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Organisation for Security and
Cooperation in Europe, and most major international economic
and financial associations. It also played an active role in central European economic and
political initiatives and organisations. In Ljubljana, much importance was ascribed to
Slovenia’s position in the United Nations, and Slovenia’s election as one of the non-
permanent members of the UN Security Council in 1997 was welcomed as a major Slovene
foreign policy achievement. In relations with Austria and Italy, the government attempted to
avoid conflict over unresolved issues that were making life difficult for the Slovene minorities
in Carinthia and in the Friuli-Venezia Giulia region respectively, and this earned the coalitions
and parties public criticism at home. In the mid-1990s, relations between Slovenia and Italy
worsened due to Italian attempts to revise international agreements which had been reached
during the time of Yugoslavia, and the demands made by Berlusconi’s government for the
return of property to Italian citizens who had left Slovene Istria and Primorska after the
Second World War. The opening of Slovenia’s property market, however, brought a rapid
improvement. At the end of the 1990s, relations between Ljubljana, Vienna and Klagenfurt
also cooled due to Austrian demands for the recognition of a German minority in Slovenia
(which had been virtually non-existent since 1945), and for the return of property seized after
the Second World War from Germans who had emigrated or been expelled from Kočevje or
Štajerska (Gottschee or lower Styria). But the two countries resolved the dispute in 2001 by
signing an agreement on cultural and scientific co-operation, which mentioned support for
“members of the German-speaking ethnic group in Slovenia.”
It was much more difficult for Slovenia to settle its affairs with Croatia, as the
governments in Ljubljana and Zagreb could not even agree on the exact course of their shared
land border, let alone the sea border. A number of issues relating to the succession from the
former Yugoslavia also remained unresolved. It was only in the late 1990s that Slovenia began
to pay more general attention to relations with the other countries that had emerged from the
former Yugoslavia; before that, the only notable co-operation had been with Bosnia-
Herzegovina, since over 50,000 refugees had fled to Slovenia during the war. After the end of
the war, Bosnia became an important market for the Slovene economy. Ljubljana only
followed a policy of greater Slovene engagement in the territory of the former Yugoslavia at
the end of the 1990s, once it seemed that there were no more serious obstacles to Slovenia’s
membership of the European Union and Nato. In 1999, it therefore joined the Stability Pact
for South Eastern Europe, and a year later (six months before Milošević extradition to The
Hague) established diplomatic relations with the Serb-Montenegrin remainder of Yugoslavia.
While the normalisation of relations with Belgrade and Slovenia’s increased political interest
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in the territory of the former Yugoslavia was supported by all the political parties and the vast
majority of the population, the proposal in 2000 for Slovenia to sign an agreement with the
Holy See caused the most serious political clash to date. Pope John Paul II visited Slovenia
twice in the second half of the 1990s and was warmly welcomed by Catholics, but this did not
bring the signing of an agreement settling legal matters with the Vatican any closer.
Opponents of the draft agreement, which also divided the ruling LDS party, accused the
government of conceding too much to the Catholic Church and of failing to stand by the
constitutional principle of the separation of church and state. Discussions on the agreement
dragged on until 2004, when the National Assembly at last ratified the agreement in a partly
amended form.
The changing relationship between Church and state was, of course, only one of the
unresolved issues dividing Slovene political and public opinion during the late 1990s and at
the start of the new millennium. Serious disagreement between the opposition and the
governing coalition was also caused by the demands of the SDS and their ‘Slovene Spring’
allies for changes to the electoral system. The SDS party believed that replacing the existing
proportional voting system with a majority system would have a favourable effect on
integrating the ‘Spring parties’ and facilitate the formation of an opposition coalition capable
of winning elections. They claimed that the majority voting system had numerous advantages,
allowing “more direct selection of parliamentary deputies, a higher quality composition of the
parliament and a more effective government.” The ruling LDS, the former Communists and
the leaders of some of the smaller parties objected to these ideas and argued that a
proportional system offered “a more balanced representation of different social groups in
parliament, more compromise in decision-making and less risk to the development of
democracy.” The SDS and its allies did not gain enough support in the National Assembly to
change the voting legislation, so they campaigned for a referendum to be held. The
referendum was called four weeks after the 1996 parliamentary elections. The turnout was
only a little over a third of the electorate, with voters choosing among three different proposed
changes to the voting system. The highest vote was for a majority system (44.5%) but this
was not the absolute majority required by referendum legislation. The SDS maintained that
the voters in the referendum had shown convincing support for a majority system and that the
National Assembly should move to change the electoral legislation. The Constitutional Court
agreed with this view in 1998. However, the governing coalition and the ZL (United List)
continued to oppose a majority system, and the National Assembly adopted no more than a
handful of amendments to the existing, proportional system. Party disputes on the electoral