Global trends in cbrn terrorism: Implications for pathogen security Dr Robert Stagg

Global trends in CBRN terrorism: Implications for pathogen security

• Dr Robert Stagg

• Department of Defence

The CBRN terrorism threat in context…

• Terrorism is likely to remain the preferred tactic of non-state actors to violently address grievances

• Most terrorist groups have and will probably remain ‘tactically conservative’

• Explosives will continue to be the overwhelmingly preferred tactic

• Some will continue to seek CBRN to

• achieve tactical and/or strategic goals

• Most organisations don’t start with CBRN but escalate
• Potential to increase fear, attention and scale
• Requires a degree of organisational learning
• Acquisition of expertise and material

WMD vs. CBRN

• Mass casualties can be achieved without CBRN

• 9/11 attacks killed 3000 people after hijacking four planes with box cutters

• Most interest in CBRN is not for the purposes of causing mass casualties

• Typically insurgents pursuing discreet and small-scale targets

• But… CBRN attacks do represent one of the most viable ways for terrorists to inflict mass casualties

Who pursues CBRN?

• Lone actors – with personal grievances and ready access to CBRN materials or expertise. eg 2001 ‘Amerithrax’ attacks

• Insurgencies – where most CBRN activity is seen

• A small proportion of insurgents invariably consider CBRN
• Discreet targets, low scale, crude in nature

• Religious cults - perpetrators of historical CB attacks

• Terrorists with local grievances

• Political, nationalist, religious, issue-motivated
• Low-level interest in CBRN that is rarely put into practice

• Violent global Jihadists (AQ and AQ-inspired)

• Seek WMD-like CBRN capabilities
• Prepared to invest time and resources in sophisticated effort

Crude vs. sophisticated

• Crude

• Extension of conventional tactics and goals

• Often improvised or requires little preparation

• Requires minimal expertise and uses readily available materials

• Purchase or theft of off-the-shelf toxic chemicals or radiological material

• Dispersal by IEDs, food supplies, conventional munitions

• Expect low scale casualties

• Sophisticated

• Usually for the explicit purpose of causing mass casualties (civilian targets)

• Requires access to specialised expertise – experienced scientists

• Requires specialised materials – CW agents, BW agents, fissile material

• Technical challenge of weaponisation (varying difficulty)

• Time consuming and relatively heavy investment of resources

• Potential to cause tens of thousands of casualties

Examples of crude CBR terrorism

• Crude CBR devices incorporate readily available materials

• Require little to no manipulation – cyanides, pesticides, chlorine…
• Terrorists utilise existing expertise – recognition of additional fear factor, increased casualties & complication of the response process
• Most cases use explosives to disseminate the CBR material

• Chlorine IEDs in Iraq (AQI), acid IEDs in Thailand

• Terrorists in Afghanistan continue to seek poisons

Comparative difficulty

Sophisticated CBRN over time

Rajneeshees: The first sophisticated CBRN terrorists (1984)

• Religious cult who sought to win County elections (USA)

• Aimed to incapacitate opposition voters

Aum Shinrikyo: The most sophisticated CBRN effort

• A Japanese-based apocalyptic cult

• > 10 000 members including dozens of scientists with post-graduate qualifications

• Hundreds of millions of dollars of assets

• WMD development was the centrepiece of the group’s goals

• Investigated acquisition of fissile material
• 1993 – commenced program to manufacture VX and sarin
• 1994 – Tested sarin and VX on sheep in Australia
• 1994 – Used sarin in assassination attempts – 7 killed
• 1995 – Tokyo subway attack – sarin kills 12, thousands injured
• Attempted anthrax attacks – but used vaccine strain

Afghanistan: AQ’s WMD efforts (1999 – 2001)

• Commenced about 1999 but went unnoticed

• Recruited multiple scientists and established multiple labs

• Concentrated on traditional agents

• anthrax, plague, nerve & blister agents, nuclear devices

• Outreach to Jemaah Islamiyah to acquire ‘appropriate’ expertise

• Recruitment of Yazid Sufaat – a U.S. trained biochemist - to isolate and culture Bacillus anthracis in a laboratory near Kandahar
• Isolation almost certainly failed

• Considered weaponisation

• Interest in crop dusters for dissemination of agent

• Disrupted by Coalition invasion

• Removal of safe haven and key operatives
• Without disruption, WMD efforts may have been successful

AQ post 2001

• AQ have not realised WMD ambitions (yet)

• Maintained intent (rhetoric), but what about in practice?

• Have they had significant time/ space/ resources to achieve development of relatively sophisticated agents?

• Possibility of ongoing highly compartmented projects

• Increasingly difficult with CT efforts

• AQ doctrine offers religious sanction, strategic preference and practical justification for using WMD and specifically CBRN

• AQ has been able to influence elements of other groups with overlapping ideology

• JI bombings against Western targets in Indonesia

• Some groups susceptible to AQ’s influence have greater access to expertise and materials

Bioterrorism: The worst of a bad bunch

• Bioterrorism probably represents a greater threat than chemical, radiological or nuclear terrorism

• Compared to bioterrorism:

• Radiological terrorism has lower potential to cause casualties
• Nuclear terrorism is very unlikely to occur
• Chemical terrorism has less potential to proliferate

What can bioterrorists achieve?

• Disruption, annoyance, fear

• White powder scares

• Augment conventional attacks

• Increase impact and complicate response to IED attack

• Poisoning of food or water

• Suitable for attacking a discreet group of people
• But why not use chemicals? Incapacitate instead of kill?

• Agricultural terrorism

• Economically devastating

• Mass casualties

• Probably relies on inhalation of organism

Bioterrorism threat: a product of intent and capability…

• ‘Low impact’ bioterrorism could meet the goals of many terrorist groups

• Few groups have shown intent in the past

• ‘High impact’ bioterrorism only meets the goals of very few groups

• AQ and affiliates
• ‘Lone scientist’
• Apocalyptic cults

• Capability of terrorist group

• Financial & logistical resources
• Knowledge/skill acquisition
• Materials & technology acquisition
• Production, weaponisation and delivery

Biological agents of concern

• Agricultural diseases

• eg Foot and Mouth Disease, wheat rust
• Huge costs to a country’s economy

• Human pathogens suitable for ‘low impact’ bioterrorism

• Salmonella, Shigella, E. coli, influenza and other respiratory viruses, malaria, TB, HIV etc
• Relatively low fatality rate
• The Rajneeshee Salmonella attacks

• Human pathogens suitable for ‘high impact’ bioterrorism

• Bacillus anthracis, Yersinia pestis, Clostridium botulinum…
• Suitable for weaponisation (inhaled, environmentally hardy)
• High fatality rate
• No terrorist group has ever obtained a suitable strain

Terrorist interest in biological agents

• Predominantly traditional biological warfare agents

• Recognition of state development as weapons
• Volume of reporting and experimental data on internet
• Media coverage of agents eg AQIM & plague
• Preparation by governments to respond to the threat

• Bacillus anthracis, Yersinia pestis, Clostridium botulinum, toxins including botulinum toxin, ricin, etc.

• List of potential agents is almost endless

• Particularly if mass casualties are not a priority
• Selected agent will be influenced by availability & expertise

The science fiction side

• Artificial manufacture of BW agents

• Synthesis of smallpox virus

• Genetically modified ‘super germs’

• Interleukin or toxin expressing viruses

• Theoretically possible and increasingly within the capabilities of states or elite researchers

• Non-state actors have shown little to no interest

• Non-state actors do not have the expertise or resources to attempt such efforts

• Exception of ‘lone scientist’?

Successful tactics proliferate

• Driven by media exposure and ease of information sharing

• Chlorine IEDs in Iraq

• Idea proliferated on the internet and in extremists circles
• Has not resulted in proliferation of chlorine attacks

• Consider bioterrorism

• No ‘trigger’ since the rise of AQ
• Ease of proliferating material

• Expect that once acquired, a BW-suitable agent would proliferate

• Highlights the importance of preventing initial acquisition (pathogen security)

Importance of biosecurity

Some thoughts on biosecurity

• Traditionally, biosecurity has focused on containing the pathogen rather than securing the facility.

• Some biosafety practices contribute to biosecurity

• Biosecurity requires multiple different security layers that, when combined, dramatically reduce terrorist access to pathogens

• Vetting of staff
• Culture of responsibility
• Controlled access to material
• Improved facility security
• Inventory control
• Management of infectious material

• Understanding where pathogens are housed

• Importance of considering ‘small’ facilities