38
The subjects
and citizens of all the Powers, traders or others, shall be treated in
Roumania, without distinction of creed, on a footing of perfect equality.’
35
The religious minorities in other Balkan countries were addressed in separate
articles: Bulgaria in Article 5, Montenegro in 27 and Serbia in 35. These were
otherwise similar to the Romanian article, but omitted the provision on the
equal treatment of foreign subjects, traders or other. Ottoman minority matters,
namely Macedonia and Armenia, were also addressed.
36
The reaction in Romania was one of infuriation,
and the Romanian
government embarked on a crusade to persuade the Great Powers to drop the
controversial article. The Powers did not accept the repeal of Article 44, so
Romania then tried to gain concessions over the paragraph’s interpretation. A
diplomatic confrontation followed, lasting one and a half years. The main
question was whether all Jews residing in Romania were to be granted political
rights and if not, to which categories of Jews could full citizenship be extended.
The British government had to choose between a prompt recognition of
Romania after the Berlin Congress and the postponement of recognition until
the Jewish problem had been settled satisfactorily. On one hand, Britain wished
for an early recognition in order to strengthen Romania and thus help to get the
Russian troops that remained in the area out as soon as possible. On the other
hand, for reasons of international
co-operation in other fields, Britain did not
want to alienate Germany and France, which, for their own reasons, both
favoured finding a full solution to the problem of Jewish emancipation.
37
Germany’s role seems to have been decisive. The Jewish question was
entwined with trouble that had arisen over the Romanian railways. Bethel
Henry Strousberg, a convert of German Jewish descent, won a concession to
build several railway lines in Romania in 1868. In 1870, Strousberg had to
announce his inability to pay interest.
38
Since the original
contract had not been
sufficiently clear or detailed, the Romanians and Strousberg quarrelled over
who should take care of the interest payments. All this led to bad blood towards
Germany in Romania. In 1871, Bismarck delegated the railway business to
Gerson (von) Bleichröder and another banker, Adoph Hansemann of the
35
Major Peace Treaties II, Treaty of Berlin, 975-997. Another condition
for the recognition
of Romanian independence was imposed in Article 45: Romania was forced to hand
Southern Bessarabia over to Russia. This clause did not cause international problems
in the long run, although the Romanians were by no means pleased about this article
either.
36
Major Peace Treaties II, Treaty of Berlin, 975-997.
37
Medlicott 1933a, 354-355. The problem of the recognition of Romanian
independence, i.e. whether the Powers were willing to recognise Romania based on
the conditions Romania offered, has been discussed in detail by W. N. Medlicott in
his classic 1933 two-part article. Medlicott has used the Foreign Office documents
from 1878-1880
extensively, many of which are also printed in the State Papers series
referred to below. As Medlicott’s work is so thorough, I have chosen not to return to
the original FO documents here.
38
Stern 1977, 359-363. There is a very detailed account on the whole railway question,
and not only the Strousberg affair, in Maier 1989, 170-262. Especially on Strousberg,
Bismarck, and Bleichröder, see 172-182, 186-198.
39
Disconto Gesellschaft, and urged them to settle matters with Romania.
39
Romania was eager to purchase the railways either completely or partially, and
of course aimed for the best possible terms. However,
the international
excitement over the Jewish question offered the Germans an opportunity to
force Romania into a less favourable railway settlement.
40
From autumn 1878 onwards, Bismarck appeared to be the champion of
Romanian Jews and the most eager supporter of a strict enforcement of Article
44. He wanted to use the Jewish question to coerce Romania in the railway
matter.
41
Austria did not want to make a big issue out of the Jewish question
and favoured a quick normalisation of diplomatic relations with Romania.
Russia also acknowledged Romania’s sovereignty, and Italy followed earlier
than the other three remaining Powers. Britain, and Prime Minister Salisbury,
would probably have preferred the Austrian line of action, despite Britain’s
traditional interests in Jewish emancipation. Britain
wanted to settle the trade
relations between the countries and to draw up a commercial treaty. However,
Bismarck pushed for the complete fulfilment of the religious liberty clauses and
France agreed so Britain eventually adopted this course as well. Therefore,
these three Powers insisted that a formal acceptance of the conditions included
in the Berlin Treaty was required on the part of Romania prior to recognition of
its independence.
42
The British government tended to favour a solution that would have given
the Jews who were born in Romania, so-called ‘indigenous Jews’, full
citizenship rights, but that would have left aside the problem of the ‘foreign’
Jews, who had not been born in Romania.
43
In March 1879, the British
representative in Bucharest, William White,
observed that, in regard to the
fulfilment of the Berlin articles, there was a considerable discrepancy between
the expectations of ‘some circles in Berlin and Paris’ and the interpretation of
the Romanians. He remarked that the Romanians would not agree to the full
emancipation of all Jews residing in Romania, irrespective of origin.
44
Naturally, the Jewish leaders in Britain were suspicious of Romania’s
behaviour and, through their newly established foreign policy organisation, the
Conjoint Committee, urged the British government to postpone the recognition
of Romanian independence until Romania complied
fully with the Berlin
articles. British Jews dismissed Romania’s suggestions of distinguishing
between those Jews who could be naturalised and those who could not.
45
39
Stern 1977, 365
40
Medlicott 1933a, 356, 360-361; Medlicott 1933b, 574-575. Stern criticises Medlicott’s
interpretation of Bismarck’s and Bleichröder’s role. Stern 1977, 582 (in endnotes).
41
Stern 1977, 382-385, 392.
42
Medlicott 1933a, 357-359.
43
Medlicott 1933b, 572-573.
44
State Papers 1880,
no 22, British Minister in Bucharest William White to Foreign
Secretary Marquess of Salisbury, 3 March 1879.
45
State Papers 1880, no 119, President of AJA Baron Henry de Worms and President of
the BDBJ Joseph M. Montefiore, (i.e. the Conjoint Committee) to Salisbury, 11 Nov.
1879.