supervised from afar by a politically absent isolationist US and, closer to
home, by the weakly committed powers of France and Britain. No
spaceless universalism was on the historical agenda. Schmitt had to wait
until after WWII, when the combination of US-American political and
economic presence on German soil – military occupation plus Marshall
Plan plus Truman Doctrine – moved Europe a step closer to the space-
lessness that he had already envisaged for the interwar period. But even
this did not generate a state-cancelling universal empire.
Salvaging Schmitt for contemporary IR theory? Theoretical reprise
Schmitt’s history of international law and order is deeply problematic due
to the limits of its theoretical assumptions and the explicit ideological
purpose of its context-bound geopolitical revisionism. It fails to function
as a plausible international theory for the historical period (1492–1919/45)
it was designed for. But can we dissociate Schmitt’s theory from his
defective history, extricate insights from Schmitt’s super-politicized pro-
ject, and salvage his theoretical premises – decisionism, concept of the
political, concrete-order-thinking – as generic analytics for IR theory?
Analytically, Schmitt’s notion of the extra-legal decision that instanti-
ates the politics of the exception is little more than a
passe-partout that
can be ‘applied’ to an indiscriminate range of polities under duress that
turn to emergency powers. The application of Schmittian concepts to the
exception can only descriptively confirm
a posteriori an already instituted
state of affairs as a
fait accompli, whose explanation is outside their remit
and whose critique cannot be formulated from within the Schmittian
vocabulary. Why is that the case? As Schmitt’s method is bereft of any
sociology of power, decisionism lacks the analytics to identify what balance
of sociopolitical forces activates in what kind of situation the politics of the
exception and fear. For the state of exception is never a non-relational
creation
ex nihilo – a unique and self-referential event equivalent to the
miracle in theology – as it remains bound to the social by an indispensable
act of calculation preceding its declaration with regard to its chances of
implementation, public compliance or resistance by those upon whom it
bears – the social relations of sovereignty. The exception remains quintes-
sentially inserted in a relation of power whose reference point remains the
social. Of the two sides of the exception – the power that invokes it and the
power that is being excepted from the normal rule of law – Schmitt only
theorizes the first. Yet, the decision alone is never decisive.
Schmitt’s concept of sovereignty remains not only de-socialized, but
curiously de-politicized, as he seeks to identify an Archimedean point not
Fatal attraction: Schmitt’s international theory 213
only outside society, but equally outside politics conventionally understood,
super-insulated from any sociopolitical contestation, in order to govern
not only against society, but to neuter domestic politics altogether –
ultra-sovereignty. This extra-political vantage point is deliberately chosen –
and here political theology and hyper-authoritarianism converge – to
pinpoint that chimerical location that re-stabilizes social processes from
nowhere –
ex nihilo – yet with overwhelming force. But this ‘place beyond’
really belongs to the sphere of theology proper. Here, at the latest, political
theology – the conception of sovereignty modelled on absolutism and the
papal
plenitudo potestatis – risks not only collapsing into unrestrained and
arbitrary state-terror, but being removed from any rational intelligibility
whatsoever – the apotheosis of the state. Sovereignty defined in terms of the
exception constitutes a legal–political category and cannot explain what
provokes and comprises concrete states of emergency as real historical
phenomena. Schmitt’s conception of sovereignty constitutes a normative
prescription, designed specifically for a hyper-authoritarian solution to the
intractable crisis of the Weimar state, and cannot function as a generic
analytic for ubiquitous invocations of emergency powers. It is singularly
unable to gauge the different constellations and transformations between
political authority and social relations, geopolitics and international law,
and, ultimately, spatial world-ordering.
But this was the task set by
The Nomos and the turn towards concrete-
order-thinking in the mid-30s, generating a reinterpretation of history as a
succession of spatial–legal nomoi that tied Schmitt’s present to a see-
mingly remote and recondite past. Yet, concrete-order-jurisprudence fails
to provide guidance as to what processes drive the politics of land-
appropriation, enemy-declarations, and world-ordering, leading to an
asociological and curiously non-geopolitical – in the sense of geopolitics
as an inter-subjective encounter between polities – stance. Schmitt’s law-
antecedent act of land-appropriation, which generated the meta-juridical
legitimacy upon which international legality is erected, is itself divorced
from any further theoretical determinations. The ‘concrete’ is largely the
factual. The descending journey from the concrete to its manifold inner
determinations and the ascending return journey to the concrete as a
‘concrete in thought’, captured in its rich inner determinations, is never
undertaken (Marx 1973, 100).
26
The concrete – facticity – turns into an
26
The notion of the ‘concrete’ – alongside ‘organic’, ‘soil-bound’, ‘telluric’, and ‘chtonic’ –
enjoyed a steep career in Nazi ideology as part of a wider idiomatic promotion of the ‘ideas of
1914’ against the ‘ideas of 1789’. It was not so much a neo-Hegelian
Wunderwaffe, but part of
the fascist jargon whose explicit purpose was to counter the ‘abstract’, ‘rationalised’, and
‘uprooted’ nature of social relations inherent in the community-dissolving character of ‘Jewish’
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