United states court of appeals for the second circuit

 Again we emphasize that the recent corruption scandals in Connecticut in no way

15

implicated lobbyists.  See Green Party I, 590 F. Supp. 2d at 321.

 The CFRA’s ban on contributions by a lobbyist’s spouse or dependent children, a measure

16

intended to prevent lobbyists from circumventing the contribution ban, is likewise not closely drawn

to achieve the state’s anticorruption interest.  On this record, therefore, it too violates the First

Amendment.

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favoritism and influence are “[un]avoidable in representative politics.”  Id. at 910 (quotation marks

omitted).  Influence and access, moreover, are not sinister in nature.  Some influence, such as wise

counsel from a trusted advisor—even if that advisor is a lobbyist—can enhance the effectiveness of

our representative government. 

Accordingly, there is insufficient evidence to demonstrate that all lobbyist contributions give

rise to an appearance of corruption, and the evidence demonstrating that lobbyist contributions give

rise to an appearance of “influence,” see, e.g., Meadow Decl. ¶ 26, has no bearing on whether the

CFRA’s ban on lobbyist contributions is closely drawn to the state’s anticorruption interest.  We

conclude, as a result, that on this record, a limit on lobbyist contributions would adequately address

the state’s interest in combating corruption and the appearance of corruption on the part of

lobbyists.   The CFRA’s ban on lobbyist contributions, therefore, is not closely drawn to achieve the

15

state’s anticorruption interest.  Thus, we hold that the CFRA’s ban on lobbyist contributions, Conn.

Gen. Stat. § 9-610(g), violates the First Amendment.   

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II.

The CFRA’s Solicitation Bans

As set forth above, the CFRA prohibits contractors and lobbyists from “solicit[ing]”

contributions “on behalf of” candidates for state office.  See Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 9-610(h),

9-612(g)(2).  That prohibition applies to current state contractors, prospective state contractors, and

the principals of current and prospective state contractors, as well as to the spouses and dependent

children of covered lobbyists and contractors.  See id. §§ 9-601(24), 9-610(h), 9-612(g)(1)(F), (2).

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 We recognize that McConnell declined an invitation to apply strict scrutiny to certain

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provisions of federal law that banned the solicitation of contributions.  See 540 U.S. at 138-40.  As

the District Court in this case concisely explained, however, the McConnell solicitation provisions

largely “barred the solicitation of contributions that the potential donor would have been prohibited

from making in the first place.”  Green Party I, 590 F. Supp. 2d at 339 (citing McConnell, 540 U.S. at

138).  Strict scrutiny certainly does not apply to laws prohibiting the solicitation of illegal

contributions, just as strict scrutiny does not apply to laws prohibiting the solicitation of other

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Unlike laws limiting contributions, which present “marginal speech restrictions” that “lie

closer to the edges than to the core of political expression,” Beaumont, 539 U.S. at 161 (quotation

marks omitted), a limit on the solicitation of otherwise permissible contributions prohibits exactly

the kind of expressive activity that lies at the First Amendment’s “core.”   That is because the

solicitation of contributions involves speech—to solicit contributions on behalf of a candidate is to

make a statement: “You should support this candidate, not only at the polls but with a financial

contribution.”  Whatever may be said about whether money is speech, see, e.g., Davis v. Fed. Election

Comm’n, 128 S. Ct. 2759, 2778-79 & n.3 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting in part), speech is speech, even

if it is speech about money, see, e.g., Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 363 (1977) (“[O]ur cases

long have protected speech even though it is . . . in the form of a solicitation to pay or contribute

money . . . .”).  Speech “‘uttered during a campaign for political office,’” moreover, requires the

“‘fullest and most urgent application’” of the protections set forth in the First Amendment.  Citizens

United, 130 S. Ct. at 898 (quoting Eu v. S.F. County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 223 (1989))

(quotation marks omitted).

Thus, the CFRA’s provisions banning the solicitation of contributions are “[l]aws that

burden political speech” and are, as a result, “‘subject to strict scrutiny,’ which requires the

Government to prove that the restriction ‘furthers a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to

achieve that interest.’”  Id. (quoting Fed. Election Comm’n v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 464

(2007) (Opinion of Roberts, C.J.)).

17

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prohibited activity.  See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 297 (2008) (“Offers to engage in

illegal transactions are categorically excluded from First Amendment protection.”).

Here, however, the CFRA’s solicitation bans prohibit contractors and lobbyists from

soliciting contributions that are otherwise legal for the contributors to make.  Such provisions are

categorically different from most of the provisions at issue in McConnell, a point the state

“concede[d]” to the District Court.  See Green Party I, 590 F. Supp. 2d at 339.  Many of the

solicitation provisions in McConnell took the ordinary step of banning the solicitation of

contributions that were already prohibited; thus strict scrutiny was plainly inapplicable.  The CFRA,

by contrast, takes the extraordinary step of banning the solicitation of contributions that are not

otherwise prohibited; that is a burden on political speech requiring the application of strict scrutiny.

In any event, to the extent that a few of the provisions in McConnell banned the solicitation

of otherwise legal contributions, McConnell is distinguishable: the extreme breadth of the CFRA’s

solicitation provisions—unlike the provisions in McConnell—justifies the application of strict scrutiny

because the CFRA’s provisions “burden[] speech in a way that a direct restriction on the

contribution itself would not.”  McConnell, 540 U.S. at 139.

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The state attempts to justify the CFRA’s solicitation bans, like the CFRA’s contribution

bans, as a means to combat corruption and the appearance of corruption.  Although the

anticorruption interest has been held sufficiently important to justify restrictions on contributions,

see, e.g., McConnell, 540 U.S. at 143; Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25-26, in reviewing limits on campaign

expenditures under the strict scrutiny standard, the Supreme Court has consistently held that the

anticorruption interest is not a compelling government interest, see, e.g., Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at

908-09 (striking down a restriction on corporate independent expenditures); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 45

(striking down a different restriction on independent expenditures).  

As we observed above, moreover, “[w]hen Buckley identified a sufficiently important

governmental interest in preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption, that interest was

limited to quid pro quo corruption.”  Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 909.  It is easy to see how a “large

contribution[]” can be “given to secure a political quid pro quo from current and potential office

holders.”  Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26.  That is the “hallmark” of corruption: “dollars for political favors.” 

Fed. Election Comm’n v. Nat’l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 497 (1985).  It is far more

difficult to see how an individual might secure a political favor by recommending that another person

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