The Qum Protests and the Coming of the Iranian Revolution
307
other religious radicals decided that the country was not yet ready for Islamic
revolution. As Khomeini (1981: 132–33) suggested in his lectures on ‘‘Islamic
Government’’ given in Najaf, Iraq, in 1970: ‘‘Ours is a goal that will take
time to achieve. . . . We must persevere in our efforts even though they may
not yield their result until the next generation.’’ For this reason, the Islamist
opposition devoted particular attention to spreading its message among the
youth.
74
At the same time, the Islamist opposition largely refrained from open
protest (Kurzman forthcoming). Spreading the message was risky enough.
75
Devout youths interested in more direct action drifted into cells of radi-
cal groups
76
that Khomeini called ‘‘deviationists from the Shi i religion . . .
whom I consider treasonous to the country and Islam and religion.’’
77
More-
over, Khomeini’s organization suffered a blow on 1 July 1975, just weeks after
the repressed Qum protests, when a thousand of his students and support-
ers were expelled by the government of Iraq, which had recently reached an
accord with the shah and no longer had a need for a resident Iranian oppo-
sition (Khomeini 1982b: 21).
Khomeini’s response to the Qum protests of 1975 may have been tem-
pered by this slew of difficulties, though he appeared to maintain his con-
fidence that the efforts of the previous decade would eventually bear fruit.
‘‘But with all these hardships, the awakening of the nation is the yeast of
hope,’’ Khomeini commented on 11 July 1975, referring to the activism
of university and seminary students (Khomeini 1982a: 232; Davani 1998,
6:464). ‘‘One clear point in these recent events that I find hopeful,’’ Kho-
meini wrote on 22 September 1975, ‘‘is this enlightenment and awakening
of the younger generation and the movement of the intellectuals, which are
developing quickly’’ (Khomeini 1982a: 237).
Two years later, Khomeini’s hopefulness seemed to have dissipated,
despite the opportunities offered by the shah’s limited political liberalization.
In a speech given on 28 September 1977, Khomeini noted that ‘‘a certain
opportunity [for protest] has been found, and it is to be hoped, God will-
ing, that good opportunities will arise.’’ However, Khomeini sounded almost
despairing of the possibility of taking advantage of such opportunities. He
began his speech with an apology for having repeated himself in an earlier
lecture: ‘‘When humans get old and senility overtakes them, all of their facul-
ties grow weak.’’ Khomeini appeared to recover his enthusiasm as his talk
continued, but he hardly sounded like a man who expected to lead a revolu-
tion: ‘‘With all this prostitution [both literal and figurative], the good people
308
Social Science History
of Iran are not saying anything. I don’t know why they’re not saying any-
thing. . . . When are they going to speak out and say something and protest?’’
(Khomeini 1977: 5, 15–16, 1982a: 251, 262–63).
Bolder elements within the opposition were in fact speaking out and
protesting at this time, as noted above, and Khomeini became aware of this
activity over the next month. On 1 November 1977, after several days of
seclusion following the death of his son,
78
Khomeini gave a hopeful-sounding
speech (quoted at length earlier). Less than two weeks later, however, on
12 November 1977, Khomeini sounded skeptical of the genuineness of this
‘‘opportunity’’:
I am compelled to warn the people against a great danger in order to save
the nation from the deception and tricks of foreigners and their func-
tionaries. This recent inattentiveness of the regime that gave a chance
to the writers to write and to the speakers to talk is a big trick to vin-
dicate the shah and to pretend an acclaimed freedom, and to attribute
the crimes to the administration, which is nothing but a stooge. Writers
also cannot, in this repressive and intimidating atmosphere, introduce
the center of the crimes, i.e., the shah himself. . . . [The shah wants
to] secure his position by meaningless and limited freedom, and thereby
prepare the atmosphere for continuation of his rulership, and once again
begin his savage attack with much more atrocity and disaster. . . . Now, it
is the duty of all Muslims, especially that of the great ulama’ (religious
scholars) and intellectuals . . . to take advantage of the opportunity to tell
and write everything that should be said to the international authorities
and other human societies. . . . I emphasize that worthy and responsible
individuals who hold the initiative avoid making themselves known, and
learn from past experience. (Khomeini 1978: 107, 109–10; original Per-
sian in Davani 1998, 6:534–37; Khomeini 1982a: 268–71; Shahidi digar
1977: 148–54; Zamimah-yi Khabar-namah, 1 December 1977, 56, 4)
As before, Khomeini recommended writing to international authorities,
though his followers continued to ignore this advice. Now, however, Kho-
meini called liberalization ‘‘a big trick’’ designed to divert criticism away
from the monarchy. Indeed, this diversion may have been working. Oppo-
sitionists in Iran were less outspoken than dissidents in the Soviet Union,
according to one knowledgeable observer, and prior to November 1977, they
criticized only particular policies rather than the regime itself (Cottam 1977: