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Social Science History
leagues. ‘‘I believe the author of the article wanted to see what the people’s
reaction would be, and if we don’t mobilize, it will mean the regime wins.’’
12
A proposal to discuss the offending article in class was outvoted by those
who wanted to cancel classes for a day in protest. But these radical teachers
controlled only a handful of classes. Most seminaries were run by the half-
dozen highest-ranking ayatullahs, and it was too late at night to ask for their
support. Instead, the plotters divided up the task of visiting the ayatullahs
the following morning.
13
On 8 January, students learned of the decision to strike. ‘‘On the advice
of their instructors,’’ one participant recalled, ‘‘the students said, ‘Let’s go
and ask the religious authorities, the theology teachers of the religious circles,
what their view is on this article.’ ’’
14
This was a time-honored method in the
repertoire of protest in Qum, where any seeker had the right to approach a
senior scholar and ask his opinion on a pressing issue of the day.
15
But this
day’s query was no neutral appeal to the expertise of seniority. The radical
students knew the response they sought and were hoping to pressure the
senior scholars into publicly denouncing the offending article and express-
ing sympathy with Khomeini. Several hundred strong, the students marched
from house to house, clashing with police several times along the way, beat-
ing two men accused of being government agents, and breaking several bank
windows. The police used a tractor and batons to try to disperse the crowd,
but there were no serious casualties (‘‘Guzarish-i sharh’’ 1978).
16
After the
protestors reached their respective destinations, they sat in the courtyard and
waited for each ayatullah.
As in 1975, the senior scholars were hesitant to support open protest.
When representatives of the radical teachers arrived at Ha iri’s home early on
8 January, requesting participation in the strike, he immediately telephoned
his senior colleagues. They agreed to strike, but only for one day.
17
Later that
same day, when the students came to see him, Ha iri expressed his fear of
open protest. ‘‘Of course I am very angry about the insult to the honorable
Ayatullah Khomeini, and I condemn it in all respects. I know that steps must
be taken, and I am taking them. But this sort of thing—my view is that it must
be peaceful, not in such a way that they will do in the Azam Mosque, too, like
the Fayziyah Seminary’’—which had been ransacked and closed following
the student protests of 1975 (‘‘Guzarish-i sharh’’ 1978: 17).
18
Shari at-Madari
was similarly cautious. After keeping the crowd waiting for more than an
hour,
19
he said he was doing all that he could, phoning and sending messages
The Qum Protests and the Coming of the Iranian Revolution
291
to government officials. ‘‘I continue to work on this. I hope that they [regime
officials] will refrain from this sort of insult, and ones like it, but I can do no
more than this’’ (ibid.: 16).
20
Ayatullah Muhammad-Riza Gulpayigani, on the other hand, sympa-
thized with the protestors: ‘‘Maintain your unity and solidarity and con-
tinue your peaceful demonstration.You will undoubtedly find success’’ (ibid.:
15).
21
Some activists were disappointed, however, that Gulpayigani spoke also
about marginal issues
22
and that he considered himself unable to help. ‘‘I
telegraphed members of parliament’’ several years ago on another matter, he
explained, ‘‘but they didn’t pay any attention’’ (Nabard-i tudah ha 1978: 2).
Only Ayatullah Shihabuddin Najafi-Mar ashi, so moved that he cried dur-
ing his speech, was an unqualified success with the student activists.
23
He
too said that he had written to Tehran in protest and, pleading old age and
heart trouble, had asked to be excused from further efforts. But, according to
a transcribed recording of his speech, he expressed his support for the dem-
onstrators several times, in no uncertain terms.
24
If these ayatullahs assumed
that their comments were being monitored by the shah’s secret police, they
were correct. The Qum branch of SAVAK, the Organization for Informa-
tion and National Security, sent summaries of the main points to Tehran that
same day.
25
The one-day student strike was extended to a second day after activists in
the Qum bazaar organized a shutdown for 9 January. Some shopkeepers had
closed on the eighth, according to secret police reports.
26
One of the leaders
of the activists approached Husayn Musavi-Tabrizi, a leader of the radical
seminarians, and asked, ‘‘How is it that we’re expressing our sympathy for the
religious circle? If the religious circle returns to work tomorrow and we close
the bazaar, this will create disharmony.’’ Musavi-Tabrizi later recalled that
he was not sure the activists could pull off a closure of the bazaar, and it was
too late in the evening to gather the radical instructors for a second meeting.
So he told the bazaar activist to bring a crowd to his seminary class early the
following morning—if enough bazaaris showed up, he would adjourn class
and have his students lead the demonstration to the other seminaries. The
next morning went just as planned, and the news of the bazaar strike shamed
the high-ranking scholars into ending their classes abruptly.
27
The students continued to make their rounds to the houses of religious
leaders. The protestors were joined by ever-larger crowds of local residents,
numbering several thousand early in the day and climbing to more than