2000
194. With Jeffrey M. Togman, “Agreement Through Threats: The Northern Ireland
Case,” in Miroslav Nincic and Joseph Lepgold (eds.), Being Useful: Policy
Relevance and International Relations Theory. Ann Arbor, MI: University of
Michigan Press, pp. 325-342; slightly revised version of #193.
195. “Approval Voting.” International Encyclopedia of Elections. Washington, DC:
CQ Press, pp. 17-18.
196. With Peter C. Fishburn, “Fair Division of Indivisible Items between Two People
with Identical Preferences: Envy-Freeness, Pareto-Optimality, and Equity.” Social
Choice and Welfare 17, no. 2 (February): 247-267.
197. “Game Theory: The Mathematics of Competition,” one chapter in For All Practical
Purposes: Introduction to Contemporary Mathematics, 5th ed. New York: W. H.
Freeman, pp. 525-577.
198. “Game Theory: Pitfalls and Opportunities in Applying It to International
Relations.” International Studies Perspectives 1, no. 3 (December): 221-232.
2001
199. “Response to Randall Stone: Heresy or Scientific Progress?” Journal of Conflict
Resolution 45, no. 2 (April): 245-256.
200. With D. Marc Kilgour, “Competitive Fair Division,” Journal of Political Economy
109, no. 2 (April): 418-443.
201. “Game Theory and the Cuban Missile Crisis,” Plus (issue 13), http://plus.maths.org/
202. With David Denoon, “Fair Division: The Spratly Islands Conflict,” in Nils Petter
Gleditsch and Paul F. Diehl (eds.), Environmental Conflict. Boulder, CO:
Westview, pp. 199-224.
203. With D. Marc Kilgour, “Fallback Bargaining,” Group Decision and Negotiation 10,
no. 4 (July): 287-316.
204. With Peter C. Fishburn, “A Nail-Biting Election,” Social Choice and Welfare 18,
no. 3: 409-414.
205. “Game Theory,” in Joel Krieger (ed.), Oxford Companion to Politics to the World,
2d ed. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 302-303.
206. With Paul H. Edelman and Peter C. Fishburn, “Paradoxes of Fair Division,”
Journal of Philosophy 98, no. 6 (June): 300-314.
207. With Dudley R. Herschbach, “The Science of Elections,” Science 292, no. 5521 (25
May): 1449 (editorial).
2002
208. With Peter C. Fishburn, “Voting Procedures,” in Kenneth Arrow, Amartya Sen, and
Kotaro Suzumura (eds.), Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare. Amsterdam:
Elsevier Science, pp. 175-236.
209. With Michael A. Jones and D. Marc Kilgour, “Single-Peakedness, Coalition
Formation, and Disconnected Coalitions,” Journal of Theoretical Politics 14, no. 3
(July): 359-383.
210. With Walter Bossert and D. Marc Kilgour, “Cooperative vs. Non-Cooperative
Truels: Little Agreement, But Does That Matter?” Games and Economic
Behavior 40, no. 2 (August): 185-202.
211. With D. Marc Kilgour, “Games That End in a Bang or a Whimper,” in George Ellis
(ed.), The Far Future Universe. Radnor, PA: Templeton Foundation Press, pp.
196-206.
212. “Game Theory in Practice: Problems and Prospects in Applying It to International
Relations,” in Frank P. Harvey and Michael Brecher (eds.), Millennial Reflections
on International Relations: Evaluating Methodology in International Studies.
Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, pp. 81-96.
213. “Approval Voting: A Better Way to Select a Winner,” in What Matters column of
MIT alumni electronic newsletter (November).
http://alum.mit.edu/ne/whatmatters/200211/
2003
214. Chapters on “Game Theory: The Mathematics of Competition” and “Electing the
President” in For All Practical Purposes: Mathematical Literacy in Today’s
World, 6th ed. New York: W.H. Freeman, pp. 544-591 and pp. 592-632.
215. With D. Marc Kilgour,“Truels and the Future,” Math Horizons 10, no. 4 (April):
5-8. Reprinted in Deanna Haunsperger and Stephen Kennedy (eds.), The Edge of
the Universe: Celebrating Ten Years of Math Horizons. Washington, DC:
Mathematical Association of America, 2006, pp. 278-282.
216. With Michael A. Jones and D. Marc Kilgour, “Dynamic Models of Coalition
Formation: Fallback Vs. Build-up,” in Moshe Tennenholtz (ed.), Theoretical
Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge, Proceedings of the Ninth Conference
(TARK 2003), Indiana University, June 20-22, pp. 187-200; and in Graph Theory
Notes of New York 45: 32-40.
217. Articles on “Approval Voting,” “Fair Division,” and “Game Theory” in Charles K.
Rowley amd Friedrich Schneider (eds.), The Encyclopedia of Public Choice.
Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic.
218. With Paul H. Edelman and Peter C. Fishburn, “Fair Division of Indivisible Goods,”
Theory and Decision 55, no. 2 (September): 147-180.
2004
219. With Todd R. Kaplan, “Dividing the Indivisible: Procedures for Allocating Cabinet
Ministries in a Parliamentary System,” Journal of Theoretical Politics 16, no. 2
(April): 143-173.
220. With Julius B. Barbanel, “Cake Division with Minimal Cuts: Envy-Free
Procedures for 3 Persons, 4 Persons, and Beyond,” Mathematical Social Sciences
48, no. 3 (November): 251-269.
221. With D. Marc Kilgour and M. Remzi Sanver, “A Minimax Procedure for
Negotiating Multilateral Treaties,” in Matti Wiberg (ed.), Reasoned Choices:
Essays in Honor of Hannu Nurmi. Turku, Finland: Finnish Political Science
Association.
2005
222. With Michael A. Jones and D. Marc Kilgour, “Forming Stable Coalitions: The
Process Matters,” Public Choice 125, nos. 1-2 (October): 67-94.
223. With Peter C. Fishburn, “Going from Theory to Practice: The Mixed Success of
Approval Voting,” Social Choice and Welfare 25, no. 2: 457-474.
224. With Daniel King, “Efficient Fair Division: Help the Worst Off or Avoid Envy?”
Rationality and Society 17, no. 4 (November): 387-421.
225. “Belief in a Superior Being: A Game-Theoretic Analysis.” In Charles L. Harper Jr.
(ed.), Spiritual Information: 100 Perspectives on Science and Religion.
Philadelphia: Templeton Foundation Press, pp. 242-249.
2006
226. Chapters on “Electing the President” and “Game Theory: The Mathematics of
Competition” in For All Practical Purposes: Mathematical Literacy in Today’s
World, 7th ed. New York: W.H. Freeman, pp. 431-472 and pp. 542-590.
227. With Hande Mutlu and Shawn Ling Ramirez, “Influence in Terrorist Networks:
From Undirected to Directed Graphs,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 29, no. 7
(October-November). 679-694.
228. With M. Remzi Sanver, “Critical Strategies under Approval Voting: Who Gets
Ruled In and Ruled Out.” Electoral Studies 25, no. 2 (June): 287-305.
229. “Fair Division,” in Barry R. Weingast and Donald Wittman (eds), Oxford
Handbook of Political Economy. Oxford University Press, pp. 425-437.
230. With Michael A. Jones and Christian Klamler, “Better Ways to Cut a Cake.”
Notices of the AMS [American Mathematical Society] 35, no 11 (December): 1314-
1321. “Letter to the Editor: Correction” (January 2007), p. 7; and “Editor’s Note:
More on Cake Cutting” (October 2008), p. 1072.
231. “The Normative Turn in Public Choice,” Public Choice 127, nos. 3-4 (June): 245-
250.
232. “With Michael W. Hansen and Michael E. Orrison, “Dead Heat: The 2006 Public
Choice Society Election,” Public Choice 128, nos. 5-6 (September): 361-366.
233. With D. Marc Kilgour and M. Remzi Sanver, “How to Elect a Representative
Committee Using Approval Balloting.” In Bruno Simeone and Friedrich
Pukelsheim (eds.), Mathematics and Democracy: Recent Advances in Voting
Systems and Collective Choice. Heidelberg, Gemany: Springer, pp. 83-95.
234. With Morton D. Davis, “Game Theory,” Encyclopaedia Britannica, 16th ed.
2007
235. With Richard D. Potthoff, “Scheduling of Panels by Integer Programming: Results
for the 2005 and 2006 New Orleans Meetings,” Public Choice 131, no. 3 (June):
465-468.
236. With D. Marc Kilgour and M. Remzi Sanver, “A Minimax Procedure for Electing
Committees,” Public Choice 132, nos. 3-4 (September): 401-420.
237. With D. Marc Kilgour and M. Remzi Sanver, “A Minimax Procedure for
Negotiating Multilateral Treaties,” in Rudolf Avenhaus and I. Willam Zartman
(eds.), Diplomacy Games: Formal Models and International Negotiations. Berlin:
Springer, pp. 265-282. Revision of #221.
2008
238. With D. Marc Kilgour, “The Instability of Power Sharing,” in Matthew Braham and
Frank Steffen (eds.), Power, Freedom, and Voting: Conceptual, Formal, and
Applied Dimensions. Heidelberg, Germany: Springer, pp. 227-243.
239. With Michael A. Jones and Christian Klamler, “Proportional Pie-Cutting,”
International Journal of Game Theory 36, nos. 3-4 (March): 353-367.
240. “Mathematics and Democracy: Designing Better Voting and Fair-Division
Procedures.” Mathematical and Computer Modelling 48, nos. 9-10 (November):
1666-1670.
241. “What Do You Think You’re Worth?” Plus 46 (March): 1-6.
242. “Mathematics and Democracy: Approving a President,” Plus 48 (September): 1-8.
243. “Game Theory,” International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, vol. 3, 2d ed.
Detroit, MI: Macmillan Reference, pp. 250-252.
2009
244. With M. Remzi Sanver, “Voting Systems That Combine Approval and Preference,”
in Steven J. Brams, William V. Gehrlein, and Fred S. Roberts (eds.), The
Mathematics of Preference, Choice, and Order: Essays in Honor of Peter C.
Fishburn. Berlin: Springer, pp. 215-237.
245. Chapters on “Electing the President” and “Game Theory: The Mathematics of
Competition” in For All Practical Purposes: Mathematical Literacy in Today’s
World, 8th ed. New York: W.H. Freeman, pp. 369-404 and pp. 467-506.
246. With Julius B. Barbanel and Walter Stromquist, “Cutting a Pie Is Not a Piece of
Cake,” American Mathematical Monthly 116, no. 6 (June-July): 496-514.
247. With D. Marc Kilgour, “How Democracy Resolves Conflict in Difficult Games,”
in Simon A. Levin (ed.), Games, Groups, and the Global Good. Berlin: Springer,
pp. 229-241.
248. “Fair Division,” Encyclopedia of Complexity and System Science. Berlin: Springer,
pp. 3327-3334.
2010
249. With D. Marc Kilgour, “Stabilizing Power Sharing,” in Ad Van Deemen and
Agnieszka Rusenowska (eds.), Topics in Social Choice Theory. Berlin: Springer,
pp. 169-184.
250. With Stergios Athanassoglou and Jay Sethuraman, “A Note on the Inefficiency of
Bidding over the Price of a Share.” Mathematical Social Sciences 60, no. 3 (November): 191-195.
251. “An Interview with Steven J. Brams.” College Mathematics Journal 41, no. 4,
(September 2010): 262-267.
2011
252. With Julius B. Barbanel, “Two-Person Pie-Cutting: The Fairest Cuts,” College
Mathematics Journal 42, no. 1 (January): 25-32.
253. With Michael A. Jones and Christian Klamler, “Divide-and-Conquer: A
Proportional, Minimal-Envy Cake-Cutting Algorithm.” SIAM Review 53, no. 2 (May): 291-307.
254. With Todd R. Kaplan and D. Marc Kilgour, “Three Procedures for Inducing
Honesty in Bargaining,” Proceedings of the 13th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality (July 2011): 170-176.
255. “Mathematics and Democracy: Designing Better Voting and Fair-Division
Procedures.” Dynamics of Socioeconomic Systems 2, no. 2.
256. “Fair Division,” Encyclopedia of Political Science. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
257. “Game-Theoretic Approaches to Power,” Encyclopedia of Power. Thousand Oaks,
CA: Sage, pp. 270-276.
258. “The Revelation Game,” Plus (July).
2012
259. With D. Marc Kilgour and Christian Klamler, “The Undercut Procedure: An
Algorithm for the Envy-Free Division of Indivisible Items,” Social Choice and Welfare 39, nos. 2-3 (July): 615-631.
260. With D. Marc Kilgour, “Narrowing the Field in Elections: The Next-Two Rule,”
Journal of Theoretical Politics 24, no. 4 (October): 507-525.
261. With Michal Feldman, John K. Lai, Jamie Morgenstern, and Ariel D. Procaccia,
“On Maxsum Cake Divisions,” Proceedings of the 26th AAAI Conference on
Artificial Intelligence, pp. 1285-1291.
2013
262. With Michael A. Jones and Christian Klamler. “N-Person Cake-Cutting: There May
Be No Perfect Division,“ American Mathematical Monthly 120, no. 1 (January):
35-47.
263. With D. Marc Kilgour, “Kingmakers and Leaders in Coalition Formation,” Social
Choice and Welfare 41, no. 1 (June): 1-18.
264. With Zeve N. Sanderson, “Why You Shouldn’t Use a Toss for Overtime,” +Plus
Magazine (May 10): 1-4.
2014
265. With D. Marc Kilgour and Christian Klamler, “Two-Person Fair Division of
Indivisible Items: An Efficient, Envy-Free Algorithm,” Notices of the AMS
[American Mathematical Society] 61, no. 2 (February): 130-141.
266. “Dispute over Divorce or Inheritance? Try This ‘Envy-Free’ Algorithm,”
Huffington Post (February 6).
267. With Gustavo Camilo and Alexandra D. Franz, “Coalition Formation in the U.S.
Supreme Court: 1969-2009,” Public Choice 158, no. 3 (March): 525-539.
268. With Joshua R. Mitts, “Law and Mechanism Design: Procedures to Induce Honest
Bargaining,” NYU Annual Survey of American Law 68, no. 4: 729-790.
269. With Joshua R. Mitts, “Mechanism Design in M&A Auctions,” Delaware Journal
of Corporate Law 38, no. 3: 873-905.
270. With Julius B. Barbanel, “Two-Person Cake-Cutting: The Optimal Number of
Cuts,” Mathematical Intelligencer 36, no. 3 (Fall): 23-35.
271. With D. Marc Kilgour, “Satisfaction Approval Voting,” in Rudy Fara, Dennis
Leech, and Maurice Salles (eds.), Voting Power and Procedures: Essay in Honor
of Dan Felsenthal and Moshé Machover. Cham, Switzerland: Springer, pp. 323-
346.
272. With D. Marc Kilgour, “When Does Approval Voting Make the ‘Right Choices’?”
in Michael A. Jones and Karl-Dieter Crisman (eds.), The Mathematics of
Decisions, Elections, and Games. Providence, RI: American Mathematical
Society, pp. 37-53.
273. With Todd R. Kaplan and D. Marc Kilgour, “A Simple Bargaining Mechanism
That Elicits Truthful Reservation Prices,” Group Decision and Negotiation 24, no.
3 (May): 401-413.
274. “Dividing the Indivisible,” +Plus Magazine (June 11).
2015
275. With D. Marc Kilgour, “Satisfaction Approval Voting,” in Roderick Melnik (ed.),
Mathematical and Computation Modeling. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, pp. 275-298.
276. With Richard F. Potthoff, “The Paradox of Grading Systems,” Public Choice 165,
nos. 3-4 (December): 191-210.
277. With Aaron Isaksen, Mehmet Ismail, and Andy Nealen, “Catch-Up: A Game in
Which the Lead Alternates,” Game and Puzzle Design 1, no. 2: 38-49.
278. With D. Marc Kilgour and Christian Klamler, “A How to Divide Things Fairly,”
Mathematics Magazine 88, no. 5 (December): 338-348.
2016
279. “The Creation and Its Aftermath,” in Beth Kissileff (ed.), Reading Genesis:
Beginnings. New York: Bloomsbury, pp. 7-23.
280. “Lessons from Brexit: Offer More Voting Options,” Nature 535 (28 July), p. 489.
281. “Game Theory,” Serious Science (in English and Russian, December 27).
282. “Donald Trump, Game Theorist,” Plus Magazine (May).
283. “Here’s How Game Theory Helps Explain Donald Trump’s Strategies,”
Washington Post (June 17).
2017
284. With D. Marc Kilgour, “Paths to Victory in Presidential Elections: The Setup
Power of the Noncompetitive States,” Public Choice 170, nos. 1-2 (January): 99-
113.
285. With D. Marc Kilgour and Christian Klamler, “Maximin Envy-Free Division of
Indivisible Items,” Group Decision and Negotiation 46, no. 1 (January): 115-131.
286. “Is President Trump Irrational—or Just Playing a Different Game Than Everyone
Else? Washington Post (March 1).
287. “If Trump Doesn’t Want a Nuclear War with North Korea, a ‘No First Use’ Pledge
Might Work Better Than Threats,” Washington Post (October 16).
2018 and forthcoming
288. With Mehmet Ismail, “Making the Rules of Sports Fairer,” SIAM Review 60, no. 1
(March 2018): 181-202.
289. With Christian Klamler, “Fair Division,” in R A. Meyers (ed.), Encyclopedia of
Complexity and Systems Sciences, rev. ed. New York: Springer.
290. “Rational Choice and Fairness: Theory,” in Roger D. Congleton, Bernard N.
Grofman, and Stefan Voigt (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Public Choice. Oxford
University Press, vol. 1.
291. “Rational Choice and Fairness: Application to Legislatures,” in Roger D.
Congleton, Bernard N. Grofman, and Stefan Voigt (eds.), Oxford Handbook of
Public Choice. Oxford University Press, vol. 1.
292. With Mehmet Ismail, D. Marc Kilgour, and Walter Stromquist, “Catch-Up: A Rule
That Makes Service Sports More Competitive,” American Mathematical Monthly.
293. With Peter S. Landweber, “3 Persons, 2 Cuts: A Maximin Envy-Free and a
Maximally Equitable Cake-Cutting Algorithm.”
294. With Mehmet S. Ismail, “Stabilizing Non-Nash Cooperative Outcomes in 2 2
Games.”
295. With D. Marc Kilgour, “Stabilizing Unstable Outcomes in Prediction Games.”
296. With D. Marc Kilgour and Richard F. Potthoff, “Multiwinner Approval Voting: An
Apportionment Approach.”
297. With Markus Brill, “The Excess Method: Multiwinner Approval Voting That
Minimizes Wasted Votes.”
292. With D. Marc Kilgour and Christian Klamler, “An Algorithm for the Proportional
Division of Indivisible Items.”
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