA to step-in. This system works pretty well — as Richard Sylves, a disaster expert at the University of Delaware, notes, most disasters are handled by local and occasionally state governments. This means that most disaster relief is already delegated locally. The principal federal role, Sylves writes, is to “supplement, not supplant, the efforts of others…[federal aid is designed to] stimulate and guide emergency planning efforts, furnish substantial response efforts after (and sometimes before) a governor secures help from the President, and fund many disaster mitigation efforts.” In other words, the feds provide money, material and coordination states can’t give on their own. Natural disasters often spill across state lines, requiring coordination and cooperation between states with different economic abilities and constraints. Moreover, the sheer expense of disaster relief stretches the limited resources of poor states and states with restrictive balanced budget amendments. Effective response to major disasters requires federal assistance.

XT – Disasters Impact

Disasters destroy critical infrastructure – causes cascading impacts.

Kadri et al 15 [Farid Kadri Babiga Birregah Eric Chatelet, Apr 15, 2015, "The Impact of Natural Disasters on Critical Infrastructures: A Domino Effect-based Study (PDF Download Available)," ResearchGate, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/262799032_The_Impact_of_Natural_Disasters_on_Critical_Infrastructures_A_Domino_Effect-based_Study]

The significant increase in disasters of a natural and/or technological origin seen today has serious consequences for CI, the population, the environment, and the economy. These consequences have been exacerbated by the development of sociotechnical systems such as transport networks and industrial plants, their interdependencies, and their sensitivity to major hazardous events. Several specific characteristics of Nat-Tech events call for greater attention to be given to the study of hazard sequences involving CI – namely, the mode of infrastructure degradation and/or propagation, the nature of infrastructure dependencies and/or interdependencies, and the resilience of infrastructure to the natural events. The scenarios generated by Nat-Tech accidents are very important in the context of quantitative risk assessment. It has been shown that from 1980 to 1990, the majority of catastrophes leading to the release of hazardous materials in the United States were caused by earth- quakes, followed by hurricanes, floods, lightning, and violent winds (Showalter and Myers 1994). Campedel et al. (2008) have studied the contributing factors and consequences of earthquakes, and the impacts of mitigation systems. According to OCHA-ROAP (2011), the economic cost of natural disasters in the Asia Pacific region in the first quarter of 2011 is the highest on record. On February 22, a 6.3-magnitude earthquake struck New Zealand’s second-largest city, Christchurch, leaving 172 people dead and parts of the city in ruins; it is esti- mated that reconstruction will cost US$12 billion. On March 11 at 2:46 p.m., an earthquake caused a tsunami that devastated Tōhoku, Japan, about 240 miles from Tokyo; with estimated damages of up to $309 billion (Carafano 2011; OCHA- ROAP 2011), this is considered the costliest disaster in the world to date. In 2008, Krausmann and Mushtaq drew up a list of the types of flood that had triggered technological accidents, their failure modes, and their consequences. Noting that floods and lightning are the most frequent natural disasters trigger- ing technological accidents; the authors show that floods can damage industrial plants and cause the release of hazardous materials. Their paper also confirms the lack of detailed information and standardized reports on Nat-Tech disasters. Over the last few decades, the European Commission’s Joint Research Centre, recognizing the risk posed by Nat-Tech disasters, has undertaken systematic research to study the mechanisms of these disasters (Cruz et al. 2006). In 2010, Krausmann et al. described the effects of the 7.9-magnitude earth- quake of May 12, 2008, in Sichuan, China, where the main cause of death and injury to workers was the collapse of industrial facilities, warehouses, and build- ings. In this case, the severity of the damage corresponded to the age of the facilities. The 9.0-magnitude earthquake that devastated northeast Japan in 2011 was followed by powerful aftershocks and gave rise to a huge tsunami, which reached several miles inland, flooding hundreds of square miles of land. Both the earthquake and the tsunami damaged or destroyed roads, bridges, ports, rail- ways, buildings, and so forth, as well as leaving more than 28,000 people dead or missing. The havoc wreaked by the earthquake and the tsunami affected more than two dozen prefectures with an estimated population of over 15 million. In addition to material damage, and the destruction of buildings, structures and infrastructures, a nuclear disaster took place. Although the Japanese example is a macro-accident in and of itself, it shows the extent to which the combination of a natural disaster and a technological event can affect a whole nation and lead to an unprecedented industrial and social crisis. Figure 1 shows the main infrastructure affected and/or damaged by the effects of the earthquake and the tsunami (first, second, and third effects). This view is merely an overview, however, and is insufficient to convey the complexity of the mechanisms (domino effect, opportunistic combinations, etc.) involved in a Nat-Tech disaster. In the case of the disastrous chain of events in Tōhoku, the trigger was an earthquake followed by a tsunami. Figure 2, which represents the sequence of accidents caused by the earthquake, gives a more detailed picture of some of he interrelated events that occurred during the disaster and the significance of the interdependencies of the CI. For example, let us consider the chain of events leading to a weakening of the power supply. The earthquake (as the initiator) trig-gers a tsunami, which, in turn, affects the nuclear plants that produce energy. As a result, the authorities are forced to reduce the overall output produced and supplied to the network. This further weakens the rest of the power plants, which are unable to deliver power to the victims.