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CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS
No. 2(26), 2004
The alliance represented by the United States is also promoting certain political projects designed
to extend considerable aid to the South Caucasian and Central Asian countries. Numerous statements made
by White House spokesmen and leading congressmen show that America intends to use its aid to strengthen
the democratic and secular principles in these regions and help the local states acquire political and eco-
nomic independence. The Silk Road Strategy Act suggested by Senator Sam Brownbeck and approved
by U.S. Congress in 1999 is one of the largest projects. As applied to the Southern Caucasus and Central
Asia this plan can be interpreted as a Marshall Plan of sorts. The British-American alliance is actively
promoting the EU-funded TRACECA project designed to create a Eurasian transportation corridor that,
in turn, will tie the Southern Caucasus and Central Asia to the West and weaken Russian and Iranian
influences there. We should say that the alliance is actively supporting the promising GUUAM regional
organization, which unites Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, and Moldova. Its Western orienta-
tion and the presence of the key South Caucasian and Central Asian countries in it creates additional
opportunities to reach the West by-passing Russia, thus promising its members’ sustainable and independent
development. It seems that GUUAM is instrumental in creating leeway to outmaneuver Russia in the post-
Soviet expanse—this suits the strategic interests of the British-American alliance.
In this way, the project and political initiatives supported by the alliance are designed to strengthen
the economic and political stability and independence of the local states, which will help them to gradu-
ally withdraw from the Russian and Iranian spheres of influence and move closer to the West. By the
same token, the alliance is keeping China in check, a country with its own far-flung strategic interests in
the region.
On the whole, the alliance’s efforts to re-orientate the South Caucasian and Central Asian coun-
tries have caused considerable shifts in their strategies. The political elites of Azerbaijan and Georgia
have been working for many years toward limiting Russia’s presence and drawing closer to the West.
They want membership in its political, economic, legal, and security structures. It was within this strat-
egy that President of Azerbaijan Heydar Aliev initiated a regional security structure with American
and Turkish involvement (Turkey as a strategic partner of the British-American alliance) at the Istan-
bul OSCE summit (15-17 November, 1999). The very fact that Georgia and Azerbaijan joined the anti-
Iraqi coalition shows that they were prepared to become the alliance’s strategic partners on both a re-
gional and global scale. In this context Georgia’s (and recently Azerbaijan’s) repeated statements about
their desire to join NATO show that both countries want to become the West’s leading partners in the
Southern Caucasus and Central Asia. If the theocratic regime in Iran is replaced, this will help the al-
liance to strengthen its foothold in the Southern Caucasus for a long time to come and promote its later
movement to Central Asia.
At the same time, the alliance will not be able to become ultimately entrenched in the region until
Russia removes its bases from Armenia. We cannot exclude the possibility that the policy aimed at grad-
ually reducing Russia’s influence in the Southern Caucasus will finally liquidate these bases and help
Armenia and Turkey settle their differences. This will create a fundamentally different political situation
and a new balance of power, which will probably force Erevan to seek another political patron.
If Russian and Iranian influences in the region are reduced to the minimum and the British-Amer-
ican alliance strengthens its foothold, and if NATO extends far enough to comprise Azerbaijan, Georgia,
and Armenia, the local conflicts will probably be settled.
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