Microsoft Word mitatcelikpaladokto doc

 
 
 
42 
 
period, he refrained from direct clashes with the Russian forces and instead he 
made a truce with them. On “several occasions he assured the Russian command of 
his loyalty, formally, accepted Russian citizenship, took an oath not to undertake 
any raids in the lowlands and to restrain people in his domain from doing so.”
93
 
During the early period of Shamil’s Imamate, in fact, in dealing with the 
peoples of the North Caucasus, the main policy of the Russians was to use 
comparatively peaceful means. As a result of Shamil’s growing power, by the late 
1836, Baron Rosen changed the Russian policy to achieve the unconditional 
surrender of the Imam and stop the spread of muridizm in the North Caucasus 
organised a military campaign to the Avar land in April 1837. This campaign, 
however, only served to icrease the popularity of the Imam. Russian troops 
captured Shamil’s base, Khunzakh and Ashilta, stormed Akhulgo, and sieged him 
with his supporters in Tiliq. But, while the Russians besieged him in the village, his 
supporters surprisingly imposed their own blockade on the Russian forces and 
deprived them of any possible reinforcements. At the end of 40 days of double 
blockade the Russians had to conclude peace on the terms offered by Shamil. The 
‘victory’ or the peace of Tiliq was the real turning point for the Shamil’s authority. 
All his rivals accepted his command and he consolidated his power over almost all 
of Dagestan and mountainous Chechnya. Moreover, Tiliq boosted his prestige in 
other parts of the North Caucasus.
94
 
This was a real danger for the Russian expansion in the region. In order to 
prevent the increase of Shamil’s power Russians had to deal with him. Thus, in 
                                                                                                                                        
92
 His other main rival Naqshbandi sheikhs were Tashou Haji al-Enderi, Qibid Muhammed al-
Tilitli, Akhberdy Muhammed, and Sayyid al-Ihali. 
93
 Zelkina, God and Freedom, 179. 

---

 
 
 
43 
 
order to understand the situation in the region, Tsar Nicholas I visited in October 
1837. Despite the Russian authorities’ efforts to bring Shamil to Tiflis to see the 
emperor, Shamil, he refused to go. During his tour, the emperor realised that in 
spite of the enormous amount of material and human resources and military efforts 
that had been committed to the subjugation of the region, it still defied Russian 
control. Disappointed and angered at what he had seen in the Caucasus, the 
emperor made subjugation of the northeastern Caucasus the immediate priority for 
1838-39.
95
 
In compliance with this new priority, Russians started a new campaign 
against Shamil in June 1839 and besieged his base, Akhulgo and trapped him in the 
fortress. Shamil manage to escape luckily but the Russian victory affected his 
position and authority adversely. Thus he was forced to move to Chechnya for a 
while in 1839. With the help of Chechen mullahs and sheikhs, he managed to 
organize his movement and increased his power in Chechnya. By 1840 he had won 
over the majority of Chechens and began his struggle. First of all, he concentrated 
his efforts in Dagestan and achieved great success over the territories of Salatav, 
Andi, and Gumbet. Through these regions he organised assaults against the Avar 
land. Haji Murad’s acceptance of his authority reinforced his position in Dagestan 
and with his support, Shamil spread his authority to the whole of Avar territories 
and Ghazi-Kumuk Khanate.
96
 
In this period, the Russian policy in the region was to use political means 
rather than force. In order to implement this policy the Tsar appointed Aleksandr 
                                                                                                                                        
94
 For the Tiliq campaign see Gammer, Muslim Resistance, 81-95, Magomedov, 66-7. 
95
 Zelkina, God and Freedom, 184-185. 

---

 
 
 
44 
 
Ivanovich Neidhart, commander-in-chief of Russian armies, and to prevent any 
further disasters, he imposed a 2 year long ban on raids and expeditions. This 
policy allowed and helped Shamil to consolidate his power and spread his authority 
over the entire North Caucasus. Thus, from the early 1840s, the struggle of North 
Caucasian peoples began to take the shape of a unified and consolidated movement 
under the control of Imam Shamil. 
 
The North Caucasian Imamate was brought about by a gradual and 
continuos process, which was initiated by the Russians, i.e. infidels, and its 
foundations were laid by the first two Imams on the basis of Shari’a. These Imams, 
in compliance with the Naqshbandi traditions, assumed the role of spiritual guides 
and supervisors of the local rulers and claimed a higher religious authority over 
them. The first Imam, Ghazi Muhammed in particular, did not envisage himself as 
a ruler. He rather regarded himself a guide to the various rulers and communities.
97
 
Although the second Imam attempted to modify the existing social and political 
order of the North Caucasus, his very short term in the Imamate did not allow him 
to make necessary regulations. It was Imam Shamil who finally set his authority, 
formalised its administrative system, codified the laws and defined the authority of 
each official in this new unified North Caucasian State that mainly extended over 
the territories of Chechnya and Dagestan. Moreover through his deputies he 
nominally set his authority over the Circassian lands. In contrast to the ad hoc 
deputies or the messengers of the first Imam, Hamza Bek and Shamil, through 
                                                                                                                                        
96
 For the struggle of Shamil see Zelkina, God and Freedom, 189-202; Gammer, Muslim Resistance; 
and Magomedov, 71-89. 
97
 Gammer, Muslim Resistance, 225. 

---