Reading Elinor Ostrom In Silicon Valley: Exploring
Institutional Diversity on the Internet
M. Six Silberman
Industriegewerkschaft Metall
Wilhelm-Leuschner-Strasse 79
60329 Frankfurt am Main, Germany
michael.silberman@igmetall.de
ABSTRACT
This paper, from the Design Fictions track at ACM GROUP
2016, is a review of a non-existent book, Reading Elinor
Ostrom in Silicon Valley: Exploring Institutional Diversity
on the Internet, edited by a non-existent researcher named
Kieran X. Yuval and published in 2021 (a date, at time
of writing, decidedly in the future) by NJU Press, a non-
existent academic press. In contrast to the fictitious nature
of the editor, book, and press, Elinor Ostrom was a real
person and everything described about her and her work in
the paper is, to the best of the author’s knowledge, true.
CCS Concepts
•Social and professional topics → Computing and
business; Commerce policy; •Information systems
→ Electronic commerce;
Keywords
Social science; sociotechnical systems; political economy;
Elinor Ostrom; Institutional Analysis and Development frame-
work; institutional diversity; online labor markets; on-demand
economy; Amazon Mechanical Turk; Uber; Lyft; reputation
systems; Turkopticon; online access to scholarly publica-
tions; intellectual property; open access; scholarly publish-
ing; online harassment; platform cooperativism; governance;
regulation; policy
1.
BOOK INFORMATION
Reading Elinor Ostrom in Silicon Valley: Exploring Institu-
tional Diversity on the Internet. Kieran X. Yuval, ed. Cam-
bridge, NC: NJU Press, 2021. 366 pp. US$24.95.
2.
SUMMARY OF THE REVIEW
Reading Elinor Ostrom in Silicon Valley is a collection of
empirical and theoretical contributions from researchers in
the “traditional” social sciences, economics, human-centered
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or
classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed
for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full cita-
tion on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than
ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or re-
publish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission
and/or a fee. Request permissions from permissions@acm.org.
GROUP ’16 Sanibel Island, FL, USA
c 2016 ACM. ISBN 978-1-4503-4276-6/16/11. . . $15.00
DOI:
10.1145/2957276.2957311
computing (HCC), and science and technology studies (STS)
that explores four major contemporary “information soci-
ety” developments—the “on-demand economy,” online ac-
cess to scholarly publications, online harassment, and “plat-
form cooperativism”—from a perspective that integrates the
sociotechnical and the political-economic.
The contribu-
tions to the volume consider the phenomena under study
through the lens of the Institutional Analysis and Devel-
opment (IAD) framework, developed over four decades by
the political economist Elinor Ostrom—the first woman and
first non-economist to win the Nobel Prize in economics (in
2009)—and her colleagues at the Workshop on Political The-
ory and Policy Analysis at Indiana University. The detailed
empirical and analytical contributions to the volume inte-
grate accepted HCC and STS methods such as ethnogra-
phy, research through design, and action research with ap-
proaches common in IAD scholarship, including game the-
ory and empirically based agent-based modeling. In doing
so, the collection builds a conceptual lens linking detailed
interpretivist empirical research in HCC and STS to practi-
cal “macro” questions about both system design and opera-
tion and economic and institutional policy—questions that
are always, in practice, interlinked. By shedding light on
these interlinked dynamics, this integrative conceptual lens
reveals new options for researchers, designers, entrepreneurs,
policy makers, users, and others to work together to evolve
existing “social-economic-political-technical” systems—and
build new ones—in ways that allow them to more substan-
tively and sustainably address the needs and concerns of
diverse stakeholders, including “on-demand” workers, schol-
ars unable to afford access to expensive journals, and people
subject to harassment in online spaces.
In a moment in
which seemingly ever more complex and politically opaque
sociotechnical systems subtend seemingly ever-greater swathes
of social, economic, and political life, reshaping interper-
sonal relationships, work, and politics in their images—or
in the not-always-democratic visions of their founders and
funders—this is a timely contribution.
3.
REVIEW
3.1
Overview of the book
Reading Elinor Ostrom in Silicon Valley is a riotously in-
terdisciplinary collection of empirical and theoretical con-
tributions from researchers in the “traditional” social sci-
ences, economics, human-centered computing (HCC, mean-
ing, roughly, “human-computer interaction [HCI] and com-
puter supported cooperative work [CSCW]”), and science
and technology studies (STS) that explores four major con-
temporary “information society” developments from a per-
spective that integrates the sociotechnical and the political-
economic. Substantively, the book examines four topics at
the intersection of computing, economics, and governance
that have in recent years garnered increasing attention from
a broad range of international publics, including practic-
ing designers, entrepreneurs, policy makers, social scien-
tists, and HCC and STS researchers: the “on-demand econ-
omy”; access to scholarly publications; online harassment;
and “platform cooperativism,” a movement developing demo-
cratically governed alternatives to for-profit information sys-
tems. The contributions are unified by the theoretical project
of actionably linking the Institutional Analysis and Devel-
opment (IAD) framework, developed over four decades by
the political economist Elinor Ostrom and her colleagues at
the Workshop for Political Theory and Policy Analysis at
Indiana University, with the research discourses of human-
computer interaction (HCI) and computer-supported coop-
erative work (CSCW). The contributions show how the IAD
framework, originally crafted to support analyses of the dy-
namics of “social-ecological systems,” can also scaffold broad-
ranging analyses that illuminate the interlinked technical
and socioeconomic dynamics of information systems—and
reveal practical strategies for more fully addressing the con-
cerns of a broad range of stakeholders in their design and
operation. Following in the tradition established by Ostrom
and her collaborators in their study of common pool re-
sources (see especially [37]), the contributors weave together
an eclectic collection of methods: detailed fieldwork and
interpretive analysis, large-N surveys and other quantita-
tive datasets (e.g., server logs), and empirically based agent
based models (i.e., computer simulations) of sociotechnical
systems.
After an introduction to the IAD framework, the book di-
vides into three major parts. Part I contains six detailed, in-
terdisciplinary, mixed-method case studies of socioeconom-
ically controversial sociotechnical systems and phenomena:
the transportation network industry, focusing on Uber and
Lyft, their struggles with regulators, and their competition
with taxi companies; hospitality platform Airbnb; “micro-
task marketplace” Amazon Mechanical Turk; online harass-
ment; the technical, economic, and legal struggle to control
online access to scholarly publications—and the links be-
tween the practices of corporate publishing giants such as
Elsevier, university libraries, and “guerrilla open access” in-
frastructures such as AAAAARG.ORG, Science Hub, and
Library Genesis; and finally, Bivy, a cooperatively managed
protocol emerging as a potential competitor to centralized
for-profit social networks such as Facebook and Twitter.
While each case begins with one or more named sociotech-
nical systems or with particular instances of a phenomenon,
the final object of study, following Ostrom’s own emphasis
(see e.g.
[35]), is always a “polycentric” system of inter-
linked technologies, institutions, actors, and practices, the
dynamics it exhibits, and the outcomes it produces for differ-
ent stakeholders. The computational, legal, economic, and
sociological aspects of the system are described quantita-
tively and qualitatively, and a working model of the system
is constructed using the concepts offered by the IAD frame-
work. This working model is then embodied in a computer
simulation—an empirically based agent based model (see
[18])—that is manipulated to explore potential consequences
of past or possible alterations or interventions within the
system. Agent based simulations of the transportation net-
work, for example, show how the development of an inde-
pendently operated reputation system for Uber and Lyft
passengers—and its adoption in 2017-18 by the majority of
“serious” drivers on both platforms—changed the incentives
facing passengers and led to an increase in driver earnings,
tenure, and satisfaction.
Part II is theoretical. Its three chapters—focusing respec-
tively on power, reputation and reputation systems, and co-
operative governance—draw on the empirical material and
models presented in Part I to explore these three themes
of long-running interest in the social sciences in the con-
text of massively distributed, interlinked information infras-
tructures. The chapter on power links prior game-theoretic
treatments of the topic with the concepts of the IAD frame-
work in the context of the empirical cases presented in Part
I to examine how various social-economic-political-technical
arrangements concentrate or distribute power, how the dis-
tribution of power affects both long-term system sustainabil-
ity and outcomes for different stakeholder groups, and how
specific interventions can redistribute power.
Reputation
systems appear in several chapters in Part I, and the chapter
on reputation and reputation systems in Part II synthesizes
these discussions and develops a series of agent-based models
to discuss the topic in more general terms. The final chap-
ter in Part II, on cooperative governance, follows a similar
pattern, drawing on the empirical and theoretical work of
Ostrom and her colleagues on self-governance among users
of common pool resources (e.g., [30, 31, 8, 5]) to draw gen-
eral lessons from the details of the cases discussed in Part
I.
Part III considers theory and method within HCC re-
search informed by the IAD framework.
The first three
chapters of Part III connect the IAD with three well-loved
theoretical traditions in HCC: activity theory, actor-network
theory, and social psychology. The last three chapters con-
sider the use of the IAD framework within research guided
by three related but distinct methdological traditions in
HCC: action research, research through design, and par-
ticipatory design.
The three methodological chapters of-
fer the collection’s sharpest development of four intertwined
themes that recur in the empirical chapters: the diversity of
users and stakeholders other than users in social-economic-
political-technical systems, the potential for conflicts of in-
terest among stakeholders, the inevitability of “politics” in
the management of systems in which conflicts of interest
arise, and the potential for structured dialogue to reveal
shared interests “beneath” the conflicts—shared interests that
can point the way to satisfactory resolutions.
A concluding chapter reflects on the contributions as a
whole and offers an agenda for future work.
3.2
Elinor Ostrom and the Institutional Anal-
ysis and Development framework
Elinor Ostrom was the first woman and the first non-economist
to receive the Nobel Prize in economics. She received the
2009 prize for her “analysis of economic governance, espe-
cially the commons” [28]. She describes her work as part of
contemporary interdisciplinary developments in economics
and political science that build on traditional game-theoretic
frameworks but reach beyond “classical” theories that as-
sume that all economic activity goes on in a “dichotomous
world” comprised only of “‘the market’ and ‘the state”’ ([35],
p. 1). In contrast to the too-simple assumptions and pre-
scriptions of classical economics, Ostrom and her colleagues
within “new institutional economics” and at the Workshop
on Political Theory and Policy Analysis at Indiana Univer-
sity found that “humans...have complex motivational struc-
tures and establish diverse private-for-profit, governmental,
and community arrangements that operate at multiple scales
to generate productive and innovative as well as destructive
and perverse outcomes” ([35], p. 1). That is, people start
businesses, make laws, establish government agencies, and
develop informal and formal not-for-profit arranagements to
realize their complex goals—and sometimes these efforts end
well and sometimes they end badly. Institutional form alone
does not predict success, failure, or the distribution of costs,
risks, benefits, and unintended consequences. Rather, out-
comes in institutional settings are shaped by a diversity of
factors, including the actors involved; the institutional roles
they occupy and the actions afforded them through those
roles; the information available to them about the potential
outcomes of their actions, including the potential actions of
other actors in response; and external conditions, including
both “biophysical” conditions (e.g., the number or growth
rate of fish in a fishery) and external social or institutional
conditions (e.g., the actions of actors in larger-scale institu-
tions such as governments).
Over four decades, Ostrom and her colleagues conducted
extensive field studies and laboratory experiments on the
social and ecological dynamics of shared “common-pool re-
sources” such as forests, fisheries, and water resources, and
extensive meta-analyses of these and other field studies and
experiments (see e.g. [29] and [33]). They found that the
complexity of factors influencing institutional outcomes means
that diverse possibilities exist for the sustainable long-term
governance of such common-pool resources.
This finding
contrasted with previous arguments arising from classical
theories which assumed most actors to be relatively short-
sighted, self-interested, and uncommunicative. These the-
ories proposed that actors should be expected to overex-
ploit shared resources, leading to resource collapse (e.g.,
[15]), and that such overexploitation could only be prevented
by either privatization or government intervention and con-
trol.
Ostrom and her colleagues found, however, that in
some but not all cases, resource users themselves can de-
velop and enforce rules to disincentivize overexploitation
and ensure the long-term sustainability of the resource. In-
deed, they found empirical evidence of many really existing
“long-enduring, self-organized, and self-governed common-
pool resources” ([29], Ch.
3).
The ability of users of a
given common-pool resource to self-govern—i.e., to them-
selves devise and enforce rules that prevent overexploita-
tion—depends on a diversity of factors, some of which can
be affected by users or actors in larger scale institutions (e.g.,
governments) and some of which cannot (e.g., the extent to
which the resource affords the demarcation of clear bound-
aries and monitoring).
(These are summarized in Chap-
ter 1 of Reading Elinor Ostrom in Silicon Valley, in [34],
and in Chapter 9 of [33].) The empirical discovery that re-
source users could under some circumstances resolve “com-
mons dilemmas” by developing and enforcing rules govern-
ing resource use led to the development of the Institutional
Analysis and Development (IAD) framework to explore and
explain the interrelated factors leading to success or fail-
ure (i.e., to “long-surviving resource institutions” [35] or to
resource collapse). The framework allows stakeholders, re-
searchers, and policy analysts to at least schematically rep-
resent real-world institutional settings, explore their dynam-
ics, and consider possible outcomes of change.
3.3
Contribution
The topics taken up in Reading Elinor Ostrom in Silicon
Valley —the “on-demand economy,” online access to schol-
arly publications, online harassment, and cooperative gov-
ernance of information systems—are hardly new to HCC re-
searchers. Indeed HCI and CSCW researchers contributed
early to the study of the “on-demand economy” (e.g. [38,
17, 21, 24, 39, 14, 23, 6, 11]) and online harassment (e.g. [2,
26]), and participated directly in the emergence of platform
cooperativism (e.g. [1]).
On the theoretical front, the claim that humans have com-
plex motivations, establish diverse structures for their col-
lective efforts, and experience success or failure based on
a diversity of factors including but not limited to institu-
tional form likely comes as no surprise for many social re-
searchers in HCC with training in, or exposure to, the in-
terpretive social sciences or humanities. Indeed the claim
resonates with long-running critiques of the na¨ıve techno-
logical optimism and determinism sometimes unwittingly
promulgated by enthusiastic proponents of new sociotechni-
cal designs—and social researchers within HCC (especially
CSCW) have offered some of the most pointed and action-
able of such critiques [22, 12, 13, 42].
And the topic of
stakeholder self-organization is a long-running interest in
HCC, especially CSCW (e.g., [19]), in particular in stud-
ies of free/open source software development (e.g., [4, 3])
and Wikipedia (e.g., [36, 44]). Indeed elements of the IAD
framework were used as early as 2007 to analyze governance
on Wikipedia [43].
Yet existing systems and their organizations rely on and
support particular economic aims, values, and logics (see e.g.
[40, 27, 10, 20]); beyond the often-cited cases of free/open
source software and Wikipedia, the final criteria shaping
“socioeconomic-sociotechnical” change in the last few decades,
at least where the main technologies involved are computa-
tional, seem still to be financial. The design and admin-
istration decisions of the operators of the large systems on
which many of us (some ambivalently) rely—Amazon, El-
sevier, Facebook, Google, Twitter, Uber, and so on—seem
much more often oriented by operators’ fiduciary obligations
(and hopes) than by an organizationally-supported inten-
tion to democratically negotiate the needs of a broad va-
riety of stakeholders, or to support a robust and vibrant
democratic culture generally. New entrants with different
aims face severe challenges—perhaps most notably, limited
access to capital. While HCC has a long tradition of devel-
oping technologies with democratic aspirations, even those
systems held up as examples of successful sociotechnical in-
terventions in asymmetrical power relations (in the last five
years, e.g., [7, 17]) are at best small victories in the face of
the continued dominance of nondemocratic systems.
The contributors to Reading Elinor Ostrom in Silicon Val-
ley show, through their institutional analyses of existing,
dominant systems, of “successor systems” [9, 25] that al-
ter the dynamics of those systems, and of cooperatively-
operated systems that aim to compete with them, that ma-
jor information infrastructures can be sustainably democrat-
ically funded and operated—and that democratically oper-
ated information infrastructures can compete effectively in
a market dominated by hierarchically-governed for-profit or-
ganizations. They argue—and the empirical material in the
volume lends weight to the argument—that democratically
operated infrastructures offer the promise of achieving, on
balance, better outcomes for the increasingly broad diversity
of stakeholders to information systems. They make a strong
case that the institutions of HCC research should welcome
the efforts of HCC researchers to study, celebrate, support,
and extend such systems—and, as needed, build new ones,
rather than marginalize such efforts by labeling them un-
acceptably political or otherwise unscientific. The empirical
chapters in the volume offer detailed accounts of the increas-
ingly significant contributions of HCC researchers in expand-
ing democratic influence over crucial information infrastruc-
tures, and the theoretical material offers conceptual and
methodological tools for others who might wish to follow in
their footsteps. The sophisticated but actionable analyses,
models, and even predictions offered throughout the volume
show convincingly that the IAD framework offers a pow-
erful complement to existing HCC theory and method for
researchers interested in understanding—and shaping—the
governance of sociotechnical-socioeconomic systems. Taken
as a whole, the volume offers a first draft of a coherent ap-
proach for analyzing and evolving existing social-economic-
political-technical systems—and for building new ones—in
ways that sustainably and substantively address the needs
and concerns of their diverse stakeholders, rather than pri-
oritizing the prerogatives of a powerful few.
Like the woman whose work guides the analyses and pro-
posals of its contributors, Reading Elinor Ostrom in Sili-
con Valley is openly and unapologetically biased in favor of
democratic governance. Ostrom once wrote that she “share[d]
a deep conviction that democratic systems of government
are the highest form of human governance yet developed”
[32], and editor Yuval and her co-contributors leave no room
for doubt that they share this conviction.
Their evalua-
tions of existing systems and proposals for new ones elevate
contextually-defined criteria of democratic participation, in-
clusion, and distributive and procedural justice to the same
importance as traditional technical and economic criteria
such as efficiency and resource sustainability. But like Os-
trom [32], they are far from blithely optimistic about the
future of democracy; like Ostrom, they observe that “gov-
erning the commons” is “always a struggle” [5]. The strug-
gle to evolve democratic social-economic-political-technical
systems will appear in many forms—organizational, techni-
cal, intellectual, and political—and many places—corporate
boardrooms, universities, political institutions, and the ev-
eryday practices of users, designers, operators, and other
stakeholders. A powerful affirmation that complex technol-
ogy and democracy can sustainably coexist, and that HCC
researchers can contribute meaningfully to that coexistence,
Reading Elinor Ostrom in Silicon Valley is a significant con-
tribution to that struggle.
4.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I thank Katie Pine for helpful discussions about this text.
5.
DISCLAIMER
This paper reflects the personal views of its author. It was
not directly materially supported, reviewed, or approved by,
nor does it bear any relation to any official position of, In-
dustriegewerkschaft Metall.
6.
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