Pivovarov

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YURI PIVOVAROV

POWER INSTITUTIONS IN POST-COMMUNIST RUSSIA:

OFFICIAL FORMS  AND HIDDEN TRANSCRIPTS

I.

 

POWER IN RUSSIA: OFFICIAL FORMS

The Constitution of 1993 has created a legal framework for the functioning of various

political institutions. Unfortunately, the knowledge of the constitutional legal pattern doesn't

imply the knowledge and understanding of how these institutions are functioning in real life and

what are the actual political developments in Russia. Certainly, the formal legal model of political

life in Western countries also considerably differs from the real course of life. Nevertheless, this

difference isn't of principal nature in the West, and the political process there can be analyzed on

the basis of and proceeding from the legal institutional design of society. But in Russia the gap

between the political system envisaged by the Constitution and the actual political system is

tremendous: there is a principal difference between them.

In other words, the Russian official institutional system is a masking cover of the real

system of power. This isn't, however, a characteristic feature only of to day's post-communist

Russia.

It was the same way in the USSR and the autocratic era. The events of the last years

have shown how stable and unvarying this tradition is. The new Constitution was adopted in

1993. In many respects it repeated and continued the first Russian Constitution by  Nikolai II in

1906. And that established historical and legal continuity of two  Russias: pre- and post-

communist. At the same time, the adoption of the 1993 Constitution meant a drastic break with

the political regime of the Soviet Union.

Indeed, the legal-constitutional and institutional system in present-day Russia is strikingly

different from the one that dominated in our country throughout the most part of the 20th

century. However, the 1993 Constitution based on the principles of the rule of Law, human

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rights and division of power and the last Soviet Constitution of 1977 have one surprising

similarity. And from a certain point of view, this similarity is much more important than all

tremendous differences between the communist and post-communist constitutional orders.

The fact is that the both Constitutions (of 1977 and 1993) have practically nothing to say

about those government bodies that play a decisive role in the government system. Under the

Soviet power that was the CPSU Central Committee, nowadays this is the President

Administration. There is, however, one microscopic distinction. While the 1977 Constitution

didn't even mention the CPSU Central Committee, the Constitution now in force makes

reference to the Administration of President. But what kind of reference it is! The article says:

The President... forms his Administration.... And that is all which is said about the institution that

governs in today's Russia. And this is not  occasional. The absence of the legal constitutional

status gives possibility for Russia's rulers to use this body most efficiently for their own benefit.

This body is the main instrument used to govern the country by the person who personifies the

power in Russia in the given period. And with the help of this instrument this person manages to

overcome juridical limitations imposed on him by the Constitution.

In is also necessary to note that the formation of such a body is not a political innovation

of the 20th century. For many centuries there have always been special organs  attached to

persons in power in Russia: the  Tsar Court  — the Emperor's Office  — the CPSU Central

Committee  — the Administration of President. This is an approximate historical series of

institutions of this kind. An analysis of their activities and an adequate understanding of their

nature are a necessary condition for studying the system of government in Russia since, I'd like

to repeat it once again, the most vital for the country decisions are considered and adopted by

these institutions.

Analysing Russia's political system, prominent American historian and  politologist G.V.

Hamburg pointed out two main types of political decision-making. First  —  consultative

constitutionalism (or  consultative=constitutional political system). Here division of power into

legislative, executive and legal is made. Executive power is subordinated to legal, controlled on

legal basis and limited through the system of meetings with other government institutions.

Second — consultative bureaucratism (or consultative bureaucratic system). The

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principle of division of powers here been made inconsistently and is far from being finished. The

system functions in the following way: before declaring its will a law, executive power consults

with formal institutions. Consultative bureaucratic bodies, naturally, have no constitutional power

to limit executive power; the latter might be limited by public opinion, elite or some influential

figures. Thus, executive power, to a certain extent, is forced to find consensus with public

opinion. In consultative  —bureaucratic system political power is practically divided between

executive bodies and other, often informal, institutions.

II.

 

POWER IN RUSSIA: HIDDEN TRANSCRIPTS

1)

 

THE ADMINISTRATION OF PRESIDENT

A.Chubais should be considered creator of the Administration in its present form. In

1996 he formulated its main goals: control over executive power bodies (government, first and

foremost), regional policy, creating and keeping an  attractive image of the president and power

in general. The goal, formulated by  A.Chubais, was: to counterbalance an amorphous and

create a dynamic structure capable of immediate reacting in critical situations.

The Administration is sometimes called a shadow cabinet. But it is not fact. It is< as has

already been noted a second edition of the CPSU Central Committee (CC). The

Administration, like of Central Committee, controls everything but it is not responsible for

anything at all. As compared to other influential Russian institutions, the Administration has a

rather limited and indirect access to financial sources (including the presidential reserve fund,

that is practically in the hands of the Administration officials). However, this weakness is more

than compensated by the possibility of using real power presidential potentialities for its aims.

Michail Komissar, being the Deputy Head of the Administration for rather a long time,

points out: We exercise political guidance of the government. And what is especially important,

this body determines cadre policy in many aspects. Thus, the Administration presents to the

president nominees for vice-premiers and ministers. No matter that Art.112 of the Constitution

gives this right to the Chairman of the Government. Besides, all the official papers, issued by the

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