S e t a 1 y ı l l ı ğ ı

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l ü b n a n ’ d a   k r i z

Turkey’s mediation efforts in the most recent 

political crisis in Lebanon in January 2011 are

driven by the assessment that a possible conflict 

would directly threaten Turkey’s interests. Tur-

key’s government believes it has a true stake in 

the resolution of the crisis since Turkey signed 

a series of free trade and strategic coordination 

agreements with Lebanon in November 2010.

Intent  on  establishing  stability  in  the  region,

Turkey consistently supports policies, such as 

visa liberation, free trade, and strategic cooper-

ation councils, as a way to establish and main-

tain peace and stability in its neighborhood.

Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan expressed his

discontent with the Israeli violations of Leba-

nese  air  space  and  waters  as  early  as  January

2010. Such criticism derives partly from Tur-

key’s pledge (made after the Mavi Marmara in-

cident) to discredit in all international arenas

what Turkey views as Israel’s harmful policies.

Given  Turkey’s  persistent  critique  of  Israeli

policies since the infamous Davos crisis, this 

should come as no surprise. However, this was 

also  aimed  at  affirming  Lebanon’s  sovereignty

while opposing policies detrimental to regional 

stability.

When Erdogan paid a two-day visit to Lebanon

in November 2010, he signed a series of bilat-

eral agreements to establish a free-trade zone 

and a high-level strategic cooperation council 

— similar to those already in place with Greece 

and Syria. During his visit, Erdogan said that 

Turkey did not want political instability, which 

would result from the international tribunal’s 

report on the Hariri assassination. When the 

Lebanese government collapsed in early Janu-

ary 2011, Turkey was one of the first countries 

to get involved especially because political in-

stability and possible conflict in Lebanon could

jeopardize a future free-trade region between 

Turkey, Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon and deepen

cooperation with Lebanon.

Turkey’s regional activism has received interna-

tional criticism, however. Analysts often ignore 

the level of domestic support Turkish foreign 

policy receives.  It  used  to  be  that  Turkey  es-

tablished its foreign policy independent of and 

SETA YORUM

What is Turkey’s Stake in 

Lebanon? 

Turkey’s government believes it has a true stake in the resolution of the crisis since 

Turkey  signed  a  series  of  free  trade  and  strategic  coordination  agreements  with 

Lebanon in November 2010.

KADIR ÜSTÜN

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often against its own public opinion but that is 

no longer the case. Since 2003, when the Turk-

ish parliament opposed the passage of Ameri-

can troops through Turkey to facilitate the US

invasion of Iraq, public opinion in Turkey has

been instrumental in determining foreign pol-

icy. Turkish public opinion has been sensitive 

to Middle Eastern affairs especially because of

the Iraq wars’ impact on Turkey’s security and

economic outlook. There are segments of the 

Turkish foreign policy establishment, which 

still have reservations about Turkey’s increased 

international profile. However, when Turkey’s 

security interests are concerned, there is a high 

degree of support. A recent opinion poll shows 

that Turks identify the Mavi Marmara incident

as the second most important event of 2010 af-

ter the September 2010 referendum. The same 

poll finds that Davutoglu is the “most liked 

minister” in the cabinet. Turkey’s mediation ef-

forts in the Lebanese political crisis should be

seen in this light.

Turkish foreign policy is broadly supported 

not only by the Turkish public but also by the 

powerful institutions such as the Turkish mili-

tary. This is clear from Turkey’s policy change 

towards  the  Kurdistan  Regional  Government

(KRG) in Iraq over the last two years as well as

the row with Israel over the Mavi Marmara in-

cident. This was arguably one of the most diffi-

cult decisions for the Turkish army as KRG was

seen hostile to Turkish interests for a long time. 

Turkish army dropped its purely security ori-

ented “hard power” approach to northern Iraq

and is supporting Turkish government’s initia-

tives to engage the KRG.

At  the  beginning  of  the  Lebanese  mediation

efforts, there were calls for an international 

meeting to solve the crisis and Erdogan ac-

cepted  French  President  Sarkozy’s  call  for  an

international  meeting  on  Lebanon.  However,

the newly appointed Iranian Foreign Minister

Ali Akbar Salehi urged a solution “from within 

“

To  maintain  its  image  of  an 

“honest  broker”  that  can  talk  to  all 

parties in the region, Turkey speaks to 

political actors such as Hamas in Pales-

tine and Hezbollah in Lebanon.

the region.” Davutoglu emphasized that since 

all parties in the region would be affected by 

the crisis, all interested parties including Hez-

bollah and Iran should be involved in the meet-

ings. Turkey’s view is that whomever could con-

tribute to the resolution of the crisis should be 

included. The Iranian administration, however,

was intent on keeping its influence over the po-

litical process in Lebanon and saw “foreign ac-

tors” as detrimental to its interests. While Iran

seems particularly interested in maintaining 

its influence over Lebanon through Hezbollah,

Turkey is not invested in one particular group’s 

success, but in Lebanon’s stability as a whole.

To maintain its image of an “honest broker” 

that can talk to all parties in the region, Tur-

key speaks to political actors such as Hamas in 

Palestine  and  Hezbollah  in  Lebanon.  Turkish

shuttle diplomacy in Lebanon included meet-

ings with the Hezbollah leader, Nasrallah. Da-

vutoglu said, “As a political party and a group 

with very strong support within Lebanese soci-

ety, Hezbollah is one of the most essential ele-

ments of this process.”

Conventional wisdom in Turkish foreign pol-

icy was that the country would steer clear of 

the  “messiness”  of  Middle  Eastern  affairs  and

follow  the  US  and  EU  lines  on  most  foreign

policy  issues  in  the  Middle  East.  Turkey  had

little to no involvement in Lebanon prior to the

onset of its economic growth starting in 2002. 

As Turkish economy grew in the early 2000s, 

Turkey sought stronger relations through free 

trade  agreements  with  the  Middle  East  and

beyond. Prevalence of economic interests and

lack of long established close ties with Lebanese

groups means that Turkey is not partisan in 

its approach to Lebanon, allowing it to engage

with all political actors.

Turkey’s heightened level of involvement may 

impact  Iran’s  influence  in  Lebanon  as  Turkey

can provide the country with “another option.” 

This does not mean that Turkey is trying to re-

place Iran but that Turkey can become a serious,

stable, reliable partner with international accep-

tance and legitimacy. Such legitimacy might be 

beneficial to Hezbollah, as the image of being an 

Iranian “extension” may not serve them in the

long run. Unlike other regional powers, which

play one faction against another, Turkey stands 

alone in its neutrality and has the best chance to 

contribute to Lebanon’s fragile stability.

www.insideIRAN.org, 31 Ocak 2011

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